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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court No. 
PlaintifflRespondent, 
40135 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, 10 83703 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
****** ***** 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
Attorney for PlaintifflRespondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defe nda ntl Appellant. 
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Supreme Court No. 
40135 
-------------------------) 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
I DAHO STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
Attorney for DefendantiAppeliant 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine Cou 
ROA Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
6/20/2011 
6/22/2011 
6/28/2011 
6/30/2011 
7/1/2011 
7/5/2011 
7/6/2011 
8/9/2011 
8/10/2011 
9/12/2011 
New Case Filed - Felony 
Prosecutor assigned Jim Thomas 
Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
Notice of suspension/fail evidentiary test 
Felony 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 06/20/2011 01 :30 PM) 
Judge 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
Amended Criminal Complaint R. Ted Israel 
Hearing result for Arraignment held on 06/20/2011 01 :30 PM: Arraignment R. Ted Israel 
/ First Appearance 
Application For Appointment Of Attorney - GRANTED 
Document sealed 
Court Minutes 
Order Setting Preliminary Hearing and Bond 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/05/2011 10:00 AM) 
Defendant: Juarez, Juan L Order Appointing Public Defender Public 
defunderDan~IM.Do~n 
Conditions of Release 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Notice Of Appearance 
Defendants Request For Discovery 
Notice Of Appearance plea of not guilty jury request 
States Response To Request For Discovery 
State's Request For Discovery/demand For Alibi 
Waiver Of Time for Preliminary Hearing 
Stipulation for continuance of preliminary hearing 
Stipulated bail reduction 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 2500.00 ) 
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 07/05/2011 10:00 AM 
Continued 
Order continuing preliminary hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 08/10/2011 09:00 AM) 
State's First Supplemental Response To Discovery 
Continued (Preliminary 09/14/2011 09:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion to Revoke Bond 
Order to Revoke bond 
Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount .00 Violation of Conditions of 
Release Defendant Juarez. Juan L 
STA,TUS CHANGED Inactive 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
Jason Walker 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
Jason Walker 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
User ANDREA 
-1 
Date 9/6/2012 
Time: 02:37 PM 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine Coun 
ROA Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon 
User ANDREA 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
9/14/2011 
9/20/2011 
9/22/2011 
9/26/2011 
9/28/2011 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 9/14/2011 
Time 9:15 am 
Felony 
Courtroom Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter 
Minutes Clerk KATE 
Tape Number MC 
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor Matthew Fredback 
Judge 
R. Ted Israel 
Warrant Quashed Violation of Conditions of Release Defendant Juarez, R. Ted Israel 
Juan L 
STATUS CHANGED: Pending 
Warrant Recall Notice Sent 
Order Binding Over 
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 09/14/2011 09:00 AM: 
Bound Over (after Prelim) 
Information 
Notice of District Court Arraignment 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/26/2011 10:00 AM) 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Arraignment 
Hearing date 9/2612011 
Time: 10:05 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number DC 
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor Jim Thomas 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 09/26/2011 10:00 AM 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100 
p, Plea is entered for charge - NG (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the 
Influence-(Two or More Offenses)) 
A Plea is entered for charge - NG (118-8001 (3) {M} Driving Without 
Privileges) 
District Court Arraignment 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/19/2011 09:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/10/201209:00 AM) 3 day 
Notice of Trial Setting. Pretrial Conference and Order Governing Further 
Proceedings 
Amended Information 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
R. Ted Israel 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J, Eigee 
Robert J, Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J Elgee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
-2 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine C 
RO/l, Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant: Juarez, Juan Leon 
User ANDREA 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
12/19/2011 
12/20/2011 
12/29/2011 
111012012 
1/12/2012 
1/17/2012 
1/19/2012 
1/30/2012 
2/13/2012 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 12/19/2011 
Time 8:59 am 
Felony 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Judge 
Robert J. Elgee 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Robert J. Elgee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terri Smith Receipt number 0009181 Dated: 
12/19/2011 Amount: $6.00 (Cash) 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 12/19/2011 09:00 AM Robert J. Elgee 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100 
Continued (Court Trial 01/10/201201 :30 PM) 3 day Robert J. Elgee 
States motion in limine Robert J. Elgee 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 1/10/2012 
Time: 1 :28 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicia! Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: MC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Hearing result for Court Triall Motion in Limine scheduled on 01/10/2012 Robert J. Elgee 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 3 day less 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/09/2012 09:00 AM) 112 day 
Notice Of Hearing 
State's Second Supplemental Response To Discovery 
State's Motion to Dismiss Count Two 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Count Two 
Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor with hearing (118-8001 (3) {M} 
Driving Without Privileges) 
Defendants Memorandum 
States Memorandum in support of motion in limine 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J Elgee 
-3 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine C 
RO,A, Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant: Juarez. Juan Leon 
User ANDREA 
State of Idaho VS. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
3/9/2012 
3/12/2012 
5/21/2012 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 3/912012 
Time 8:58 am 
Felony 
Courtroom District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number. DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Found Guilty After Court Trial 
Judge 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 03/09/2012 09:00 AM: District Robert J. Elgee 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 1/2 day more than 
100 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 03/09/2012 09:00 AM: 
Trial Started 1/2 day 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/21/201210:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order for Presentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse 
Assessment 
p, Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the 
Influence-(Two or More Offenses)) 
Court Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Miscellaneous Payment For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Robert J. Elgee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: terry smith Receipt number: 0002085 Dated: 
3/12/2012 Amount $7.00 (Cash) 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing type Sentencing 
Hearing date: 5/21/2012 
Time 10:54 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk ANDREA 
Tape Number DC 
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor Matthew Fredback 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/21/2012 1030 AM District Robert J Elgee 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100 pages 
Hearing resultror Sentencing scheduled on 05/21/201210:30 AM 
Sentencing 
Robert J. Elgee 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the Influence-(Two Robert J. Elgee 
or More Offenses)) Confmement terms Jail 60 days. Credited time 14 
days. Penitentiary determinate 3 years Penitentiary indeterminate 2 
years 
Court Accepts Guilty Plea 1118-8004 {F} Driving Under the I nfluence-(Two Robert J. Elgee 
or More Offenses)) 
-4 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine Cou 
ROA Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon 
User ANDREA 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
5/21/2012 
5/22/2012 
5/30/2012 
7/212012 
7/10/2012 
7/26/2012 
7/27/2012 
7/31/2012 
8/312012 
Felony 
Judge 
Probation Ordered (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the Influence-(Two or More Robert J. Elgee 
Offenses)) Probation term: 3 years. (Supervised) 
Judgment Of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony County, 
Suspending Sentence & Order Of Supervised Probation 
Order on Restitution 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 2,500.00) 
State's Motion to Dismiss Count Three 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss count Three 
Addendum to Probation Condition Re: Ignition Interlock Device 
Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor with hearing (123-505 Alcoholic 
Beverage-Unlawful Transport or Open Container Violation) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Ex Parte Motion to : Appoint counsel on appeal; waive fees and costs of 
appeal; prepare the transcript and clerk's record at public expense 
Motion to proceed in forma pauperis & supporting affidavit 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Order: appointing attorney; waiving all fees; for preparation of transcript and Robert J. Eigee 
clerk's record at public expense 
Petition to Revoke Probation 
Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 5000.00 Probation Violation 
Defendant: Juarez, Juan L 
Warrant Returned Probation Violation Defendant: Juarez, Juan L 
STATUS CHANGED: Pending 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 5000.00 ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/20/201209:00 AM) 
Amended Petition to Revoke Probation 
Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 100000.00 Probation Violation 
Defendant: Juarez, Juan L 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/03/2012 0130 PM) on PV 
STATUS CHANGED Reopened 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type. Arraignment on PV 
Hearing date 8/3/2012 
Time 147 pm 
Minutes Clerk Heidi Schiers 
Tape Number MAG 
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor Tim Graves 
Warrant Returned Probation Violation Defendant Juarez. Juan Leon 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Hearing result for Arraignment on PV scheduled on 08/03/2012 01.30 PM Robert J Eigee 
Hearing Held 
-5 
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Judicial District Court - Blaine Coun 
ROA Report 
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Eigee 
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon 
User ANDREA 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez 
Date 
8/3/2012 
8/6/2012 
8/7/2012 
8/8/2012 
8/13/2012 
8/21/2012 
Felony 
Judge 
Hearing result for Arraignment on PV scheduled on 08/03/2012 01:30 PM Robert J. Eigee 
Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Admit/Deny Hearing 08/06/2012 11 :00 AM) 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type Admit/Deny Hearing 
Hearing date: 8/6/2012 
Time: 4:02 pm 
Courtroom Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: SUES 
Tape Number DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 08/20/2012 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Admit/Deny Hearing scheduled on 08/06/2012 11 :00 
AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:less 100 
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (120-222 Probation Violation) 
Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 08/20/2012 03:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order reducing bond 
Letter from Bondsman stateting bond is still in effect 
Notice Of Appearance 
Defendants Request For Discovery 
State's Request For Discovery/demand FOI Alibi 
States Response To Request For Discovery 
State's Motion to Continue 
Continued (Evidentiary 10/01/201209:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order Granting Continuance 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
State's Third Supplemental Response To Discovery 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J. Eigee 
Robert J Eigee 
-6 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
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i JlAN' to 2011 
! Jolyrm Drs.[lO, C rk /!)istrict ,-~s..o.lJ.!!BIEJll1e County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-11- ~"7 ~ '---< 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW, Matthew Fredback, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who hereby 
submits the following criminal complaint based upon the sworn affidavit of Joshua 
Pritchard, a duly appointed peace officer, and charges the defendant with the following 
criminal offense: 
COUNT ONE 
Part One 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open 
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010, at or 
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 1 
-7 
.. 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired 
her ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of 
.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
COUNT ONE 
Part Two 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth 
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty 
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th 
of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a 
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada; 
2. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17'h 
of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle 
Code § 23152, in the State of California; 
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that the defendant be brought before the 
Court and dealt with according to law. 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 2 
Matthew Fredb c , ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
-8 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ""20 day of June, 2011. 
Magistrate 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 3 
-9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 U day of June, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the withih and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 4 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
Deputy eyer( 
- 10-
OR1GI ['11" \ 1\ f-\ L 
Jim J. Thomas. ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
!) 
I FILED~~~ 
i JUN 2 0 2011 I S I 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District ! 
Court Blaine County, Idaho I 
-------'-'--., ----' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11- ;23 b ~ 
Plaintiff, AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Matthew Fredback, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who hereby 
submits the following criminal complaint based upon the sworn affidavit of Joshua 
Pritchard, a duly appointed peace officer, and charges the defendant with the following 
criminal offense: 
COUNT ONE 
Part One 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open 
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 03010, at or 
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the 
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influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired 
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of 
.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
COUNT ONE 
Part Two 
That the Defendant, JUAN L JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth 
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty 
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th 
of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a 
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada; 
2. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 1 ih 
of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle 
Code § 23152, in the State of California; 
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY. 
COUNT TWO 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 0301 0, at 
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's 
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR. 
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COUNT THREE 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully possess an open 
container of alcohol in a motor vehicle located on or at or near milepost 104 on State 
Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 23-505(2), 
POSSESSION OF AN OPEN CONTAINER OF ALCOHOL IN A MOTOR VEHICLE, a 
MISDEMEANOR. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that the defendant be brought before the 
Court and dealt with according to law. 
v Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this [0 day of June, 2011. 
Magistrate 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;;2.011- day of June, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
Deputy Clerk 
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OR\G\\'~AL 
Department Report:# BCSOI106-OO32 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 5TH JUDICIAL DIS . 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..l\ffi FOR THE COUNTY 0 {( 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, JUN 1..0 2011 
Plaintiff, Jolynn Drage, District 
COURT CASE NUMBER Court Blaine County, Idaho 
v. 
Juan L. Juarez 
Defendant,. 
DOB:  
SSN:  
DL#:  
State: CA 
State of Idaho, 
County of Blaine 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT, IN" SUPPORT 
OF ARREST AND/OR REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST 
ss 
I, Joshua Pritchard, the undersigned, being fIrSt duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed by The Blaine County Sheriff s Office 
2. The defendant was arrested on 6/18/2011 at 10: 11 0 AM L8J PM for the crime of driving while under 1i 
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance pursuant to section.18-8004 Idaho Code. 
Seoond or more DUJ offense in the last five years? 0 YES r8J NO 0 FELONY 0 MlSDEM:EANOJ 
3. Location of Occurrence: Highway 75 , Milepost 104, Blaine County, Idaho. 
4. Identified the defendant as: Juan L Juarez By: (Check Box) 
o Military ID 0 State ID Card r8J Drivers License 0 Credit Cards 
OPaperwork found 0 Verbal ID by defendant 
o Witness: identified defendant. 
[81 Other: International Drivers License 
5. Actual physical control established by: (2J Observation by affiant 0 Observation by Officer 
o Admission of Defendant to , 0 Statement of Witness; 
o Other 
6. I believe 1hat there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed such crime because oftbe 
following facts: 
-15 . 
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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: 
On June 18, 2011 at approximately 20:00 hours while on patrol on State Highway 7S near milepost 103 I 
observed is a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010 traveling northbound. I observed tID; 
vehicle cross the center line once and the fog line three times in approx:i.mately a 60 second period. I activated 
my over head emergency lights and initiated.a traffic stop on the vehicle at State Highway 75 and milepost lo. 
for failure to maintain lane pursuant to Idaho Code 49-637. 
I approached the vehicle and spoke with the driver who was identified by his international driver's license as 
Juan L. Juarez (DOB  When speaking with Juarez I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from his breath. Juarez's eyes also appeared to be bloodshot and glassy. I asked Juarez how 
much he had to drink tonight Juarez stated "oh ... 1 am kind of drunk." I again asked Juarez how much he had 
to drink. Juarez stated "quite a few." I then asked Juarez what he had been drinking and he stated "Budweiser: 
I asked Juarez where he had been drinking at. He stated in Shoshone. 
I checked Juarez~s driver status through dispatch and found he was revoked out of Nevada and suspended or 
revoked out of California. I returned to Juarez's vehicle and asked him to step out and come to the rear of his 
vehicle for me. Juarez stepped out of his car and stumbled almost falling over backwards on two occasions. I 
advised Juarez I was going to administer him the three standardized field sobriety test to determine if he was 
ok to be operating a motor vehicle. Juarez then stated "I am drunk dude." I asked Juarez ifhe could take one 
step forward toward me. Juarez stated "I can't." I asked Juarez if he was going to do the tests. Juarez stated 
"no." I again asked Juarez ifhe was going to perform the tests for me. Juarez stated "no,," I instructed Juarez to 
tum around and place his hands behind his back because he was being pia.ced under arrest for DUL Juarez was 
placed in handcuffs. searched and placed in my patrol vehicle. 
I transported Juarez to St Luke's Hospital where I read the ALS form to him. After reading the ALS form an 
employee from StLuke's entered the room and drew two vials of blood from Juarez using the Idaho State 
Blood Kit that I provided. A .. fter completion of the blood draw Juarez was placed back in my patrol vehicle and 
transported to the Blaine County JaiL 
Once at the Jail I checked Juarez's criminal history and found a nUl conviction out oftbe state of Nevada on 
7-11-2007. I also fOlmd a Dill conviction out of the state ofCalifomia on 9-17-2007. 
D.U.INotes 
Odor of alcoholic beverage 
Admitted drinking alcohol beverage 
Slurred speech 
Impaired memory 
Glassylbloodshot eyes 
Other 
Drugs Suspected 0 Yes [Zl No 
Reason Drugs are Suspected 
~Yes DNo 
tgJ Yes 0 No 
DYes {8JNo 
(glYes ONo 
[g) Yes 0 No 
sobriety Tests - Meets Decision Points? 
Gaze Nystagmus 0 Yes 0 No 
Wa1k& Tum 0 Yes ONo 
One Leg Stand 0 Yes 0 No 
Crash Involved 
Jnjury 
Dyes 
DYes 
(8jNo 
{gINo 
Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed 0 Yes [gj No 
Prior to being offered the test. the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and 
failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
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rgj Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration. drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s) 
waslwere performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the standards and 
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement. 
BAC: by: 0 Breath Instrument Type: 0 Intoxilyzer 5000 0 Alco Sensor Serial # 
[gJ Blood ANDIOR 0 Urine Test Results Pending? [gJ Yes 0 No (Attached) 
Name of person administering breath test: Date Certification Expires: 
o Defendant refused the test as follows: 
By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby 
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may 
be included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
Signed: /~/-dj? ? ~ 
//i?" (affiant) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on ,1\AME?..- 11 f 10 II ~ (Date) 4. 
II 
_________________ {or) 'Y,/ 
PERSON AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER 
OATHS. 
Title: _______________ _ 
NOTA:R 
Residing at: -...:::~::::..::--«_fi----
My Commission expires: 
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5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STA IE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLA1NE 
FELONY ARRAIGNMENT MINUTE ENTRY 
STATE v. Juan L Juarez 
D.L.#:  DOB:  
Case No. : CR-2011-0002386 
Date: 6/20/2011 
Address:  Hailey, ID 83333 Judge: R. Ted Israel 
CD No. HAC. Counter: +. 3£ / I: JS': rr Interpreter: __ ....j.m....:..u:;;~..s:::...:· -=~~.=~=~~ ____ _ 
Prosecutor: Matt Fredback ./ Clerk: Heidi 
---
DEFENDANT having been charged with the following: 
COUNT 1: Drivin Under the Influence- Two or More Offenses 
AMENDED: .. J! :irs· »,-~. ~ )f PINf !f11 'I' - tf~;;'()1'j;L,~/1t4.p1>L~~~  - (, ~1:3.i<l'ltrO" ~ 
Defendant: (.-1 Appeared ( ) Failed to.Appear :. ) Bench Warrant Issued ~ Bond Forffiiture Ordered 
~.:J tf.~ 
( ) Advised of all rights and penalties per1( 5, including right to remain silent, that statements 
may be used against hirnlher, right to bail, right to counsel, appointment of Public Defender 
as provided by law, Preliminary Hearing. (0' viewed slideshow 
( ) Represented by Counsel (present) ___________________ _ 
(,;) Advised of Charges () Waived Counsel (v") Requested PD () Private Attorney 
( ) Waived Reading Complaint 
( .;) Bond $ '1 S"DO. tyf) 
I 
( ) Ordered Released 
( /) Complaint Read by Court () Requested Continuance 
~~I-IL-
( ) Remanded to Custody of Sheriff 
( ) Own Recognizance ( ) To Pre-Trial Senrices 
( ) Other ________________ _ 
Public Defender appointed: ___ ---cj.-:p-""a,-.LL--"JJ~~W.!::~L..:_ _____________ _ 
Preliminary Hearing set: J~ 0 s, .;J () tIe I (): ()t) tLItv 
I: .L{t {'ttWr. f p.fil11'4 A /Ii. ~~U4 . A ",,-r:;f: of 19p !~ tt;<. 'btl 9" AU.f. 
~o 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICLAL DISTFJCT 
C) 
:z~ ~ 
OF THE STATE OF IDlLBO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE <1:0.: = 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
0 C"J Z W ::::> 
.-J 
....., 
CASE NO. CR- LG \ STATE OF IDA..HO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------~-----1~~---
VS. 
rJ\..- f:..,..? L. j \.,..~t. '- , ) 
) 
) 
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
Defendant. 
Defendant having appeared before the Court and the Court having: 
-,~ t:::Iu IN set Bail in the amount of $~L~~=--~-~_' ____ _ 
[ ] released the Defendant on his/her own recognizance. 
AND 
LA determined that conditions of release are necessary. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
[x] The Defendant shall appear at all further proceedings in this matter. 
[x] The Defendant shall at all times keep the Clerk of the Court advised of his/her current 
mailing address. It is the Defendant's responsibility to obtain and correctly respond to any 
notice or other document mailed to hislher last known address. 
[x] If represented by counsel, the Defendant shall maintain contact with the attorney as the 
attorney requires. 
[x] The Defendant shall not be cited, arrested, charged or convicted of any offense that shall 
constitute a misdemeanor or felony under the laws of the State of Idaho OJ any other municipal, 
state or federal jurisdiction. 
ix1 The Defendant shall not consume or possess any alcoh01 <H= controlled ~1I'bi'taMeeC withOllt 
b. presctiption Issueo by a physician. The Defendant shall submit to evidentiary testing at his 
own expense for alcohol OJ "ow;r:oHee sooatans8£ when requested by a police officer, probation 
offIcer, cQunselor or the Court. Said testing shall be provided and/or monitored by the Blaine 
County Misdemeanor Probation Office or any agency contacted by the Blaine County 
Misdemeanor Probation office to supervise such testing. The Defendant shall campi)' Wltl, all 
requirements of the Probation Office. Said testing shall occ,ur: 
Lfj. Randomly. 
! J Daily (The probation department may require more than one test peT day.) 
[ ] Other: ______________________________________________________ __ 
--------------------~~---
~~ 
'- "0 D-
~:;l i:35 
-(,) 
~!1!1 !='J.~f 
CS-'" 
_1Il 
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r'>4' The Defendam shal; not enter am' estabIishmenl where alcohol is sold by the drink to be ;b~~sumed on the premises. - . 
((J The Defendan~. shall not be in actual physicaJ control of a motor vehiclt mQr "oosuruing 
l\.l.rQhQ!-at.{'ontn~n~HJ 5ubatllftQfS 99' prAsrribwc '3: e pl"si"";,l1' 
l J The Defendant shall not leave: [] the State of Idaho J Blaine County [J Other: 
________________________ withou: the prior written 
permission ofthe Court. 
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global po:;itioning tracking. The 
Defendant shall pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that 
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape. 
r ] Monitoring shall be provided by: 
l ] Tbe Defendant shall abide by all provisions of an)' existing no contact order. 
fJ Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendan: shall immediately 
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department. 
J Other provisions: ___________________________ _ 
Judge 
FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN 
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF ANY) AND A WARRA.NT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST. 
1 acknowledge that 1 have read and received a copy of this Order. 
0-2-0 -1/ -- . DATE~()(f"'Cjk@7;7,-~~,--
Dei dant 
l t: j Prosecutm l x] Defendant 
[-1 :);:fense .Attorney l>:] Blaine Coun:;.' Sbe:-Iff 
[.-{Blaine Count)' \1isdemeanor Probation Depa;tmel1~ 
1 .1 ()the:-: 
- 2 0-
r4 T.he ~efen~ant shall not enter any establishment where alcohol is sold by the drink to be 
~~~sumeG on the premIses. 
[YJ The Defendant shall not be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle m8r cgpSllming 
*OhgI-m; cQntn~n8E1 6HBsta'8e:£;fi not ?r""sc~i-gid 1>: e ph~ &i~.jatl 
[ ] The Defendant shall not leave: [J the State ofIdaho ] Blaine County [] Other: 
________________________ without the prior written 
permission of the Court. 
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global positioning tracking. The 
Defendant shan pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that 
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape. 
[ ] Monitoring shall be provided by: ________________ _ 
[ ] The Defendant shall abide by all provisions of any existing no contact order. 
p<J Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendant shall immediately 
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department. 
[ ] Other provisions: _________________________ _ 
DATED LI:::J ') \..'ve:... L~ \ \ 
Judge 
FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF TillS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN 
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF Al"Iry) AND A WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST. 
I acknowledge that 1 have read and received a copy of this Order. 
DATED ____________________ __ 
Defendant 
cr'· [x J Prosecutor [x] Defendant 
[1Defense Attorney [x] Blaine County Sheriff 
[.{Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department 
[ ] Other: ______________ _ 
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lLED_~~_ 
JUN 20 2011 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
El;) EL TRfBIJNAL DE DrSTRJTO DEI.. QUiNTO DlSTRlTO JUD1CIAL DEL EST.~DO DE 
IDAHO. Eh' 'y' PAE.A EL CON DADO DE BLAINE. 
SrJlkitucl ele Ahogadrl ncf!;!nsor Publico 
lisc:;d dehe c2Impletar esta soliciwd [O[almeme t"\arql.,e wdas las c<lsilla:=: que correspopdan Si 
:ill resnuesta a Ul1(\ pre!:!unta es "nil1g-unc l< e:;cribil "ninlrLlTIQ" en el espaciQ en blanco. Si la 
pregullta 110 es z-plicahle a su sinmciol:, escriott "N:A" (no e::: ariicabJe", en el e;;pnciQ en blanco. ~ ~ L . r.-- ~v'" Nomb~e. y APellido:t ~ (§~..) Fecha de nacimiento: 1- } I - ?C? ~ ~ t)-DlrecclOn Postal:.s =a Numero e Seguro Soclal:hl{2,-IZ .. -6Z69 
Ae+: a "Z. 12 2." Telefon ' 0-
[ J Soltero~a) ~lsa~~i)~1 D~~~&n) eltgo 0- hijos(a5) meno;'es de J g anu.s 
Estoy obhgado a pagar fnan'.ltencion infu:Jtii (pensi6n de alimentos) en in suma de $~ por ( 
meso ActLlnlmcl1te debo $~ pOl' pagos atrasados. ~ to\ 
f'ombre de empleador: Trt..b<lJo I\.I JIL boras por sernana. ~ tJl \ 
ingreso total mensu.a!: .$ antidad q,~e !leva a la c~es $ 7CjC) " J 
Dur!ici6n de Empleo: [ ] En Ia actualidad no estoy emp\eado. J' 
Tengo LIlla cuen~a [ J corriente r J de ahorros u ( J otra cuenta en el banco: :=-__ _ 
EI valot· total de todns [as cantidades depositadas el1 ese banco es: $_/:.;:,,'-"'bJ."'-'o ... "'---'------
Tengo los SigUiel1tes}nf:esos adicionales mensuales: S~gundo trabajo:$ tJ:= A--
Desempleo: $ V /... B! ?vlanutencion infantil:$ V  
Otros ayudas gubernamentales: $ e> Trabujo de media jomada:$~ 
lngreso de fonda fiduciario:·$ c? Dividendos: $·-~O~------
lngreso de esposo(a): 3; a Otro $_..::=0:::..--______ _ 
Mi ingreso total el uno pasado fue:$:r: taM.. tJo\- =:; Vye,.... 
Soy Dueno de los sigLlientes bien::s inmuebles: 
LUQ:ar tv /&= Valor Cantidad Debida 
Los siguientes bicn~s personales me perteoecen r su valor es: 
Cua!quier tlpo de vehiculo motorizado$ C? Armas de Fuego: $ ~ 
Cualquier remolque 0 casa rnovil 0 rodante: $ .0 Muebles, enseres domesticos $ D 
Cualquier tipo de herramientas 0 equipo: $ 6 
Cualquier otro bien personal Incluyendo, pero no siendo limitado a, equipos electr6nicos, 
computadoras, equipo deportivo, instrumentos musicales, colecciones de sellas:,) estampillas, 
monedas 0 tarjetas de colecci6n U otros objetos de valor', $ V 
Tenga inten:s directo como socic. coma parte de una empresa c· como beneficlario de un 
fideicomiso en los siguientes articuJos: 
ArticulQ ) 
t. -/?r 
A-
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t ] Puedo r ] N .. , puedo pedir ptestac!o el di:1ero para pa;:1.r un abog<Lcio 
':engo los sigllicnl\:!5 gasros mcnsuales 
Gusto 
Renta de .arrend[lfliiento / [)ng<J menStiat de IJ ll.poreca de la C<1!;,: 
Corn ida 
Scrvic(os (Agua, Elect:icidad. Gao, etc) 
Dellda de Tarjetas de Credito 
P'Ig.C de IprestalTIo de 1 a~{t'J 
Gastos M6d icos 
SegufOs (casa, auto, mrendnt.;\rio) 
Orros: (sea espedfico.Por FaVOIf.' -
(') $ ,~ 
C' $ -"g~-"----
--~---.-
r:-x' --..-.\::::~ ... ~.-.---
sa 
$0 
De:-;o a las sigL!i~nrcs personas 0 elltijades una cantidad en e.xceso de $150: 
Persona 0 etH10fd rc!i)tidud deb ida Raz.6n de \a deudu. 
__ t;L ·-+A ...... ··---------
POi' la presente autarizo a cuaJqtli~r persona::; emidil(! <1 revl!.lar infomw.ci6c fil1:ln::ieru a! Tribut.a; 
de Distrito deJ Q"into Distrito ]udi~iat, Conctad0 de Blaine, bwdo de [darlO, siempre que ia 
informacion esre re!acionada con mi siwac!-.'1!\ finuncien! como hI': :.ida descrita en est" soii::.imd, 
codo 10 anterior con el prop6sito de evaluar mi eJegibilidad per:nanente parn el nombrmn!enta de 
u;-; Abogado Defensor Publico. 
Por 10. pre:sente. ademas. declar~ j certiftco bajojl:ra:neilto qCJe tod.1s las deci.araciones anteriores 
son ciertas se~l: mi leal saber. Entiendo que $1 estas dtclaraciones no soc ciertas p~ledo se;-
procesado por PeijL.lrio. l.c.§ ] 8-540;, y ca:itigado con una c:Jndena de no mencs que [(no DJ mas 
qtle catorce aries en 1::J penite:1ciada estataL 
FEerr.A: (; - :kO-1 ( ACVSADO:JV('{r\ k 0 a f\..::; . 
~***** •• *.~.***~*.*.~~*** •• ***.~*~~ ••••• *.*.*.*.~.* •• _~.~W**~.*$~ •• ** •• * 
ORDER 
Based on the bove oppOication and good C;luse appearing tberefor:::; 
iT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
l. The application for Public Defender is: ~RA1'olED [ ] DE~lED because-
! The DefenCa:1t shaU ir:.irialiy reimburse Blaine County iT: the SU'Ti of:5 for t.''.1:: 
services of :he Public Defender. Paymem Clrrangernems sr.;o.tl be made WIth the Clerk of 
the Court. Fallure ::0 ab:ce by those .!l!';a::gemenu rr.al' be grounds for Con.temp' of Court 
and .an additional Jali ser.te<\..:e of" up tQ fi'v e da)'f1''1d<'~e of up r .,. ,GOO 
1 ~ f""),-'vC L u\ \ j. ;OGE y "- ~''''''''''''''-DATEO: ____________________ ~l __ -
p.2 
ORDER SETTlNC PRELIMINARY HEARING AND BOND 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 111:11\(;1 i., SET FOR PREUM!~AWY IIEARI:'-lC ill till' 1~I:tiIlC ( ()tllll~ 
()tlrlh()l!~c, i j;liie;, Idaho. a" (nli(1\\ S 
DATE OF PRELIMINAR" HEARI~G: _ _ ,. ___ "-q !::::t._ ~:r-2b JL _. ~ ___ . AT .-J.l!.:"'qp-~_. 
ASSI(;i"rW.JI'l)(;r I I Israel [1 Ingram I 0 Other ___ ...wAJ..KE;~.~ ____ . __ ._._ 
- ().::) IT IS F! 'RTIHJ{ ORDERED that BONO IS SET ill lill' amount of: I I ()I{ t><r $ .7~_\:)~~ 
IT IS Fl'RTHEH OJ{DEIU:D that 
2. I l)\.ip ('nlliact (lrlier issued. 
I The Defendant MLJST APPEAR at the lime sct. ] Ii Conditions of' Release required. 
1\1 CLivi',!) !\1" .J1~ ~~~ _/ ___ . _. __ . V- f)lll§ft~----: 
I v(1"O\LClltll1~ 1\11<11111.') 1--1 Defense Allomcy r I nl~lill\: County Sh<.:rill 
1'1-. 0 lYIaS D# I fM'\; 
\FILEiTI~~ 
\ JUN 2 0 2~Y-\ 
, 
J 
,--------- - 2 2 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Juan L Juarez 
  
Hailey, 10 83333 
Fifth Judicial District Court, State 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 
Hailey, idaho 83333 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
\ FILED ~.~. =1 ~ 
I JUN 2 2 2011. I I I . 
(J 
, Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District \1 
Court Blaine County, Idaho . 
) Case No: CR-2011-0002386 
) 
Defendant. ) ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
) 
008:  ) 
DL or SSN:  CA ) 
) 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Juan L Juarez, and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Daniel M. Dolan 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum ID 83340 
Public Defender for the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Juan L Juarez, in all proceedings in the above-entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appOinted counsel. 
Date: __ --:.-(, _-_.)_t) _-"",,;1..:;;.,0 1 ..... ---
Copies to: 
~Public Defender 
~Prosecutor 
~Defendant - received info at PSF 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Ju ge 
"DeputyCierk 
DOC30 10/88 
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DANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
Attorney for Defendant 
DANIEL DOLAN 
PAGE 01/04 
n 
FILED ~~. --f-.1 V 
JUN 2 8 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Cour1 Blaine County,. Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCf OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Juan L. Juarez, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
- -) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Daniel M. Dolan, Attorney at Law, DOES NOW, 
appear as counsel of record for the above named defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
DATED: June 28, 2011 
Daniel M. Dolan 
Attorney for Defendant 
Page 1 
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DA..1\UEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
187 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726·3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
DANIEL DOLAN PAGE El4I El6 
F\LED~:-.-..-' 
JUL 0 1 2011 
1 
Clerk District JoLynn Drage, Idaho 
Court Blaine Coun , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTli JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO. ) 
) 
Plaintiff. ) Case No. CR 2011 002386 
VS. ) 
) STIPULA nON 
Juan. L. Juam;z ) FOR CONTINUANCE OF 
) PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Defendant ) 
) 
CO:MES NOW the State ofIdaho by and through the Blaine County Prosecutor's 
Office and Daniel M. Dolan, Attorney at Law and counsel of record for the abovc"named 
defendant, and hereby stipulate that the preliminary hearing set in the above-entitled aw"1ion for _ 
JulyS. 2011 may be continued to August 10, 2011, because the blood test 
~~lI.j)~ the report. 
Matthew Fredback 
~ 
Daniel M Dolan 
Attorney For Defendant 
STIPULA TION 
I I 
DATED 
DATED 
Page 1 
- 2 5· 
Jun 30 2011 3:52PM ~INE COUNTY DETENTION 
eQ/36/2Bll 15:46 1268726~7 DANIEL DOLAN 
p. 1 
r:>AGE 82/134 
DANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208·726·3005 
Facsimile: 208-726·11 &7 
Attorney for Defendant 
Idaho State Bar # 4147 
JUL C 1 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun ,Idaho 
IN THE DISTR..ICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCf OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGISTRATE DMSION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
Juan Juarez, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
Waiver of Time 
for Preliminary Hearing 
The defendant by his signature below acknowledges 1hat he/she has a right to bave a 
preliminary h=aring within 14 days if in custody and 21 days if out of cUS'tOdy of the defendant's 
initial appearance as is provided by Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 
Further, the defendant acknowledges by hislhcr signature below that he/she waives 1he 
rigilt to have the preliminary hearing on the date cwn::ntly set and said hearing should be 
continued to a date certain. 
Dated this ~ day of .. )() f\;€""-2011 
~~, J Juarez 
Defendant 
Waiver of Time Pagel 
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() 
FILED ~.~: m:;23Y 
JUL D 5 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff~ ) Case No. CR20112386 
vs. ) 
) Order Continuing 
Juan Juarez~ ) Preliminary Hearing 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
f.p;.. 
This matter having come before the above entitled Court upon the Defendant's motion for 
a continuance of the preliminary hearing, the State not objecting and good cause appearing the 
preliminary hc::u-ing shall be reset to a date certain. 
NOW THEREFORE the preliminary h~g currently schedule herein shall be 
continued to AUgust 10.2Ql1 • at 2;OOa.m. o'clock. 
Dated this -...L day of }\.. \ i 
Order Continuing Preliminary Hearing 
R. Ted Israel 
Magistrate Judge 
Page 1 
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05/30/2011 16:30 1 187 DANIEL DOLAN 
PAGE 06/06 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this (P Day of ~ 2011. I served a 
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the~indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the fonowing: 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208 788~5554 
Daniel M. Dolan 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
208 12&-1187 
Order Continuing Preliminary Hearing 
------------ ----------------
Deputy Clerk 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overni&b.t Mail 
Telecopy 
Page 2 
-28 
OR\G\\\~AL 
jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
FILED A.M~_ P.M. 
SEP 1 2 2D11 }c.. 
JOLynn Dran C Court 81. . "e, ~erk District 
aln€} Coun . loaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO REVOKE BOND 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to its previous ORDER ON 
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE for the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, in the above-
captioned case to revoke bond. 
The Defendant was arraigned on June 20th , 2011, on the felony charge of 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), 
I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(5), with an Order from the Court on Conditions of Release, 
see State's Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho hereby alleges through the Affidavit Regarding Violation of 
Conditions of Release of Blaine County Probation Officer Jodi Brown dated September 
1 ih, 2011, see State's Exhibit 2, that the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, has violated the 
terms and conditions of his release as follows: 
MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 1 
-29 
1. The Defendant was arraigned on June 20th, 2011, with an Order from the Court 
on Conditions of Release, see State's Exhibit 1. 
2. On June 20th , 2011, the Defendant was ordered not to consume or possess any 
alcohol and to submit to random testing as requested by the Blaine County Probation 
Office, see State's Exhibit 1. 
3. On July 1S\ 2011, the Defendant posted a bond of two thousand five hundred 
dollars ($2,500.00). 
4. On September 6th , 2011, the Defendant submitted to a random 80 hour alcohol 
test (ETG/ETS). which was sent to Redwood Toxicology Lab and returned positive for 
alcohol consumption, see State's Exhibit 2. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that a warrant be issued for the arrest of 
the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, and that the Defendant be brought before the Court 
and dealt with according to law. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this \ 'L day of September, 2011. 
MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 2 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
- 3 o· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- )V'--
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this bL day of September, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 3 
Lu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
J~tary 
- 31· 
rN The DISTPJCT COURT OF 'Y'HE FIFTH JU'DICIAL DISTF'JCT 
~l)"nl 
o a~ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COuNTY OF BLA.D~E ~~ : ~~l 
O C"J ~~I Z E·",l 
MAGISTRATEDIVrSION LU ~ i~ 
...J -J 0 
STATE OF ID/LBO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR- '26 \ 1..-_---' .!S (.) 
~----~--~~--~--
VS. 
r .h/- 6r? L. ~ 'v-. if'S.\{(t;: "-
Defendant. 
, ) 
) 
) 
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
Defendant having appeared before the Court and the Court having: 
1~ ~u IN set Bail in the amount of $ ~ \:)\.::::, . . 
[ ] released the Defendant on his/her own recognizance. 
AND 
LA determined that conditions of release are necessary. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
[xJ The Defendant shall appear at all further proceedings in this matter. 
[x] The Defendant shall at all times keep the Clerk of the Court advised of his/ber current 
mailing address. It is the Defendant's responsibility to obtain and correctly respond to any 
notice or other document mailed to hislher last known address. 
[x] If represented by counsel, the Defendant shall maintain contact with the attorney as the 
attorney requires. 
[x] The Defendant shall not be cited, arrested, charged or convicted of any offense that shall 
constitute a misdemeanor or felony under the laws of the State ofIdaho or any other municipal, 
state or federal jurisdiction. 
"k1 The Defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol w= controlled SuPita·IH!.e6 witlJout 
~ prescription lssued by a phYSlci'an. Tne Defendant shall submit to evidentiary testing at his 
own expense for alcohol or cOlUfellee s~atEffie.e£ when requested by a police officer, probation 
offlcer, cqunselor or the Court. Said testing shall be provided and/or monitored by the Blaine 
County Misdemeanor Probation Office or any agency contacted by the Blaine County 
h1isdemeanor Probation offlce to supervise such testing. The Defendant shall comply witll all 
requirements of the Probation Office. Said testing shall occur: 
Lf!r RandomlY 
[ 1 Daily. (The probation departrnen1 may require more than one teSt per day.) [ J Other: _____________________________ _ 
StkrE:-s-- . 
~lf,IT 
I 
- 3 2· 
M The Defendant shall not enter any establishment where alcohol is soid by the drink to be 
;b~sumed on the premises. 
l)(l The Defendant shall not be in actual ph~'sical cont:ol o~ 2 motor vehicle mSf consnming 
~ contrgUsEl sHbstal'll:;fl:5 PQt ?~"'s~:r;:,)"ioi 13;' fI pt"~1ila'" 
[ ] The Defendant shall not leave: [J the State ofldaho ] Blaine County [J Other: 
_________________________ without the prior written 
permission of the Court. 
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global positioning tracking. The 
Defendant shall pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that 
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape. 
[ ] Monitoring shall be provided by: ________________ _ 
[ ] The Defendant shall abide by all provisions of any existing no contact order. 
r<J. Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendant shall immediately 
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department. 
[ ] Other provisions: ________________________ _ 
Judge 
FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN 
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF ANY, AND A WARRAI\TJ' FOR THE DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST. 
I acknowledge that I have read and received a copy of this Order. 
DATED ______________________ __ 
Defendant 
cc: [x] Prosecuto: [x] Defendant 
[0Defense Attorney [x] Blaine Count)' Sheriff 
[ ~Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department 
[ ] Other: __________________ _ 
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Teresa Espedal 
Blaine County Probation Department 
219 1 51 Avenue South, Ste 108 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5528 
Fax: (208) 788-5541 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A-1W FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CASE #CR-2011-2386 
AFFIDAVIT REGARDING VIOLATION 
OF CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
Juan 1. Juarez 
Defendant 
STATE OF IDiillO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
I, Jodi Brown, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I serve as the Blaine County Probation Officer 
1. Juan L. Juarez was ordered to comply with Conditions of Release in Case #CR-
2011-2386 on June 20th, 2011. 
2 A term of the defendant's release was that he/she not consume or possess any 
alcohol. The Defendant shall submit to an evidentiary test at his own expense for 
alcohol or controlled substances when requested by a police officer, probation 
officer, counselor or the Court. Said testing shall occur: Randomly, 
-34 
3 The defendant has violated the Conditions of Release by: Juan Juarez reported to 
the Blaine County Probation Office on September 6th, 2011 and submitted to an 80 hour 
alcohol test (ETGIETS) .The test was sent to Redwood Toxicology Lab and came back 
positive for alcohol consumption. 
fJ,f---
rown 
e County Probation Officer 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this li!( daYOf54£~ ,20.i1. 
DIVINA B. SLOAN 
N Olary Public 
State of Idaho Not~ P~blic fO~. / ... / /I 
ResIdmg m: I~.l~ 
M C .. E..1d.Y co N EXPIJUl',6 Y ommlSSlOn Xpll c;S;- " .. 26, aI" 
.0NIJI&I)'DDlU NOrBY PllJUC ~ 
- 3 5· 
W 
0'1 
REDWOOD TOXICOLOGY LABORATORY 
3650 Westwind Blvd., Santa Rosa, CA 95403 Phone: 707-577-7959 f 800-255-2159 Fax: 707-577-0365 
TOXICOLOGY SUMMARY REPORT 
Client: 5906 Blaine County Juvenile Print Date: 09/09/2011 
Probation 
Attn: Bea Sloan Date Received: 09/08/2011 
......... 
Accession I ldenti fication Collected EtG ETS otherfCooments 
IReq f 
110908-08187 JUAN JUAREZ 09/06/2011 5350 798 [EtG] Screen Cutoff - 100 ng/mL 
JOO I BRO'rIN LCM Lot [EtG] Confirm Cutoff - 100 ng/mL 
[EtG] Confirmed by LC/I1S/HS 
(ETS] Cutoff - 25 ng/mL 
[ETS) Confirmed by LC/HS/MS 
.--------~ 
(? 
fi5 
~ 
~ 
..... 
.... 
lA) 
N 
.... 
l 
.J, 
!;:i 
a 
OJ 
'-J 
OJ 
OJ 
lJ1 
'£ 
,~ 
.. ~ .. - .-........ ' -~ ...... --. . ....... ~~, ........... -..-..,."....---_. 
. .. ,'-- .... -~. -..--................ 
Note: POS indicates positive result; (-) indicates negative/none detected result: QNS indicates specimen quantity not sufficient for testing. 
EtG:Ethylglucuronide (EtG) ETS:Ethyl Sulfate (EtS) 
Fax No : (208)788-554l 
D 
ILI=O A.M,., ,6' I.... P.Mr. -,> , 
I SEP 1 2 2011 r 
Cierk District 
Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, ORDER TO REVOKE BOND 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Motion to Revoke Bail having been laid before me by 
Matthew Fredback, Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the Court hereby finds 
probable cause to believe the Defendant has violated his conditions of release and 
hereby enters the following order. 
It is hereby ordered that the Defendant's bond of $2,500.00 be hereby revoked 
and the Defendant held without bond until he is brought before this Court for further 
proceedings, : 
D a summons be issued compelling the appearance of the defendant so that 
the defendant may be dealt with according to law. 
a warrant be issued for the arrest of the defendant so that the defendant 
may be immediately brought before the Court and dealt with according to 
law. 
SO ORDERED this ILday of September, 2011. 
\\-~~ 
R. Ted Israel 
Magistrate Judge 
-----·8RDER'1B--REV0K-E-B6NB=-Page-1-------------------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Y- day of September, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
-----ORDER-'fO'RE\1oKE~BONe-.:._pageL 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_Aand Delivered 
_ Ovemight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
VU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Tele opy 
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Counter # 
918 
919 
935 
COURT MINUTES 1 
COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-o002386 
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 9/14/2011 
Time: 9:15 am 
Judge: R. Ted Israel 
Courtroom: Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: KATE 
Tape Number: MC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Case called. Defendant is present with Counsel. The State is represented by Counsel. Maria 
Djasran, Court's Interpreter, is present aSSisting the Court. Charge: DUI, repeat offense, felony. 
State calls OFFICER JOSHUA COREY PRITCHARD of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. He has been 
with BCSO for three years. Pritchard is P.O.S.T. certified. Mr. Dolan: Objection, hearsay. 
OVERRULED. Pritchard was dispatched on a report of suspected DUI. On June 18,2011, Officer 
Pritchard was on patrol when he was contacted by Dispatch. He observed a white Chevrolet 
Blazer cross the fog line 3 times, activated his lights, pulled over Juan Juarez. Defendant Is 
identified as the driver of the vehicle. Pritchard advised Juarez of the reason for the stop, Inquired 
if he was "all right", was provided an international driver's license and a manuel. Prtichard could 
smell an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant's breath and noted Juarez had blood shot 
eyes. Juarez was asked if he had consumed any alcohol and he replied that he had. The driver said 
"Oh, I am drunk." and reported having consumed Budweiser and that he was coming from 
Shoshone. The conversation was in English and the defendant appeared to understand the 
English language. When asked to perform field sobriety tests the driver said "/ am drunk Dude." 
When the driver exited the car he appeared to be very unstable. He declined to perform field 
sobriety tests saying he was drunk. The defendant was transported to St. Luke's in Ketchum 
where an ALS advisory was read to him prior to a St. Luke's employee drew blood using a blood 
kit provided by Officer Pritchard. The blood klt was sealed when Pritchard provided It for the 
draw. Officer Pritchard observed the draw, watched the tech agitate the vials to mix the 
contents, took possession of the vials, sealed them in the package and taken back to Blaine 
County Sheriff and placed in the evidence refrigerator. The blood was sent to the State Lab. 
Results of the blood draw were received back from the lab. STATE'S EXHIBITS 1 AND 2. are 
introduced and identified as the toxicology report from the State Lab. Exhibit 1 is offered. 
Mr. Dolan: Examination in aid of objection to admission of State's 1. Defense objects to admission 
of this exhibit as the expiration date of the test kit is unknown. 
Mr. Fredback: Response. Mr. Fredback continues direct of Officer Pritchard. Officer Pritchard 
testifies the blood kit was not expired. 
937 Mr. Dolan: Further exam in aid of objection. Officer Pritchard testifies his practice Is to check the 
expiration date prior to using a kit. 
938 Mr. Fredback: Exam is beyond scope and not relevant. Court inquires of Mr. Dolan re: relevance. 
Court allows the question. 
939 Mr. Dolan continues exam in aid of objection. Officer Pritchard estimates he has been Involved in 
about 12 blood draws. Officer Pritchard denies having any issues with remembering how a blood 
draw is to be conducted. Objection is renewed. COURT: STATE HAS PROVIDED ADEQUATE 
FOUNDATION AND EXHIBIT 1 IS ADMITTED. 
940 Mr. Fredback concludes direct exam: Officer Pritchard states everything he has testified to 
occurred in Blaine County, State of Idaho. 
941 Mr. Dolan: CROSS EXAMINATION OF OFFICER PRITCHARD. OffIcer Pritchard reviewed his report 
and the video of the stop prior to testifying today. He did not review the audio of the hospital 
interview. Mr. Juarez provided a passport in addition to an international driver's license at the 
time of the stop. Officer Pritchard testifies that Mr. Juarez speaks with a heavy accent that he 
assumed was Spanish. When Mr. Juarez was asked to perform the field sobriety tests, he baSically 
said take me In, I'm drunk. Officer Pritchard testifies the unsteadiness observed In the Defendant 
after he exited the vehicle was not due to his being cuffed. Officer Pritchard testifies that the 
Defendant was not offered a breath test as Dispatch had advised Pritchard of prior DUI offenses. 
It is the practice of SCSO to use blood draws for suspected felony DUl's rather than a breath test. 
This is not SCSO required procedure. Mr. Fredback: Objection, relevance. Mr. Dolan responds. 
COURT: THE OFFICER'S OPINION AS TO WHICH TEST IS MORE ACCURATE IS IRRELEVANT; 
SUSTAINED. 
Mr. Dolan inquires further re: Pritchard reporting that the Defendant refused to take a breath 
test. Officer Pritchard does not recall making such a statement. Pritchard did not take the 
Defendant's failing to submit to field sobriety tests as a refusal. 
949 Witness is excused. 
956 Mr. Fredback: Exhibits 2 and 3 are Introduced and Identified: STATE'S EXHIBIT 2 Is a packet from 
the State of Nevada for a 2007 DUI conviction. STATE'S EXHIBIT 3 is a packet from Placer County 
California for an excessive DUI in 2007 
Mr. Dolan: No objection to the admission of State's:.: and 3. EXHIBITS 2 AND 3 ARE ADMITTED. 
Mr. Fredback: Submits the matter to the Court. 
959 Mr. Dolan moves to dismiss the case as the State has not provided any evidence that the Nevada 
and Califomia DUl,s conform to Idaho DUI law. The waiver of rights form in Nevada does not 
include a waiver of Jury Trial. Nevada does not allow jury trial for DUI as is allowed in Idaho. 
COURT MINUTES 2 
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COURT MINUTES 3 
Mr. Fredback: Response: State vs Moore, 2010 Court of Appeals case cited. Responsive Argument. 
2011, Supreme Court case State vs. Howard cited; addresses conformance with california DUllaw. 
COURT HAS LISTENED TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS. STATE'S BURDEN ADDRESSED. THE 
DRIVING PATTER OF THE DEFENDANT, THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICER, THE 
ADMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 PRESENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE ON THE DATE CHARGED THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL REGARDING A FELONY CHARGE: STANDARD AT THIS LEVEL IS THAT THEY ARE 
SUBSTANTIALLY CONFORMING JUDGMENTS. STATE'S 3 INCLUDED A MISDEMEANOR 
COMPLAINT FOR DUI: .08 or higher. DEFENDANT ENTERED A NOLO CONTENDRE PLEA TO THE 
OFFENSE, ESSENTIALLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH IDAHO STATUTE. STATE'S 2, DUI 
ADMONISHMENT OF RIGHTS DESCRIBES DUI IN NEVADA: 3 WAYS TO BE IN VIOLATION-
PHYSICAL CONTROL WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE, BLOOD ALCOHOL EXCEEDING .08 OR 
BLOOD ALCOHOL EXCEEDING .08 WITHIN 2 HOURS, SUBSTANTIALLY CONFORMING JUDGMENT 
TO IDAHO STATUTE FOR PROBABLE CAUSE PURPOSES. THE LACK OF WAIVER OF RIGHTTO JURY 
TRIAL IS SOMETHING TO BE ADDRESSED BY DISTRICT COURT. PROBABLE CAUSE IF FOUND AND 
THE DEFENDANT IS BOUND OVER TO DISTRICT COURT. The Court notes the State has filed a 
Motion to Revoke Bond a couple of days ago and a Warrant of Arrest was Issued. 
Mr. Dolan addresses the Court regarding the warrant. Defendant denies consuming alcoholic 
beverages during the time frame. He was ill and treating his symptoms with over-the-counter 
medications, including Nyquil. Defendant has been out of custody for an extended period and has 
fully complied with the testing portion of his conditions without Incident. Defendant has been 
able to go a long period of time without drinking. When he drinks, he drinks to excess. Defendant 
has been going to work every day working for a landscaping company. Defense requests the 
defendant be allowed to remain on bond. 
Court inquires of Mr. Dolan if he has seen the reports from the lab. Mr. Dolan has not seen the 
levels. Mr. Dolan reviews the document further. 
Mr. Fredback: 5000 is very high metabolite reading. District Court does not consider ETG's below 
1000 as they are inconsistent. Below 1000 can be different substances that would give positive 
alcohol readings. 
Mr. Dolan: With Nyquil, has a high alcohol content, approximately 20%. 
Mr. Fredback: Responds to the Court's question. In the alleged crime .31 BAC, very high. In the 
Nevada case, there was a violation of conditions of release that resulted in a Warrant that is stili 
outstanding. The california DUI is an excessive, over .15. State's concern is that the defendant has 
been drinking and driving with exceptionally high BAC. It is unknown whether the defendant can 
afford a SCRAM unit. If he is drinking and driving, safety Is an issue. State requests revoking the 
bond and incarcerating the defendant or amending the Conditions of Release to inciude a SCRAM 
unit. 
RECESS to allow counsel time to investigate whether a SCRAM unit is available. 
RECONVENE, ALL PARTIES PRESENT. There is a SCRAM unit that can be installed at 1:30 p.m. 
today for $6-$10. Assuming that a bond revocation has not been sent out, the Court reinstates the 
bond on the same terms and conditions with the additional requirement that the defendant will 
have a SCRAM unit installed. Court addresses the defendant that any use of alcohol in any form 
may lead to his arrest. WARRANT IS QUASHED. ORDER BINDING OVER IS SIGNED. DEFENDANT IS 
REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN DISTRIG COURT AND ENTER PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY. 
ADJOURN 
COURT MINUTES 4 
OR\G\t~AL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, ORDER BINDING OVER 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
THIS MA TIER came before the Court for a preliminary hearing on the 14th day of 
September, 2011, on a complaint charging the Defendant with the felony offense of 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS, in 
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10). 
The Court, having considered the testimony, other evidence and argument of 
counsel, finds based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the 
aforementioned charged offense, that such offense was committed and that there is 
probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant committed such offense. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (b), the Court hereby orders that 
the Defendant be held to answer in the District Court on said felony charge and is 
hereby bound over on the same to the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
( 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2011. 
ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 1 
(~~~ 
R. Ted Israel 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this li- day of September, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 2 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
vHand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ Hand Delivered 
_ Ov rnight Mail 
Te copy 
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, , [ I. \ ~ 'f' \ . ", el r< \ u \ \'~ ~\ L 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208)788-5554 
FILED ~·ti;;>:3( 
SEP 2 0 2011 t:~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, INFORMATION 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, by this Information 
charges the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, with the following crimes: 
COUNT ONE 
Part One 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open 
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 03010, at or 
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired 
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of 
INFORMATION - Page 1 
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.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
COUNT ONE 
Part Two 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth 
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty 
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th 
of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a 
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada; 
2. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17th 
of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle 
Code § 23152, in the State of California; 
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY. 
COUNT TWO 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 0301 0, at 
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's 
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
INFORMATION - Page 2 
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DATED this ;)0 day of September. 2011. 
INFORMATION - Page 3 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~cr=:y of September, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
INFORMATION - Page 4 
J 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
21.vernight Mail 
. Telecopy 
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Counter # 
10.03 
10.04 
10.09 
COURT MINUTES 1 
COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-0002386 
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Arraignment 
Hearing date: 9/26/2011 
Time: 10:05 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Interpreter: Maria Djasran 
Counsel present, Def. present with Interpreter. 
Court introduces the case, reviews the Info. Cnt 1- DUI (felony), Cnt 2: 
DWP(misd). 
Mr. Dolan waives formal reading of the Info. 
Court reviews the maximum and min. penalties. Cnt. 1: 10 yrs. prison or 30 days 
jail, fine of $5,000, driving privileges suspended for 1-5 years, and must use and 
interlock device while operating a motor vehicle after the suspension period. 
Cnt. 2: 2 days jail or up to 6 months jail, fine of$1000, driver's license would be 
suspended up to 180 days which would add to any current suspension period. 
Gives notification of subsequent penalties. 
Def. pleads not guilty. 
- 49· 
Court sets 3 day J.T. for 1/10/12 and a PTC for 12/19/11 at 9a.m. 
10.11 Recess 
COURT MINUTES 2 
- 5 o· 
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FILED ~:~.1 // r V 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 ........-
SEP 2 8 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 Court Blaine Coun!li. Idane: __ 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, AMENDED INFORMATION 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, by this Amended 
Information charges the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, with the following crimes: 
COUNT ONE 
Part One 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open 
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010, at or 
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired 
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of 
AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 1 
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.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
COUNT ONE 
Part Two 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth 
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty 
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th 
of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a 
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada; 
2. That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17th 
of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle 
Code § 23152, in the State of California; 
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY. 
COUNT TWO 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E 103010, at 
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's 
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR. 
COUNT THREE 
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in 
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully possess an open 
AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 2 
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container of alcohol in a motor vehicle located on or at or near milepost 104 on State 
Highway 75 in Blaine County, Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 23-505(2), 
POSSESSION OF AN OPEN CONTAINER OF ALCOHOL IN A MOTOR VEHICLE, a 
MISDEMEANOR. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho . 
DATED this 
• ' C> 
l-(/ day of September, 2011. 
AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 3 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this)S-f:: day of September, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 4 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
v-Telecopy 
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Juan L Juarez 
Shenandoah 39 Apt A 202 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Defendant. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
) 
) Case No: CR-20 11-0002386 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OF TRlAL SETTING, 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, AND 
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial Conference 
Judge: 
Jury Trial 
Judge: 
Monday, December 19,2011 09:00 AM 
Robert J. Elgee 
Tuesday, January 10,2012 09:00 AM 
Robert J. Elgee 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER 
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS J 
- 5 5· 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
September 28, 2011. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Daniel M. Dolan 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum ID 83340 
Prosecutor: 
Juan L Juarez 
Mailed / Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed / Hand Delivered 
Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: Wednesday, September 28, 2011 
/~ By: 
------~--~r-~~~~L-~~~ 
Deputy C e 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING. PRETRlAL CONFERENCE & ORDER 
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 2 
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COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-0002386 
State ofldaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 12/19/2011 
Time: 8:59 am 
Judge: Robert J. Eigee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Interpreter: Maria Djasran 
Counter # I 
I 
9.03 Counsel and Def. present with interpreter I I 
Court introduces the case and reviews the Amended Info. I 
I 
Mr. Dolan waives formal reading. I 
I 
i 
Court reviews the maximum penalties 10 years prison or a minimum of130 days 
county jail, fine $5,000, driving privileges are suspended for 1-5 years. . 
I 
I 
Mr. Dolan comments that this is a pretrial. 
i 
State clarifies that a misd. Count 3 was left off the original info. Def. has been 
arraigned on all charges. 
9.07 Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. is prepared to waive jury trial and hare a 
court trial. The dispute is about the Defs previous record, which could be done 
as a motion to dismiss or limine or court trial. The Def. is contesting that this is 
COURT MINUTES 1 
~--~~-~--'-~-~-- - 5 7· 
a felony charge. 
Court clarifies. 
, 
i 
I 
I 
Mr. Dolan comments that whether the State has to prove the allegation~ is up in 
the air. 
9.09 State has no problem waiving the jury, will be motioning up a Motion ill Limine 
before the trial. i 
[ 
Court makes the trial a court trial. 
I 
! 
Mr. DC?lan requests keeping the trial date for 1/10. I I 
• 
I 
Court comments, sets Court Trial for 1/10/12 at 1:30p.rn. I 
9.16 Def. waives is right to a jury trial. 
9.18 Recess 
i 
! 
COURT MINUTES 2 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
I 
I I 
F I LED ~'~.' 10' 71L L+ 
DEC 2 9 2011 
II JoLynn Drage Clerk District L-..;;C:.:::.:ou:::..;rt~B.:::;/al~>ne:..,~ C~'o:::;.;un.:.:.:tV'...;.;ld~ah.;...o----, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-11-2386 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
---------------------------) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through the Blaine County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and HEREBY moves the Court for an Order in limine. 
The State seeks the Court's in limine ruling that the Defendant's two prior Driving 
Under the Influence convictions within ten years are substantially confirming foreign 
criminal violations as included in I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10). 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this '29 day of December, 2011. 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisA 9~ay of December 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 2 
Ja 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ 9vernight Mail 
vTelecopy 
son, Legal Secretary 
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Counter # 
1.40 
1.41 
1.45 
COURT MINUTES 1 
COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-0002386 
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Court Trial! Motion in Limine 
Hearing date: 1/10/2012 
Time: 1:28 pm 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: Me 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Interpreter: Mary Jo Palma 
Counsel present, Def. present with Interpreter. 
Court introduces the case. 
Interpreter's oath is on file with the court. 
Mr. Dolan comments that a jury trial has been waived. The Def. will be pleading 
guilty to Part 1 of the Information. The State still has to prove Part 2. 
Understands that the State will dismiss Count 2. Count 3 will be left for another 
day. 
State comments, intended to file a motion in limine which is the important issue. 
Wants a ruling on the out of state DUI convictions, and after that decision has 
been made then it can be decided if a court trial is needed. 
Mr. Dolan responds about the continued court trial for identification of the Def. 
-61 
State responds. 
I Mr. Dolan thought the trial was going to be done today. 
1.49 Court comments about the confusion, reads from the pretrial court minutes. Will 
hear the Motion in Limine today and will give the State a continuance re: the 
court trial. 
Mr. Dolan requests that Discovery be closed at this time, doesn't want more 
witnesses to be added or evidence. 
1.53 State agrees. 
Court has evidence disclosure and discovery closed. 
State clarifies about disclosure. 
Mr. Dolan states concerns about the identification issue. 
1.55 Court comments. 
Mr. Dolan only has the disclosure of the arresting officer. 
State has every intention to disclose the records custodian. 
Mr. Dolan doesn't have a disclosure or the documents from the jail. 
Court will hear the Motion in Limine today, any other issues need to be address 
at a later time. Disclosures need to be done immediately. At the end of today 
there will be a briefing schedule and a court trial will be set. Court will take the 
plea of guilty to Cnt.l Part 1 
1.59 Def. wishes to plead gUilty to Cnt.l Part 1: DUl 
Court inquires about a rights waiver form. 
Mr. Dolan had the Def. just read the rights waiver form. Has a copy of the 
Amended Information. 
Court has the Interpreter read Count 1 Part 1 of the Amended Information to the 
Def. 
2.02 Court reviews the max. penalties for a misdemeanor charge 
I Counsel agree the penalties are the ones that are in effect at the time of the 
COURT MINUTES 2 
offense 
Court continues to review the penalties: 1st offense: 6 mo. jail $1,000 fine and dl 
suspension for 30 days, permit maybe granted 60-150 days, 2nd offense: 10 days 
jail min. up to 1 year, fine of $2,000, dl suspension for 1 year, must use an 
interlock device. Felony penalties: 10 yrs. prison, min 30 days jail, fine of $5,000, 
dl suspension for 1-5 years, must use and interlock device while operating a 
motor vehicle following suspension period. 
2.05 Def. understands the penalties and what he is charged with. 
Def. pleads guilty, understands the rights that he is waiving by pleading gUilty. 
2.09 Mr. Dolan comments that if this is a felony the most the State will ask for is a 
Rider. 
State agrees. 
Court continues to question the Def., wishes for the Court to accept his plea of 
guilty. Was driving a motor vehicle on Hwy. 75 in Blaine Co. and was under the 
influence at the time of driving and tested higher than a .08. 
Court accepts the Defs plea of guilty to Cnt 1 part 1, finds that it was knowingly 
and voluntarily made and it was made on a factual basis. Court will now hear the 
Motion in Limine 
State moves to dismiss Count 2: driving without privileges. 
Court has the State prepare and order of dismissal of Count 2. 
2.13 State addressed the motion in limine, presents State's Exh. 1 & 2- premarked- ID 
-prior offenses within the last 10 years. Also presents the statute for the 
individual states Nevada: 484.379 & 484.3792 & California: 23152 all for 2007. 
Court inquires. 
State also has Idaho case law that will be referred to in argument. 
Court comments about rules re: judicial notice 
2.19 Mr. Dolan has no objection. 
Court will have them marked so that it is clear to the appellant court. 
Mr. Dolan comments about in the State of Nevada the Def. doesn't have a right to 
COURT MINUTES 3 
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a jury trial 
State stipulates that is the law of Nevada. 
2.24 Mr. Dolan has no objection to Exh.l & 2 I 
DOllrt.:ADMITS£XFLl '& 2 
2.26 Court wants to preserve the law of Nevada and California for the record. State's 
Exh.3 premarked- id- Nevada Law, Exh. 4 premarked-id- Nevada Law & Exh. 5 
premarked- id- California Law. 
Mr. Dolan has no objection to Exh. 3,4 & 5 
Court ADM ITS £XH. :3,4, &:5 
2.28 State addresses the Motion in Limine, reviews the issue re: Nevada not allowing 
a Def. to a jury trial for a first offense DUl, cites case law. The Def. had a defense 
attorney in both Nevada and California. Therefore re: a constitutional argument 
it doesn't matter if another state doesn't permit a jury trial. Adds that the Def. 
admitted to the charge. Addresses the substantially conforming argument, cites 
Idaho Statute and case law, presents copies to the Court The only thing the 
Court has to do is compare elements of the statues in the foreign judgment state. 
Idaho has a lower standard for the definition ofDUl compared to Nevada & 
California (it is easier to get a convicted in Idaho). 
2.54 Mr. Dolan responds, clarifies that the Court is not ruling from the bench. 
Court agrees if counsel would like to brief the issues. 
Mr. Dolan continues, addresses the constitutional argument, believes that if the 
Def. did not have the right to a jury trial it doesn't allow for that conviction to be 
used as a prior conviction for enhancement. Addresses the substantially 
conforming argument, it maters what is under the per-say statute and the 
language between states. There are differences in the time of testing between 
other states (Nevada & North Dakota). 
3.12 State will file a brief on the constitutional argument, responds on the 
substantially conforming argument re: only violating the per-say statute, in 
I 
Nevada the judgment doesn't differentiate the definition of per-say or DUL 
Nevada and California criminalize driving under the influence not the BAC at the 
time of the test. It is not required that the other state's law be identical it only 
has to be substantially conforming. 
COURT MINUTES 4 
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3.17 Court inquires about the briefing schedule. 
, 
I State suggests that Mr. Dolan reply and the State can reply to the Defenses reply. , 
Mr. Dolan doesn't mind going first in the writing portion, but wants the ability to 
respond if there is something in the State's reply. 
Court takes the State's 3 cases as the opening brief, Defenses brief, State's reply, 
and Defenses reply. Oral argument can be done at the time of triaL 
Court has Defense brief due 1/30/12, State's reply brief due 2/13/12, 
evidence/ testimony needs to be disclosed immediately court trial set for 
3/9/2012 at9a.m. 
3.24 Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. is on a SCRAM unit and it is getting expensive 
because of his job. Probation might be able to help, otherwise a motion might be 
filed. 
3.25 Recess 
COURT MINUTES 5 
_ - 65-
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
iFlLE51~~\ 
JAN 1 7 2Q~2 \ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-11-2386 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNT TWO 
Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3504 and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 48(c) for its order dismissing Count Two of the above-captioned 
criminal action. 
The reasons for the dismissal are: (a) pursuant to a plea agreement between the 
parties; and (b) dismissal would serve the ends of justice and the effective 
administration of the Court's business. 
DATED this \ '1- day of January, 2012. 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / 2 day of January, 2012, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
C/Telecopy 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TVVO - Page 2 
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. FILED },::. iYX£ ' I JAN 1 9 2012 I 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk Distr1ct 
Court Blaine Ccun ,lctaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-11-2386 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DISMISS COUNT TWO 
The Court, having considered the Motion to Dismiss Count Two, and good cause 
appearing therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that Count Two in the above-captioned criminal 
action be dismissed. 
DATED this I r day of January, 2012. 
RObeteJYr 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /1 day of January, 2012, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
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DANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Attorney for Defendant 
Idaho State Bar # 4147 
rF[fgQ~l ; I 
: I JAN 3 D 2012 K-
: JOLYnn Draae ,-., k . 
_ Court 81 . ': . v.er DIstrict 
-. ·----.!!.1f!.!!.2.oun . Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
vs. 
Defendant's Memorandum 
Juan Juarez, 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff herein has raised the issue that the purported Judgment of Conviction from Nevada 
should be admitted as a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation. 
The state has introduced Exhibit 1, a Judgment of Conviction packet from Nevada consisting of 
7 pages [bates stamp pages 39-45]. In the Judgment of Conviction packet from Nevada on page 3 
[ bates stamp page 41] provides: 
DUT ADMONISHMENT OF RIGHTS 
... AND/OR while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my blood 
or breath; AND/OR while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my 
blood or breath within two hours after driving or being in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle, in violation ofNRS 484.379. 
Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez Page 1 
I 
- 70· 
The state has also submitted Exhibit 2, Nevada Statues § 484.379 in this matter. 
The pertinent language of the submitted statue is: 
§ 484.379. 1 part (c):. 
(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle to have a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in 
his blood or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a 
higbway or on premises to which the public has access. 
The language which the Defendant maintains causes that the Nevada statue to not be a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation is: 
while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my blood or breath 
within two hours after driving or being in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, in violation ofNRS 484.379. 
Compared to the Idaho code § 18-8004 (1) (a) which provides: 
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs 
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 
0.08, as defined in subsection (4) ofthis section, or more, as shown by analysis of 
his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical cOlltrol of a motor 
vehicle within this state, whether upon a higbway, street or bridge, or upon public 
or private property open to the public. (Emphasis added) 
To put this simply the Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the 
Nevada statue is not concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the 
concentration at the time of the test. 
Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez Page 2 
In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Dannv Rav Avers, 17 Va. App. 401: 437 S.E. 2d 580 1993 Va. 
App: (Attachment A) the Virginia court looked the same issue as presented here and ruled that 
the North Carolina statue as compared to the Virginia statue was not a substantially confirm 
statue for the purpose of enhancing a DUI to a felony based upon the North Carolina conviction. 
In reaching their decision the Virginia Court reasoned as follows. 
To be a substantially conforming statue does not mean that [the other] state's law must 
substantially confom1 in every respect to Virginia law. Only that the prohibition of the other 
state's law under which the person was convicted must substantially conform to Virginia's law. 
In making the determination the court looked at the elements of the two statues rather than to 
look at the offender's conduct. 
The Virgin court went on to state, if a conviction in another state is based on conduct which is 
not a violation of Virgin law than to consider it to enhance a Virginia DUI would without 
authority expand the scope of convictions which could be considered beyond that which the 
Virginia General Assembly specifically authorized. Therefore, another states law permitting a 
conviction for an act not constituting an offense under the Virgin DUI law is not a substantially 
conforming statue. 
The Virginia Court recognized that the North Carolina Statue, (like the Nevada statue) contains a 
conclusive presumption that does not require that the accused have any particular blood alcohol 
concentration or impairment at the time of driving, so long as he consumed no additional alcohol 
between the time of driving and the time of the test. 
The Virginia Court went on to state: 
Thus under the North Carolina statue (or Nevada statue) a person whose blood-
alcohol concentration, as a result of alcohol consumed before or during driving, 
was at some time after driving 0.10 or greater must have had some amount of 
Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez Page 3 
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alcohol in his system at the time he drove and under the North Carolina statute 
that was enough to be guilty. 
Under the Virginia and Idaho statues the language is that it is unlawful to drive or operate a 
motor vehicle while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 0, for Virginia, 0.08 for 
Idaho. The Virginia Court went on to state that the result of the subsequent alcohol test in 
Virginia is merely an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttal presumption that the measurement 
accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving. 
In Virginia, as in Idaho, a defendant may introduce evidence that despite the blood alcohol 
reading at the time of the test his blood alcohol concentration was less than the legal limit at the 
time of driving. However, in North Carolina, as in Nevada, such evidence would be irrelevant 
because of the conclusive presumption. Thus as a result of the conclusive presumption the North 
Carolina or Nevada statue was not a substantially conforming statue. This is based upon the fact 
that the North Carolina and Nevada statues do not look at the concentration at the time of driving 
but rather North Carolina and Nevada are only concemed of the concentration at the time of the 
test. 
In State v. Schmoll. 172 P.3d 555, 144 Idaho 800, (Idaho App. 2007) the Idaho Court of Appeals 
for the first time addressed the issue of what a substantially confom1ing foreign criminal 
violation is. The Court in it's analysis looked at United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194 (4th 
Cir.2004) a Virginia case which holding was similar to Avers, supra, 
The court in Schmoll stated: 
The Fourth Circuit compared Maryland and Virginia statutes for 
enhancement purposes and determined that a prior Maryland conviction could not 
be used for enhancement purposes in Virginia. United States v. Thomas. 367 F.3d 
194 (4th Cir.2004). The Virginia statute provided for use of foreign convictions 
to enhance a charge only if the statute on which the previous conviction is based 
Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez Page 4 
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was substantially similar to Virginia Code § 18.2-266. Thomas, 367 F.3d at 197. 
In Virginia, a person could be guilty ofDUJ for driving or operating a motor 
vehicle either with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more, or while 
under the influence of alcohol. Va.Code . tum. § 18.2-266 (2004). A test result of 
0.08 or more created a rebuttable presumption that the person had such 
concentration while driving and was under the influence while driving. Thomas, 
367 F.3d at 198. 
Maryland prohibited driving under the influence of alcohol and driving 
under the influence of alcohol per se. Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 21-902(a) (2003). 
Driving under the influence of alcohol per se occurred when a person showed a 
BACofO.080rmoreatthetimeoftesting. M.C.A. § 11-127.1(a) (2002). This 
alternative for conviction did not create a rebuttable presumption that the person 
was in fact driving under the influence of alcohol, but rather gave rise to an 
independent conviction merely for having a BAC of 0.08 or more. Thomas, 367 
F.3d at 198. Although a conviction in Maryland for driving under the influence 
would constitute a valid prior offense for enhancement purposes in Virginia, a 
conviction for driving under the influence per se would not. rd. The standard the 
court declared itself to be using to compare these two statutes was "substantially 
similar," but the comi applied this standard very narrowly by turning the 
comparison on the issue of the rebuttable presumption. It was unclear which 
portion of the Maryland DUI statute served as the basis for the underlying 
conviction. rd. Therefore since Maryland's per se violation did not provide for a 
rebuttable presumption based on the blood alcohol concentration, the Maryland 
statute was deemed not to be substantially similar to the Virginia statute. Id. 
The court in Schmoll than went on to hold: 
This Court exercises free review over questions of law and the application and 
construction of statutes. State v. O'NeilL 118 Idaho 244 .. 245,796 P.ld 121, 122 
Defendant's Memorandum Juarez Page 5 
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(1990); State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, ]] 06 (Ct.App.2003). 
In order to determine if the Montana statute under which Schmoll was previously 
convicted is substantially conforming to I.C. § 18-8004, the court must first 
determine which factors to compare and the standard with which to compare 
them. The legislature expressly provided that the focus of the comparison should 
be on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the 
prior violation. See I.e. § 18-8005(8). The elements of the violation in each 
state must substantially conform to each other. The legislature did not define 
substantial confonnity; however, where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, this Court must give effect [144 Idaho 804] to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 
988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); > State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.ld 214, 
219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389,3 P.3d 65,67 (Ct.App.2000). 
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. 
Bumight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. Substantial conformity does not 
require exact correspondence between the two statutes. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines substantially to mean "[e]ssential; without material qualification ... in 
substance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed.1990). Conformity 
means 11 [c]orrespondence in ... use; agreement; ham10ny; congruity." Id. at 300. 
The Court in Schmoll than went on to hold: 
Although Idaho and Montana use the BAC test results differently, they 
both prohibit the same essential conduct--driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. Proving that a person is under the influence absent a BAC test requires a 
greater degree of impairment in Montana than in ldaho, since in Idaho, the ability 
to drive need only be impaired "to the slightest degree," while in Montana, the 
ability to drive "safeJy" is the quality that must be diminished. lmpairment to the 
slightest degree is an equal or lesser standard than the diminished ability to drive 
safely test used by Montana: thus Montana's higher standard surpasses the 
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elements required for a violation in Idaho. These two statutes frame their 
prohibitions using the same language. requiring substantially conforming elements 
to be met to sustain a violation .(Emphasis added) 
The Court of appeals next looked at this issue in State v. Moore 231 P.3d 532, 148 Idaho 887" 
(Idaho App. 2010), and adopted the language of Schmoll when it stated: 
Although Idaho and Montana use the BAC test results differently, they 
both prohibit the same essential conduct--driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. 
As pointed out in Avers, supra and Thomas, supra, by the Viriginia courts the difference between 
the Viriginia law and the North Carolina and Maryland laws is the same as the difference 
between the Idaho and Nevada law and that is the Nevada statue and the Idaho statue prohibit 
different conduct. The Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the 
Nevada statue is not concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the 
concentration at the time of the test. Thus we ask you to adopt the same finding as the Viriginia 
courts that from the plain face of the statue Idaho and Nevada are not SS# for the purpose of 
enhancement of this matter. 
The other issue concerning the Nevada conviction is that Nevada does not allow a jury trial for a 
first offense DUI.. 
The United States COUli of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United Slates v. Tighe 266 F.3d 
1187; 2001, (9th Cir) Attachment B ruled that to be able to use a prior conviction to increase the 
maximum sentence in a criminal matter requires that in order to use the prior conviction the prior 
conviction needed to include the protection of the right to a jury trial. 
Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez Page 7 
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F or the same reasoning as set forth in Tighe this court should not allow the use of a Judgment of 
conviction to enhance a misdemeanor to a felony when the defendant in the prior proceeding did 
not have a right to a jury trial. ;'/ \ ~;r;~2012 
.. ' / \ Dated this ..!V day of 
, ./-1., ~  
(.../J)aniel M. Dolan, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
} ?-" 
I hereby certify that on 1- ~)c , 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing document and upon the attorney named below in the manner noted: 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum. Idaho. 
~r' 
,...- , 
.. /
G/13y hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney at his offices in Hailey. 
__ By sending facsimile copies of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number 208-788-
5554. 
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Daniel M. Dolan. 
Attorney at Law 
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COlvllvl0}f'1lTEJ..LTH OF VIRGD'fLA v. DAN!\ry RA_Y AYERS 
Record No. 0636-92-3 
COUP .. T OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
17 Va. App. 401; 437 S.E.2d 580; 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 592; 10VLR 631 
November 30, 1993, Decided 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [*"*1] As Corrected 
December 6,1993. 
OUTCOME The COllrt affirmed the order of the trial 
COLlrt vacatlllg defendant's dTiving while intoxicated 
habitual offender adjudication. 
PRlOR HISTORY: FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY. Kenneth 1. Devore, Judge. CORE TERlvIS dnving, habitual offender, 
DISPOSITION: AffIrmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The state appealed an order 
of the Circuit Court of Montgomery COLmty (Virginia), 
which vacated defendant's habitual offender adjudication 
by holding that another state's driving while intoxicated 
staMe, NC. Gen. Stat. 20-138.](a)(2), did not 
substantially conform to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 and 
could not be used as predicate offenses for an habitual 
offender adjudication in the state. 
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted in the state of 
driving while intoxicated in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 
18.2-266(i), and he was adjudged a habitual offender on 
the basis that he had prior driving while intoxicated 
convictions in another state. Defendant then flied a 
motion to vacate the habitual offender order on the 
ground that his DUI convictions could not have been 
used as predicate offenses \.Ulder the habitual offender act 
because the DUl statute tUlder which he was convicted in 
the other state, NC, Gen. Slat. § 20-]38.](a)(2), did not 
conform to Va. Code Ann § J8.2-266(i). The 11101ion was 
granted, and the state appealed. The court affmned, 
holding that N.C Gen. Stat § 20-J38.1(a){2) did not 
conforn1 to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-2 6 6 (i). N. C Gen. Stat. 
§ 20- j 38. J (a)(2) contained a conclusive presumption that 
allowed a conviction of anyone with a blood alcohol 
concentration of 0.10 percent or higher at the time of the 
test. The driver's blood alcohol concemration at the time 
of driving was iIrcievan1, On tht other hand, Va. Code 
Ann. § J8.2-266(i) allowed a defendant to imroduce 
evidence to show that his blood alcohol concentratioI! a~ 
the time of driving was less that' 0.10 percenl. 
concentration, blood alcohol, twice convicted, time of 
driving, consumed, conform, alcohol, conclusive 
presumption, predicate, Habitual Offender Act 
substantially similar, case law, administered, conforming: 
va.cation, drive, conformity 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
COlJNSEL: Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney 
General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attomey General, on 
briefs), for appellant. 
MarcLls H. Long, Jr. (Frederick M. Kellerman, Jr., on 
brief), for appellee. 
JUDGES: Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Fitzpatrick. 
OPD'-llONBY: L.A.RRY G. ELDER 
OPINION: [**580] [*402J 
OPINION BY JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 
The COlwnonwealth appeals from the trial court's 
vacation of DanDY Ray Ayers' habitual offender 
adjudication. It argues on appeal that the trial court ened 
in holding thai North Carolina's DUI statute, Lmder which 
appellee was twice convicted, does not substantially 
conform to Code';; 1 and [**581] could not be 
used as predicat~ offenses for an habitual offender 
adiudicati~n in Virgu1ia. For the reasons set forth beloyv, 
w~ afflfm the trial COW-t'3 vacation of the adjudication. 
Appellee was declared an habilual offender under 
VirairJic( law 011 F ebruarv 7. 1992, based on three c- -' < 
convlctlOl1S rendered agz.ins! him in the s1.iite of North 
Carolina. The certiflcc copy of his driving recorc showed 
fOLII No:tb Carolinz, convictions, two for[**"'2J 
ATTACHMENT A 
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LUider the miluence (DUl) and TWO for dJ:iving on a 
suspended license, The DUI convictions were based on 
offenses corrnnitted after July 1, 1986, the effective date 
of the 0,10 percent "per se" provisions of Code § j 8,2-
266(i) , Appellee filed a motion to set aside the habitual 
offender order on the ground that his DUI convictions 
could not be used as predicate offenses under the 
Habitual Offender Act because the North Carolina statute 
under which he was twice convicted was not substantially 
similar to the Virginia statute, At the hearing on February 
25, 1992, the rrial court agreed and entered an order on 
March 3, 1992, setting aside appellee's habitual offender 
adj udication, 
The sole issLLe in this case is whether the North 
Carolina DUI law lmder which appellant was twice 
convicted, N,C, Cen. Sial, § 20-138. 1 (a)(2) , 
"substantially conforms" to Virginia's DUJ law, § 18,2-
266, See Code § 46.2-351(3), As we held in Cox v. 
Commonwealth, 13 Va, App, 328, 411 SE.2d 444 
(1991), "this does not mean that [the other] state's law." 
must substantially conform in every respect to Code :§ 
18,2-266, Only that prohibition of the other state's[***3] 
law under which the person was convicted must 
substantially confonll," Ie! at 331, 411 SE.2d at 446, 111 
making this determination, we look to the elements of the 
two statutes rather than to the offender's conduct: 
If a conviction in another state is based on conduct which 
is not a violation of Code § 18,2-266, then to consider it 
tmder Code § 46,2-351 would, without authorit)!, expand 
the scope of the convictions which could be considered 
beyond that which the General Assembly specifically 
authorized, Therefore, another [*403 ] state's law 
permitting a conviction for an act not constituting an 
offense under Code § 18,2-266 is not substantially 
conforming under Code § 46,2-351, 
ld. The mere fact that both provisions are loosely 
referred to as per Se statutes is insufficient to show 
substantial conformity, 
In their briefs in this case, the parties argue the 
different interpretations given the ctUTent statutes and 
their predecessors, See Shinault v. Commol1vveaLth, 228 
Va. 269, 321 5.E,2d 652 (1984): Davis v, 
Commonwealth, 8 Va, App 29 J, 38J S.E,2d lJ 
(J 989),[**'4] The Commonwealtb urges us La interprd 
the Habitual Offender Act and its substantial conformny 
clause liberally to accomplisb the Act's stated plL.rpose of 
, . l' f /' 11 aso""'ts 'hr,' 'hp }, "1 preservllW pub IC sa ·ety, r~ppe ee uV' Ca",l L ~ - LV 
~hould b~ narrowly construed because it results in a 
forfeiture, We fmd it unnecessa:'Y to m~alyze either the 
case law or the Vrrginia Habitual Offende, Act i11 deDth, 
.' r',...,... therns P ! ~,TPC. hO'0/evcT, f02" a!l examln~Ulor:. 0] tne ~taLuteS 'J~ , V'-' 
n 1 --wItb mmimal .'"ehaLce or:: relevant case law--
makes clear that ,hey are nOl substamially slIYlilar, 
regardless of whether we mlerpreT the Act broadly or 
narrowly, 
nl NeIther the Virginia nor North Carolina DUI 
statutes were amended between the time of appellee's 
convictions in North Carolina and his adjudication in 
V irginia as an habitual offender. 
Appellee wa~ twiGe convicted ofDUl uncleI' NC Gen. 
SIal. § 20-J38,J(a)(2), which states as follows: "A person 
commIts the offense of impaired driving if he drives any 
vehicle upon any highway afIer having consumed 
sufficient alcohol ["''"';'5J that he has, at any relevant time 
after the driving, an alcohol concentratioD of 0.1 0 or 
more." NC Cere Slat, § 20-4,01(330) defines "releyant 
time afier the driving" as "any time after the driving in 
which the driver still has in his body alcohol consumed 
before or during the driving." A careful reading of this 
statute reveals that it contains a conclusive presumption 
that does not require that the accused have any pat1iclllar 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of driving, 
so long as he consLUlled no additional alcohol between 
the time of the stop and the time ofthe test. 
A person whose blood-alcohol concentration, as a result 
of alcohol consumed before or dmiJ:lg driving, was at 
some time after driving 0,10 or greater must have had 
[**582] some amount ofaleohol in his system at the time 
he drove, The legislature has decreed that this amount, 
whatever it might have been, is enough to constitute an 
offense, This it may constitutionally do, 
[*404J North Carulina Ii. Rose, 312 N,C 441. 323 SE.2d 
339, 343 (N C j 9(4) (emphasis added), 
Under the corresponding VirgiYlia statute, by contras~, 
it is "unlawful for any person to drive or operate any 
motor vei1icie["'*';'6] while sucll person has H blood 
alcohol concentration of 0,10 percent or more ",," Va. 
Code S j 8,2-266(i) (emphasis added). As we held in 
Davis :', Commonwealth,- 8 Va, al 298, 381 S,E2d 
a1 15, a convicLion uIlder Code § 18,1-266(i) require:, 
moof ihat the BAC of the accllsed We.S at least CUD 
, "fl}p. t1·'11P 'ne w'as drlving," The result of the percent . a1 '-__ - ~ - - _ 
adn1inistered ::::henucaJ test iE, 111erely Ii an 
evidentl2.r)' fact \VhlCb creates 2, rebuttable presummion 
Ulat the meaSUTe:me:nt accurately reflects the: blood 
the :ime of driving," le. 
onutled) A dcfenciam 
rna;, introduce 
- 79· 
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evidence to show that, despJte his blood alcohol 
concentration of at least 0.10 percent on a subsequently 
administered Test, his blood alcohol concentration a! the 
time of driving was less than 0.] 0 percen7. See, e.g., Keh! 
y Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 602, 605-06, t(26 S.E.2c! 
127, 129-30 (1993). In Norti1 Carolina, such evidence 
would be irrelevam, fm the statute comains E conclusive 
presl.Uuption which aEoVis conviction[''';''"7] of anyone 
with a BAC of 0.10 percent at the time of the test. 
Although a defendant in Nortb Carolina would still be 
free W c.ttilck the accuracy of the tesl, his 0, her BAC at 
the lnne of cirivmg is melevalll. 
The applicable f'-iorth Carolina law contains a 
conclusive presmnptlOn: therefore the statute is 110t 
substantially confoJIIling under Code § 46.2-351. 
Accordingly, because appellee's North Carolina DUJ 
convictions could not properly be used as predicate 
offenses, the trial court did not err in vacating appellee's 
habitual offender mlication. 
Affirmed. 
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UNITED STATES OF }\MER1CA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNONWA YNE TIGHE, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 00-30263 
Ul'\lTED STATES COURT OF A.PPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
266 F.3d 1187; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20861; 2001 Cal DailyOp. Service 8333; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 10289 
hme 13,2001, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington 
September 24, 2001, Filed 
PRlOR HISTORY: [** 1] Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana. D.C. 
No. CR-OO-00005-JSR John S. Rhoades, District Judge, 
Presiding. 
DISPOSITION: VACATED ,4.NI) REMANDED. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States District 
Court for the District of Montana sentenced defendant 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 
U.s.c.s. § 924(e), which mandates a minimum sentence 
of 15 years for any person who violates the felon-in-
possession statute, 18 U.S c.s. § 922(g), and who has 
three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious 
drug offenses. Defendant appealed his sentence. 
OVERVIEW: Defendant claimed that his sentence could 
not stand because ACCA was unconstitutional in light of 
the Apprendi decision, and because two of the prior 
offenses upon which the district court relied as predicate 
offenses were improperly counted as such. On appeal, the 
court held that ACCA's use of prior convictions as 
sentencing factors was proper. It also held that 
defendant's prior South Dakota third degree burglary 
conviction was a generic burglary conviction that 
properly served as a predlcate offense under ACCA. 
However, the court also held that Apprendi's narrow 
"prior conviction" exception was limited to prior 
convictions resulting from proceedings that afforded the 
procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, the "prior conviction" exception 
did not include nonjury juvenile adjudications. 
Therefore, the use of defendant's nonj ury juvenile 
delinquen~y adjudicailon to increase his maximum 
statutory penalty violated Apprendi. As the sentence 
imposed was in excess of the applicable statutory 
n~ximum, the district court's eITo: was not harmless. 
OUTCOME: Defendant's sentence was vacated and the 
matter was remanded for resentencing. 
CORE TERMS: juvenile, prior conviction, sentence, 
sentencing, jury trial, burglary, juvenile adj udication, 
reasonable doubt, indictment, felony, statutory maximurn, 
predicate offense, predicate, resentencing, convicted, 
generic, violent felony, enhancement, sentencing 
enhancement, proved beyond, juvenile delinquency, 
maximum penalty, general rule, nonjury, qualifY, 
sentenced, beyond a reasonable doubt, statutorily 
mandated, burglary conviction, violent felonies 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
COUNSEL: Michael Donahoe, Assistant Federal 
Defender, Helena, Montana, for the defendant-appellant. 
Bernard F. Hubley, Assistant United States Attomey, 
Helena, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee. 
JUDGES: Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Melvin Brunetti and 
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge 
Fisher; Di.ssent by .Iudge Bnll1etti. 
OPINIONBY Raymond C FisheT 
OPINION: [*1189] 
FISHER, Circuii Judge: 
OVERVIEW This case is before us to review the 
legality of Tighe'S sentence, imposed pursuant to the 
Armed Career Cnmillal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C § 
924(e), which manciates a minimum sentence of 15 years 
for any person who violates the felon-in-possesslOn 
statute, 18 U.S C § 922(g), a..T1d who has three previous 
convictions fOT violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 
T 19he claims that hls sentence C2u'1l1ot stand because 
ACCA is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's 
recent deClsion in Apprendi v. Nerv Jersey. 530 U.S 466, 
ATTACHMENT B 
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147 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Cr. 2348, and because two of 
the prior offenses upon which the district[**2] court 
relied as predicate offenses were improperly counted as 
such. Although we reject Tighe's claim that ACCA 1S 
facially unconstitutional, as well as his claim that his 
third degree burglary conviction was not a "violent 
felony" under ACCA, we agree that the district court 
violated Apprendi in countmg as a predicate offense 
Tighe's previous juvenile adjudication. 
[*1190]Accordingly, we vacate Tighe's sentence and 
remand for resentencing. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 20, 2000, Tighe pled guilty to three counts of 
a three-count indictment charging him with bank robbery 
in violation of 18 USe. § 2iJ3(a) and (d) (Count I), 
being a felon in possession of a flreann in violation of 18 
USe. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(4) (Count II) and 
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in violation of 
18 Us.e. § 2312 (Count III). The indictment did not 
state that if he was found to be an armed career criminal, 
he would receive a minimum sentence of at least 15 
years. n1 During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district 
court informed Tighe that if he had three prior 
convictions for a violent felony he would receive a 
sentence[**3] of not less than 15 years. 1n the 
Presentence Report ("PSR"), the Probation Office 
concluded that the ACCA sentencing enhancement 
should be applied to Tighe, and set forth five previous 
incidents of violent conduct. Tighe submitted objections 
to the PSR, including objections to whether or not his 
convictions qualified him for the enh.ancement. In a 
sentencing memo, Tighe also objected on the ground that 
Apprendi required that the tlu'ee felony predicates be 
proven before a jury by a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard of proof. 
nl Although the government claims in its brief that 
the indictment indiGated that Tighe was notified of 
the applicability of ACCA, the indictment makes no 
such reference to ACCA or its applicable minimum 
sentences. 
At sentencing on August 28, 2000, the district court 
determined. over Tighe's obieGtion, that he should be 
sentenced ~ursuant t; U.S.S.C;. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), whiGb 
implements ACCA. The district court rejected !ighe's 
Apprendi objection. As for the thre(;: pnor telOmes 
reqwred[**4] to trigger the armed career criminal 
enhancement. the district Gourt Erst relied upon a 1993 
Wyoming anned robbery convlctior .. which was agreed 
upon by both p'1l1ies. The cow-t then found that a J 988 
Oregon Juvenile adjudication of a charge of reckless 
endangerment and first-degree robbery and lmauthorized 
use of c motor vehiCle counted as a prior conv1ction. 
Finally, the district court found that a 1992 Soutb Dakota 
bw-glary conviction feil squarely within the "Taylor 
heartland of burglary offenses" and therefore counted as 
the third conviction necessary to apply the enhancement. 
Having found tlu'ee countable convictions, the district 
court sustained Tighe's objection to a 1993 South Dakota 
grand theft conviction "in the interest of judicial 
economy." The court sentenced Tighe to 23 5 months 
lmprisonment for Count I, 180 months for Co\'ill! II and 
120 months for COLmt III, all sentences to nm 
concmrently. He timeiy appeals his sentence. 
ST ANDAED OF REVIEW 
The legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. United 
Stales v. ivfUlphy, 65 F3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1995). The 
constitutionality of a statutory provision is reviewed de 
novo. Taylorll. UniledStates, 143 F.3d Il78, 1179 (9th 
Cir. 1998). [**5] Whether a conviction is a predicate 
felony Lmder section 924(e) is reviewed de novo. United 
States v. Bonal, 106 F.3d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997). 
DISCUSSION 
1. Constitutional Challenges to Tighe's Sentence under 
ACCA 
Tigbe brings both facial and as-applied constitutional 
challenges to his se:ltences [*1191] under ACCA. We 
address each challenge in turn. 
A. Facial Challenge 
The lvmed Career Criminal Act, 18 u.s. C § 924(e), 
mandates a minimum sentence of 15 years for anyone 
conviGted of being a felon in possession of a fireann in 
violation of 18 U.s. C § 9 22(g)(1) who is fotmd to have 
three previous convictions for a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense. J8 us.e. § 924(e)(1); United 
Slates v. McElyea, 158 F. 3d 1016, J 018 (91h Cir. 1998). 
A defendant convic1.ed of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm who has not been previously convicted of three 
violent felonies or serious drug offenses can be sentenced 
anI v to a maxim1.l1n of 10 years. 18 U.s.e. § 924(a)(2). 
Tighe challenges ACCA on its face on (he ground that it 
"allows for a substantial increase[**6] in [the] statutory 
maximum r sentence 1 based on prior convictions, the 
e;mtence of wi1ich n~ed only be proved to the judge by a 
preponderance o~' the evidence." He argues that under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S 466, 747 LEd 2d 
435. 720 S Cr. :3348 (2000;. the fact of bls pnor 
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convictions must be proved to a Jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Under the current state of the law, the Constitution 
cioes not require prior convictions that increase a 
statutory penalty to be charged in the indictment and 
proved before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United 
States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 4Jl, 413-14 (9th 
Cir. 2001) ("The district court was entitled to consider 
any prior aggravated felony convictions in sentencing 
Pacheco-Zepeda for illegal reentry even though sllch 
conduct had not been charged in the indictment, 
presented to a j Llry, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt."); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S at 490 ("Other than 
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)); [**7] 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 243-
44, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, lI8 S Ct. 1219 (1998). 
Accordingly, we affIrm the district court's holding that 
ACCA is constitutional on its face. 
B. As-Applied Challenge 
Tighe argues that his sentence is lllconstitutional 
because it was increased beyond the statutory maximum 
10 years by the district court's finding that he was 
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for committing a 
violent felony when he was 14 years old. He argues that 
Apprendi requires that the fact of his juvenile 
adjudication be charged in an indictment and found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
One of the three predicate felonies used by the district 
court to enhance Tighe's sentence was a 1988 Oregon 
juvenile adjudication for reckless endangerment, robbery 
and lUlauthorized use of a motor vehicle. As a juvenile, 
Tighe was not afforded the right to a jury trial during the 
juvenile proceedings under either state or federal law. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 LEd. 2d 
647, 91 S Ct. 1976 (1971) (concluding that, in a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication, trial by jury is not a 
constitutional requirement); Stare v. Reynolds, 317 Ore. 
560, 857 P,2d 842 (Or. 1993).[*"'8J Despite the lack of a 
jury trial and certain other procedural protections in the 
context of most juvenile proceedings, however, Congress 
has declared that juvenile delinquency adjudications 
involving violent felonies may nonetheless quaiify as 
predicate "convictions" lmder ACCA. 18 U.s. C § 
92 4( e )(2)( C). 
This is not the Erst lime we have addressed the 
constitutionality of nonJlL"y juvenile [*1192] 
adjudications as sentencing enhancements. In Ul1iled 
Stares v. Williams, 89 J F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), a pre-
Apprendi case, we held tbal a sentencing Judge's use of a 
prior, 110njury juvenile adjudication to enhance a 
defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines did 
not violate due process. Contrary to the government's 
assertion, however, Williams is not dispositive of the 
issue presently before us, because the nature of the 
sentencing decision reviewed U1 that case was 
fundamentally different from the sentencing decision 
Tighe now challenges. Although Wilhams addressed the 
use of pnor juvenile adjudications to enhance a 
defendant's sentence, the defendant'B ultimate sentence in 
that case was within the statutorily mandated range for 
["'*9)the offense of conviction. In other words, William's 
prior juvenile adJ udications were not used to increase the 
statutorily mandated maximum punislllTlent to which he 
was exposed. n2 
n2 In Williams, the statute under which the defendant 
was convicted, J 8 U.s. C § 2 J J3(a), set the statutory 
maximum punishment at not more than 20 years 
incarceration. The defendant in that case was 
ultimately sentenced to 57 months, which was well 
below the statutory maxim\.UTI. 
In contrast, under ACCA the fact of Tighe's prior 
juvenile adjudication was used to increase his statutorily 
mandated maximlUll punishment from not more than 10 
years, under 18 USC § 924(a)(2), to at least 15 years, A 
fact that is used to increase the maximum statutory 
penalty to which a defendant is exposed raises an entirely 
different set of constitutional concerns than a fact that 
merely affects where a sentence is fixed within an 
I.mdisputed statutorily mandated range. See United States 
v. Moss. 252 F,3d 993, (**IO) 200] WL 637312 (8th 
Cir., 2001). Accordingly, because Tighe challenges the 
use of his prior juvenile adjlLdications to raise his 
statutory maximum p\.Ulishmont, Williams does not 
answer tho question of whether the district court's use of 
sLlch adj udicatiol1s was constitutional. 
As discussed in the preceding section addressing 
Tighe's facial challenge to ACCA, the Supreme Court has 
held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crim:; beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 
530 US at 490, ]47 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Cl. 2348 
(emphasis added); see aiso Jones v. United States, 526 
U.s 227 aI 243, n. 6, J43 LEd 2d 311.119 S Ct. 1215. 
Thus, the Supreme Court nas held that prior convictions 
are exempt from Apprendi's general mle 2.11::, as 
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sentencing factors, need not be afforded the same 
procedural protections that anach to facts that are 
construed as elements of the charged crime. n3 
n3 It should be noted that several states' recidivism 
statutes treat prior convictions as eiements of a crime 
or provide for a jury determination of the fact of a 
prior conviction. See Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S at 
246 (noting that some states treat prior convictions as 
elements of the related crime and submit the fact of a 
prior conviction to a jury); see generally Spencer v. 
Texas, 385 U.S 554, 566-67. 17 LEd. 2d 606, 87 S 
Ct. 648 (J 967) (describing various states' procedures 
for proving prior convictions); Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S 448, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446, 82 S. Ct. 501 (1962) 
(examining West Virginia's procedure for proving 
prior convictions). 
[**11) 
At first blush, it may appear that Tighe's 1988 juvenile 
adjudication, which Congress has characterized as a 
"prior conviction" for the purposes of ACCA, falls 
precisely within Apprendi's exception for "the fact of a 
prior conviction," thus foreclosing Tighe's argument that 
the use of that adjudication at sentencing to increase his 
maximum penalty violated Apprendi. Such an analysis, 
however, ignores the signifIcant constitutional 
differences between [* 1193 }adult convictions and 
juvenile adjudications. Compare McKeiver, supra, with 
Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 Us. 145, 149, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
491,88 S. Ct 1444 (1968) (holding that ,he rigbt of trial 
by ju..ry is a fundamental right applicable to the states). 
Neither Apprendi, nor Almendarez-Torres -- the case 
upon which Apprendi relied to create the "prior 
conviction" exception to its general rule .- specifIcally 
addressed the urlique issues that distinguish juvenile 
adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of 
a right to a jury trial in mosl juvenile adjudications. Thus. 
neither case squarely tackles the question that Tighe's 
appeal now raises: do prior juvenile adjudications, which 
do[**12] not afford the righe to a jury trial, fall within the 
"prior conviction" exception to Apprendi's general rule 
that a fact used to increase a defendant's maximwl1 
penalty must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
~easonable doubt? In order to answer this question, we 
must inquire into the scope of the term "conviction" as 
used by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. and tbe cases 
leading up to Apprendl. 
In Aimendarez-Tones, the case that fIrst held prior 
convictions could be treated as sentencing factors that 
raise the maximum penalty of an offense, the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of a statutory prov1sion 
that autholizes ar. increased prison sentence for aliens reo 
entering the United States after deponalioD if the alien 
was convicted of a pno: aggravated felony. Almendarez. 
Torres, 523 U.S. a/ 229. The defendant ~rgued that the 
fact of his prior conViction, which was used to increase 
hiS statutorily mandated maxilUum punishment, was an 
element of his offense and should have been charged in 
the indictment. The Court rejected this argument, bolding 
that the fact of the prior conviction was a sentencing 
factor, and not 8 separate element of the[**13J crime t~ 
be charged in the indictment. !d. at 243. 
The next term, in Jones v. United Slates, 526 US 227, 
143 L. Ed 2d 31J, Jl9 5 Ct 1215 (2999), the Court 
considered Almendarez-Tones' holding regarding the use 
of prior convictions in the context of emerging concerns 
about the viability of using facts not charged in an 
indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt to increase the statutory maximum penalty to 
which a defendant is exposed. The Court explained why 
the fact of prior convictions was cOllStitutionally distinct 
from other sentence-enhancing facts, such that it was 
pern1issible, wlder Almendarez-Tones, to use prior 
convictions to increase the possible penalty for an 
offense without treating them as an element of the current 
offense: "One basis for thal constitutional distinctiveness 
[of prior convictions) is not hard to see: unlike virtually 
any other consideration used to enlarge the possible 
penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself 
have been established through procedures satisfying the 
fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees." 
Jones, 526 US at 249 (emphasis[**14] added). Thus, 
Jones' recognition of pnor convictions as a 
constitutionally permissible sentencing factor was rooted 
in the concept that prior convictions have been, by their 
very nature, subject to the funda...'Tlental triumvirate of 
procedural protections intended to guarantee the 
reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable 
doubt and the right to a jury trial. 
One year later, in Apprendi, the Court further 
elaborated on the importance of such procedural 
protections being inherent in prior convictions used as 
sentencing faciors to increase statutory penalties. The 
COUli expiained that "the certainty that procedural 
safeguards attached to the 'fact' of prior conviction" was 
crucial to [* 1194 J Almendarez· Tones' constitutional 
holding regarding prior convictions as sentencing factors. 
Apprendi, 530 U.S at 488. The Court identiiiec the right 
to a jury trial as one of the requisite procedural 
safeguards \0 which it refe:-red: "There is a vast 
difference between accePting the validity of a. prior 
judgment of conviction e~tered in a proceeciing in which 
the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the nght to 
reqUlre the prosecutor to prove guil: beyond[**15] a 
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reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the 
required fact under a lesser sta.lldard of proof" Apprendi, 
530 u.s. ai 496. The Court's continued acceptance of 
Almendarez-Torres' holding regarding prior convictions, 
then, was premised on sentence-enhancing prior 
convictions being the product of proceedings that afford 
crucial procedural protections -- particularly the right to a 
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, as we read Jones and Apprendi, the "prior 
conviction" exception to Apprendi's general rule must be 
limited to prior convictions that were themselves 
obtained througb proceedings that included the right to a 
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Juvenile 
adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury trial 
and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, 
therefore, do not fall within Apprendi's "prior 
conviction" exception. n4 
n4 It does not matter to this analysis whether any 
state provides the right to a jury trial for juvenile 
adjudications. It is undisputed that Tighe was not 
provided a jury when he was adjudged a juvenile 
delinquent in Oregon or when he was sentenced as an 
armed career criminal in tilis case. 
l**16] 
To the extent the government's argument can be 
construed as a request to extend Apprendi's "prior 
conviction" exception to io.ciude prior nonjury juvenile 
adjudications on the basis of Almendarez-Torres' logic, 
we decline to do so. The Apprendi Court's serious 
reservations about the reasoning of Almendarez-Torres 
counsel against any extension of that opinion's holding: 
Even though it is arguable the Almendarez-Torres was 
incorrectly decided, a..'1d that a logical application of our 
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were 
contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's 
validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our 
decision today to tTeat the case as a narrow exception to 
the genera! rule we recalled at the outset. Given its 
unique facts, it surely does not warrant rejection of the 
otherwise ulufonn course of decision during the entire 
history of our jurisprudence. 
Apprendi, 530 U.S al 489-90 (emphasis added); see also 
id. at 487 (" Almendarez-Torres represents a1 best an 
exceptionai departure from the historic practice that we 
have described. ") Although this Circuit recogaized 
[** 17] the continuing precedential vaiue of Aimenciarez-
Torres in Pachecu-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 4J3-N. we 
conclude that, given the ''lmique facts "of Almendarez-
Torres, its holding regarding prior convictions should 
remain a "narrow exception" to Apprendi that does not 
extend to nonjw-y juveniie adjudications. 
In sum, we conclude Apprcndi's narrow "prior 
conViction" exception is limited to prior convictions 
resulting from proceedings that afforded the procedural 
necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. n5 Thus, the "prior conviction" [* 1195J exception 
does not include nonjury juvenile adjudications, 
Therefore, the district coun violated Apprendi when, at 
sentencing, it increased Tighe's penalty beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum based on an adjudication 
which denied Tighe the right to a jury trial. See 
Apprendi, 530 Us. at 489; Jones, 526 US at 243 IJ. 6, 
249. 
n5 We acknowledge the concern that defendants 
might be prejudiced if their prior juvenile 
adj udicatiol1s are presented to the jury, but we note 
that courts may fashion procedures to avoid putting 
such defendants to the "Hobson'S choice" described 
by the dissent The Court in Spencer v. Te.J:as, 385 
u.s 554, 566-69, 17 1. Ed. 2d 606, 87 S Ct. 648 
(1967), recognized that states, in implementing their 
recidivist statutes, could use various procedures to 
mitigate any prejudice to the defendant. Although the 
Court declined to require a two-stage jury trial 
constitutionally, see id. at 568, such a separation of 
the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial would 
address such potential prejudice. 
[*"'181 
Because Tighe properly preserved his ]onesiApprendi 
clain: for appeal, his sentence CaImot stand unless the 
disnict court's constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. United States v, Velasco-Heredia, 249 
F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2001), United States v. Garcia-
GUizar, 234 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Or. 2000). Because 
Tighe's sentence of 180 months for his violation of 18 
u.S.C § 922(g)(1) is in excess of the applicable statutory 
maximum (10 years) based upon the jury's findings, we 
hold this enor is not harmless. Id. 
We note that Tigbe's sentence lL."1der COlli,t I, the armed 
robbery offense_ was also improperly affected by the 
inclusi~n of hi~ juvenile adjudication as a predicate 
offense for ACCA. For sentencing purposes, the district 
court grouped COWlls I and II. See U.S.S.G. § 
3Dl.l(a)(3). The com1 then detenmlled that Tighe was 
an armed career offender because be was convicted of 
being a felon in possession with three prior vlOiem 
felonies. It applied U.S.SG § 4B14 (b)(3)(a) and 
-85· 
266 F.3d 1187, "'; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20861, "'"'; 
2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8333; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 10289 
detennined that Tighe's offense level was 31 (34 minus 
three points for an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment) [*" 19J and that given his criminal history 
category, the sentencing range for Count 1 was 18&-235 
months. It sentenced him to the high end of that range, 
235 months. 
For § 4B 1.4 to apply, however, the defendant must be 
subject "ra an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 
[ACCA,] J8 USC § 924(e)." U.S.S. G. § 4Bl.4 (a). A.s 
we conclude above, Tighe could not be subjected to an 
enhanced sentence under ACCA; thus, he also was not 
subject to a sentence enhancement W1der U.S.S.G. § 
4B 1.4. Without that enhancement, Tighe's offense level 
would have been 29 and, given his criminal history 
category, the sentencing range for Count I would have 
been 151 to 188 months. Accordingly, Tighe's 235-
month sentence under Count I was also improperly 
affected by the Apprendi violation. Cf. United States v. 
Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Apprendi error resulted in a misapplication of the 
Sentencing Guidelines but that W1der the applicable plain 
error standard, no relief would be granted). n6 
n6 Given our conclusion that the district court erred 
in counting Tighe's 1988 juvenile adjudicatioG as a 
predicate offense under ACCA, we do not reach 
Tighe's remaining claims of error regarding the use of 
that adjudication. 
[**20] 
II. Tighe's Taylor Challenge to his South Dakota 
Burglary Conviction 
Tighe also claims that his 1992 conviction for burglary 
fails to qualify as a predicate felony under ACCA 
because South Dakota's defmition of burglary is too 
broad to constitute a "violent felony." vVe address this 
issue here because it may arise again on remand if the 
goverrunent attempts [* 1196] to resentence Tighe w1der 
ACCA. We hold that Tighe's South Dakota conviction 
can be counted as a predicate felony for ACCA purposes. 
Although ACCA includes "burglary" among the 
enumerated violent felonies, 18 U.S. C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Taylor v. Uniled Slates, 495 U.S 575, 
109 LEd. 2d 607, jj 0 S Ct. 2143 (1 990J. nonetheless 
established that not all state burglary convictiom should 
be considered predicate felonies lUlder thal Act. In 
deciding whether a prior burglary conviction constltutes 
a "burglary" for the purposes of ACCi'., the sentencing 
court must determine whether the burglary statute at issue 
substantially corresponds to the "generic" definitior: of 
burgla!)'. Jd at 600, United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. ]992).[**21J To constitute generic 
bmglary, a burglary stantte must contain the foliowing 
three elements: "[lJ an unlawful or unprivileged entry 
into, or remaining ill [2J a budding or other structure, [3] 
with the intent to commit a crime." Taylor, 495 U.S at 
598. 
Tighe argues that South Dakota's third degree bmglary 
statute, SDCL § 22-32-8, does not contain the necessary 
elements of generic bmglary, because the South Dakota 
statute omits any reference to the required entry being 
unlawful or unprivileged. Accordingly, Tighe maintains 
that his 1992 bmglary conviction was non generic and 
cannot constimte a predicate offense w1der ACCA. In 
relevant part, SDCL §§ 22-32-8 provides: 
Any person who enters an llTIoccupied structure, with 
intent to commit any crime other than the act of 
shoplifting or retail theft ... or remains in an unoccupied 
structure after forming the i.ntent to commit any crime .,. 
is guilty of third degree burglary. 
Given the plain language of the statute, Tighe's assertion 
is technically correct, as there is no mention of the 
lawfulness of the entry. Taylor itself recognized that a 
state might omit this necessary element of generic[**22J 
burglary: "[aJ few States' burglary statutes, however, ... 
define burglary more broadly, e.g. by eliminating the 
requirement that the entry be unlawful." 495 U.S at 599 
(emphasis added). Ii would appear, therefore, that South 
Dakota's statutory definition of burglary falls outside the 
generic defmition of burglary. 
In Slate v. Derby, 462 N,W2d 512,513 (S D. 1990), 
however, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that, 
although not explicitly stated in the statute, "unlawful or 
unauthorized entry into a structure [isJ an element of 
third-degree burglary." The Derby decision's explicit 
inclusion of the element of "unlawful or unauthorized 
entry" brings the burglary statute under which Tighe was 
convicted squarely with the defll1itioll of generic 
burglary, as each of the three essential elements of 
generic burglary are actually required to obtain a 
conviction under the South Dakota Supreme Court's 
mterpretation of South Dakota law. A state court's 
interpretation of a statute is binding in dctennining 
whether the elements of generic burglary are present 
Bonal, 106 F.3d at 1475. Therefore, given the Soutb 
Dakota court's inlerpretation[ *~23J of the burglary 
statute, the Taylor definition of generic burglary is 
satisfled and Tighe's pnor South Dakota conviction for 
burglary was properly cOlmted as 2 predicate violent 
felony uncier ACCA. 
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Ill. Remand for Resentencing Because we conclude 
that the district court ened by counting Tighe's 1988 
juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense [" 1 1 97Jul1der 
ACCA, we vacate Tighe's sentence and remand to the 
district court for resentencing. Tighe argues that at 
resentencing, the government should be precluded from 
arguing that his fourth prior conviction, a 1993 
conviction for grand theft, qualifies as a predicate offense 
under ACCA. At his original sentencing, tbe govel11ment 
urged the district court to COlmt this cOllviction as a 
predicate offense under ACCA. The district court, 
however, sustained Tighe's objection to the conviction 
"in the interest of judicial economy, "because it had 
already determined that Tighe had the requisite truee 
countable offenses. Despite sustaining the objection, 
however, the district court noted that it had not fully 
analyzed the conviction, which "could well qualify as a 
violent felony pursuant to 18 US.C § 924(e)(2)." 
Nonetheless, [**24] Tighe now argues that because the 
government failed to file a cross-appeal contesting the 
district court's grant of Tighe's objection to the use of that 
conviction as a predicate offense, it has waived any 
argument that the 1993 conviction qualifies as a 
predicate offense. We disagree. Failure to cross-appeal a 
sentencing enor does not constitute a waiver of the right 
to contest that enor at resentencing. See United States v. 
Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We 
reject [the defendant's] claim that the goverruncnt waived 
its right to correct the error in the original sentence 
because it did not cross-appeal from the original 
sentence. "). At resentencing, a district court is" free to 
review the entire sentencing calculus." United States v. 
Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390,1394 (9th Cir. 1994), ovenuled 
on other grounds, Witte v. United States, 515 Us. 389, 
132 L. Ed. 2d 351, 1J5 S. Cl. 2199 (1995). Thus, at 
Tighe's resentencing, the district court is free to consider 
whether Tighe's 1993 conviction for grand theft qualifies 
as a predicate offense under ACeA. 
Finally, Tighe argues that if thc district court is 
permitted[**25] to consider his 1993 grand theft 
conviction at resentencing, the government should be 
precluded from offering any additional evidencc 
regarding that conviction. In support of this contention, 
Tighe relies on United Slates v. Matthews, 226 F.3d 
1075 (9th Cir. 2000). Matthews involved completely 
different facts. n7 There, the government patently faiied 
to comply wlth evidenllary requirements al sentencing 
and wanted to Ie-open the record on remand to correct its 
error. Here, the government complied with its evidentiary 
burden during sentencing. AlIOWlllg the governmcnt to 
submit eVldence at Tighe's resentencing heanng will 
therefore nm constitute an impermissible "second bite at 
the apple" fo; the govemment. Accorciingly, at Tighe's 
resentencing, the government may offer Tighe's 1993 
grand theft conviction for consideration as a predicate 
offense under ACCA, and may, if necessary, submit 
additional documentation regarding that conviction. 
117 Matthews has been taken en bane and can no 
longer be cited as precedent. See United Slates v 
Mallhews, 254 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001). If this case 
were nol distinguishable from Matthews, we would 
delay our decision until that case was decided. 
[**26J 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that ACCA's usc of prior convictions as 
sentencing factors is proper under Almendarez-Torres. 
We also conclude that Tigbe's 1992 South Dakota third 
degree burglary conviction was a generic burglary 
conviction that properly served as a predicate offense 
under ACCA. We hold, however, that the use of Tighe's 
1988 nonjury juvenile delinquency adjudication to 
increase his maximum statutory penalty violated 
Apprendi. Accordingly, we vacate [*1198] his sentence 
and remand for resentencing. 
VACATED At'lD REMAND ED. 
DlSSENTBY; Melvin Bl1l11erti 
DISSENT: 
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
The majority reachcs the lU1supportable conclusion that 
a juvenile adjudication is not a "conviction" for 
sentencing enhancement pmposes because, in essence, 
juveniles have no constitutional right to a trial by jury. I 
respectfully dissent from Part I.B of the opinion because 
it fails to recognize the full force of Supreme Court 
precedent, our case law, and congressional intent. I begin 
with 18 USc. § 922(g)(1), the relevant statute Lmder 
which Tighe was convicted. That provision makes it 
unlawful for a prior felon to possess a firearm. V\Then an 
individual[**27] vlOiatcs the substantive crime set forth 
ill section 922(g), he is subject to an enhanced penalty 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act CAeCA"), 18 
US.C § 924(e), if he i1as suffered th:'ee previous 
convictlOl1S for "a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense." Congress speciflcally included in section 
924(e)'s definition of 2 countable conviction any "find.ing 
that a person has c:ommitted aa ;:,ct of juvenik 
delinquency invoiving a violent feiony." Id. § 
924(e)(2)(C). 
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This court has clearly held that section 924(e) is a 
penalty enhancement statute and does not create a new 
substantive federai crime. United Siales v. Dunn, 946 
F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. J991) (citing United States v. 
West, 826 F2d 909, 91 J (9th Cir. 1987)): see also 
Taylor v. United Stales, 495 U.S 575, 1091. Ed. 2d 607, 
110 S Ct. 2J43 (1990) (referring repeatedly to § 924(e) 
as a "sentence enhancement provision"). We have further 
held that the fact of the predicate felony convictions 
required for a sentencing enhancement under section 
924(e) need not be included in the indictment nor proved 
at triaL ld. The judge may find the facl of1**28] the 
requisite predicate convictions at the sentencing hearing 
under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Uillted 
States v. Phillips, 149 F3d J026, 1033 (91h Cir. 1998). 
With this backdrop in mind, I tum to the facts of this 
case rclevant to my concern. The district court 
determined at sentencing that Shannon Wayne Tighe had 
been convicted of at least three prior violent felonies, 
requiring an ACCA enhancement. One of these prior 
convictions is a 1988 Oregon juvenile adjudication for 
reckless endangerment, first-degree robbery, and 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Over Tighe's 
constitutional objections, the district court included the 
Oregon juvenile adjudication as a countable felony under 
section 924(e) by relying, in great part, on our decision in 
United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
In Williams, the defendant contended that his due 
process rights were violated because his adult criminal 
sentence was enhanced due to prior Juvenile 
adjudications for which he did not have a right to jllry 
trial. Jd. at 2 j 3. Relying on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
403 U.s. 528, 29 LEd. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976 
(1971), [**29] in which the Supreme Court held that jury 
trials are not constitutionally required for juvenile 
adjudications, we allowed the juvenile conviction to 
support the sentence enhancement. We observed that 
while "juvenile delinquency proceedings must conform 
to the due process guarantees of the Constitution ". these 
due process guarantees do not include the right to a jury 
trial for delinquency adjudications." Vlilliams, 891 F2d 
at 214 (citations omitted). Thus, where a juvenile 
received all the process constitutionally due at the 
delinquency proceeding stage, we fOLU1d the later use of 
the juveniie adjudication for an adult enhancement to be 
constitutionally sound because" the conviction was 
constitutionally valid for purposes of imposing a ~* ]199] 
sentence of imprisonment for the [juvenile] offense 
itself." fd. at 215. To hold otherwise would have required 
the court "to hold that the enhancement of an adult 
criminal sentence requues a higher level of due process 
protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence"--a 
notion the court squareJy rejected. Id. 
Tighe's case should be suaightforward lU1uer Williams 
because, as explained above, there is[**30J no 
constitutional problem with using a Juvenile deiinquency 
adjudication to support a sentencing enhancement. But 
the majority suggests that the Supreme Cooo's decisions 
in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi direct a 
different result than the one Williams demands. 
disagree. 
Jones v. Uniled Stares, 526 u.s. 227, 1431. Ed. 2d 
3Jl, 1J9 S. Ct. 12/5 (1999) was a precursor to the 
Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 
466, 147 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Ct. 2348 (2000), which 
held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi. 
530 Us. at 490: see also Jones, 526 Us. at 243 n. 6. 
The "other than a fact of a prior conviction" language in 
Apprendi hearkens back to the Court's decision in 
Almendarez-Torres v. United Slates, 523 U.S 224, 140 
L. Ed. 2d 350, Jl8 S Ct. 1219 (1998). 
Almendarez-Torres held that where a legislature crafts 
a penalty provision which simply authorizes a court to 
ll1crease a[**31) sentence for a recidivist, the 
Constitution does not require the government to charge 
the fact of the prior convictlOn in the indictment. ld at 
226-227. There, the Court examined whether a provision 
in an illegal re-entry statute, which raised the penalty for 
illegal re-entry from two to twenty (20) years based on 
recidivism, was a sentencing factor or an element of the 
crime. In concluding that it was a sentencing factor, the 
Court rejected the argument that, because the fact of 
recidivism increased the maximW11 penalty to which a 
defendant was exposed, Congress was constitutionally 
required to b'cat recidivism as an element of tbe crime 
that must be charged in an indictment and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 239: see also United States v. 
Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 411, 413-J4 (9th Clr. 2001) 
(explaining that Almendarez-Torres "stands for the 
proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range 
must be staled it: a felony indictment, the precise holding 
being that recidivism ll1crcasing the maximwn penalty 
need not be so charged.") (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). In United States v. Pacheco-
Zepeda,[**32] we had occasion to address whether 
Almendarez.-Tones remained good law after the Court in 
Apprendl eXDressed some concern ove: its continuing 
validity. Pacheco-Zepeda. 234 F3d at 414. We 
obse;ved that ADprendl 
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reasoned that any clue process Of Sixth Amendment 
concerns--arising Oll! of the judicial detennination of a 
"fact" that increased punishment beyond the statutory 
maximum--were mitigated in Almendarez-T olTes by 
"both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to 
any 'fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that [the 
defendant) did not challenge the accuracy of that 'fact' in 
his case. 
rd. 
Thus, we found that "the Comt in Apprendi chose not 
to overrule Almendarez-Torres, and unmistakably carved 
out an exception for "pnor convictions" that specifically 
preserved the holding of Almendarez-Torres. Id. 
(emphasis added). The majority acknowledges, as it 
must, that Almendarez-Ton'es is still part of [* 1200J "the 
current state of the law." However, it proceeds to rnake 
the tortured argument that prior juvenile adjudications, 
which do not afford the right to a jmy trial, do not fall 
within the "prior conviction"[**33] exception to 
Apprendi's general rule that a fact used to i.ncrease a 
defendant's maximum penalty must be submitted to a jury 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority 
does so by relying on language in Jones (and later 
reiterated in Apprendi) that explains why it is 
constitutionally permissible to use prior convictions to 
increase the possible penalty for an offense without 
treating the fact of the convictions themselves as 
elements of the crime. I repeat the specific Jones 
language here: 
One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of prior 
convictions] is not hard to see: LU1like virtually any other 
consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an 
offense ... a prior conviction must Itself have been 
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, 
reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees." 
Majority Opinion at 13595 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S at 
249.) 
The majority takes tlus language and makes the 
quantum leap to hold, in effect, that in order for a pnor 
conviction to support <1 sentencing enhancement, it must 
have been "subject to the fundamental tnumvirate of 
procedmal protections intended to guaramee[**34] tbe 
reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable 
doubt and the right to a Jury trial." Majority Opinion at 
13595. Because part of this 50-called "fundamental 
triumvirate of procedural protections" is absent for 
juvenile adj udications, the majority takes Juvenile 
adjudications out of the equation, even though Congress 
sp~cifically made tbem pm1 of it. 
I do not beheve the Janguage plucked from Jones 
provides sufficient authOrity to overrule (albeit 
implicitly) this court's decision m Will1ams, nor do 1 
think the majority'S attempt to distinguish Williams is 
valld. In my view, the language in Jones stands for the 
basic proposition that Congress has the constitutional 
power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors 
subj ect to a lesser standard of proof because the 
defendant presunlably received all the process that was 
due when he was convicted of the predicate crune. For 
adults, this would indeed include the right to a jw:y trial. 
For Juveniies, it docs not. Extending Jones' logic to 
juvemle adjudications, when <1 juvenile receives all the 
process constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, there is 
no constitutional problem (on which[**35] Apprendi 
focused) in using that adjudication to support a later 
sentencing enhancement. Our decision in Williams 
recognizes just that. 
The majority does not make clear how its decision 
today will work in practice, but it is obvious that it will 
be troublesome. If a Juvenile adjudication (withollt the 
right to a jury trial) does not fall within the Almendarez-
Torres exception, then, to comply with Apprendi, 
prosecutors will be required to prove the fact of the prior 
convictions to the jury in order to support the sentencing 
enhancement. While, as the majority notes, some states 
treat prior convictions as elements of the related crime 
and submit the fact of a prior conviction to a jill)', it 
overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court has long 
recognized "that the introduction of evidence of a 
defendant's prior crimes risks significant prej udice." 
Almendarez- Torres, 523 US. at 235 (citing Spencer v. 
Texas, 385 U.s. 554, 560, 17 L Ed 2d 606, 87 S. Ct. 
648 (1967)); see also United Slates v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 
615, 619-620 (9th Cir. j 996) (commenting that including 
information regarding three prior violent felonies in 
the[**36J defendant's indictment "probably would have 
introduced an unacceptable level of prejudice into his 
trial"). Thus, a [*1201J defendant with a prior juvenile 
adjudication will be put to the Hobson's choice of 
stipulating to the priors or parading them before a jury. 
But, as Almendarez-Tones recognized, "even if a 
defendant's stipulation were to keep the name and details 
of the previous 0 ffense trom the j my, ... jurors would still 
leam, from the indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor, 
that the defendant had committed [three violent 
felonies]." 523 U.S. at 235 (Citation omitted) This 
approach seems to wreak havoc on the very due process 
rignts Apprendi sought to vindicate. 
Fo' these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Pan I.B 
and tl1t ultimate result. bul concur ir: all other respects. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-11-2386 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
Plaintiff, State of Idaho hereby submits this memorandum of authority in support of the 
Motion in Limine. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 14th , 2011, a preliminary hearing was held in this case in front of the 
Honorable R. Ted Israel in Magistrate Court. During that hearing, the State presented evidence 
showing that the Defendant was previously convicted of driving under the influence pursuant to 
Nevada Revised Statute 484.379, attached hereto as Exhibit A. This evidence consisted of a 
certified judgment of conviction dated July 11 th, 2011 out of Lyon County, Nevada, attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
Evidence was also provided that the Defendant had been previously convicted of Dr'lving 
Under the Influence pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 23152, this evidence consisted of a 
certified judgment of conviction dated September 1 tn, 2007, out of Placer County, California, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
At the preliminary hearing, Judge Israel found probable cause for Driving Under the 
Influence, 3rd Offense in 10 years, a Felony, and ordered the Defendant bound over to the 
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District Court. The State then filed a Motion in Limine to have this Court rule that the California 
and Nevada Judgment of Convictions are substantially conforming to Idaho's DUI statute as 
included in LC. § 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10). The Court heard preliminary arguments on the 
issues and allowed the parties the opportunity to submit briefs. While the Motion in Limine 
requested the Court rule that both the California and Nevada DUI statutes are substantially 
conforming criminal violations, the Defendant's Memorandum is focused solely on Nevada's 
DUI Statute. Whether or not the Defendant is conceding that the California DUI statute is 
substantially conforming, this brief shall address and respond to the Defendant's arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Nevada conviction for Driving Under the Influence is Substantially Conforming 
criminal violation under I.C. § 18-8005(10). 
Under Idaho Code, § 18-8005( 10), a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation 
exists when a person had pled guilty to or found guilty of a violation of any federal law or law of 
another state, or any valid county, city, or town ordinance of another state substantially 
conforming to the provisions of section I. C. § 18-8004. The determination of whether a foreign 
criminal violation is substantially conforming is a question of law to be determined by the Court. 
The Statute under which the Defendant was convicted in Nevada (N.R.S. 484.379) (see 
exhibit A) substantially conforms to LC. § 18-8004. Nevada's applicable statute states in 
applicable part: 
"1. It is unlawful for any person who: 
(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
(b) Has a concentration of alcohol or .08 or more in his blood or breath; or 
(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle to have a concentration of alcohol If .08 of more in his blood 
or breath, 
To drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to 
which the public has access." 
N.R.S. 484.379. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a) reads: 
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"It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating 
substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this 
section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or 
upon public or private property open to the public." 
Defendant first argues that the Nevada statute is not substantially conforming because 
"Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the Nevada statue is not 
concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the concentration at the time of the 
test." Defendant's Memorandum p.2. The Defendant incorrectly reads the Nevada Statute. 
N.R.S. 484.379 clearly prohibits driving while intoxicated by including the statutory language 
prohibiting ..... any person who... is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or has a 
concentration of alcohol of .08 or more in his blood or breath to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access. The 
Defendant's argument relies solely on sUbsection 484.379(1)(c) and ignores 1(a) and 1(b). A 
plain reading of the statute provides that N.R.S. 484.379(1) has an "or" after (b) that applies to 
(a),(b), and (c). Therefore, The Defendant is incorrect in stating the Nevada Statue is not 
concerned with the alcohol concentration at the time of driving. 
Defendant also claims that there is a significant different between Idaho and Nevada 
because Idaho's statutory scheme allows for a defendant to introduce evidence that his blood 
alcohol reading was less than when he was driving and this same evidence would be prohibited 
in Nevada. The Defendant ignores N.R.S. 484.379(4). Importantly, N.R.S. 484.379(4) 
provides that "if consumption is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative 
defense under paragraph (c) of subsection 1, that the defendant consumed sufficient quantity of 
alcohol after driving or being in actual physical control of the vehicle, and before his blood or 
breath was tested, to cause him to have a concentration of alcohol of .08 or more in his blood or 
breath." The statute then provides the Defendant must provide notice to the State for this 
defense. Basically, it is a defense in Idaho and Nevada where the Defendant claims he was not 
intoxicated while driving. Nevada merely created an affirmative defense and required noflce. 
This is not a substantial deviation from Idaho's statute. 
Idaho case law supports the argument that the Nevada statute is a substantially conforming 
foreign conviction despite the provision allowing for testing within 2 hours of driving. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals first analyzed substantially conformity in State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 172 
P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the Court was comparing Montana's DUI statute to 
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Idaho's and set out some basic guidelines. First, exact correspondence is not required. Id. at 
559. Next, the Court compares the elements of the statutes. Id. at 558-59. Finally, it is 
important for the Court to decide whether both statutes prohibit the same essential conduct -
driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id. 
The Defendant in State v. Schmoll made a similar argument under the Montana DUI statute 
as the Defendant in the present case. In Schmoll, the Montana statute at issue provided "If 
BAC tests are preformed within a reasonable time after the alleged violation, the results of the 
tests give rise to several inferences... If the test reveals a concentration of .08 or more, there is 
a rebuttable inference that the person was in fact under the influence of alcohol when driving." 
Schmoll, 172 P.3d at 559., M.C.A §61-8-401(4)(c). The Court ruled that the difference between 
Montana and Idaho in using BAC was inconsequential, reasoning "[p)roving that a person is 
under the influence absent a BAC test requires a greater degree of impairment in Montana than 
in Idaho ... " Id. Finally, because the "two statutes frame their prohibitions using the same 
language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a violation." Schmoll 
at 559. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals also considered the substantially conforming prior out of state 
DUI statutes in State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case the 
Court considered whether North Dakota statute is substantially conforming to Idaho. The North 
Dakota statute had a provision similar to Nevada's and stated "that person has an alcohol 
concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the 
performance of a chemical test within 2 hours after the driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle." State v. Moore 231 P.3d at 541. The Defendant did not challenge this issue and 
the Court did not rule on it, but the Court reiterated the same issues in Schmoll and ruled that 
North Dakota's DUI statute was substantially conforming to Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
As in Schmoll, since Nevada uses the BAC evidence differently, this Court should compare 
the statutes respective definitions of "under the influence." In Idaho, under the influence has 
been defined to include "impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree; the impairment 
must be noticeable or perceptible, but does not need to rise to a level where the defendant is 
incapable of driving safely or prudently." Schmoll, 172 P.3d at 559. Nevada defines under the 
Influence in 484.379(2)(c) as "to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or 
exercising actual physical control of a vehicle." Therefore, Nevada has a higher standard that 
surpasses the elements required for a violation in Idaho. See Schmoll at 559. The elements of 
the Nevada and Idaho statutes are substantially conforming under Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
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2. The Nevada conviction for Driving Under the Influence is constitutionally valid and can 
be used by the State to enhance the Defendant's current Driving Under the Influence 
charge. 
The Defendant next claims that because Nevada does not allow for a jury trial for a first 
offense DUI, a prior conviction cannot be used as a substantially conforming prior conviction. 
The Defendant cites United States of America v. Shannonwayne Tighe 266 F.3d 1187, (9th 
Circuit 2001 ) as authority for his argument. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld Nevada's refusal to provide jury 
trials for misdemeanor DUls as Constitutional. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 
489 U.S. 538, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). In Blanton, the Court stated that a 
person charged under Nevada law with a DUI does not have a right to a trial by jury because it 
is a "petty crime" which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. See Id. at 
538, 1290. The Court concluded that the Nevada DU I statute is a petty crime because it carries 
a maximum prison term of six months or less and the additional statutory penalties are not so 
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is a "serious" one. Id. 
This reasoning conforms to previous Supreme Court decisions which hold that petty crimes are 
not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision, while "serious" crimes are subject to that 
provision. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444,20 L.3d.2d 490 (1968), Frank 
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,89 S.Ct. 1503,23 L.3d.2d 162 (1969), Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886,26 L.3d.2d 437 (1970). Therefore, the refusal of Nevada to provide a 
jury trial for defendants charged with misdemeanor DUI does not violate that defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada has addressed the issue of 
whether prior nonjury DUI convictions can be used to enhance a felony DUI sentence. In 
Westmoreland v. Demosthenes, the U.S. District Court held that a defendant's due process 
rights are not violated when a prior non-jury DUI conviction is used to enhance a sentence for 
felony DUI. See 737 F.Supp. 1127 (D.Nev. 1990). 
The Defendant relies on United States of America v. Shannonwayne Tighe. That case 
discusses the use of a prior juvenile conviction as a sentencing enhancement because he had 
no right to a jury trial for juvenile offenses. While the Tighe Court ruled that a juvenile conviction 
without the right to a jury trial may not be used as a sentencing enhancement, most federal 
appellate courts disagree with the Ninth Circuit and have rejected the reasoning of the Tighe 
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majority. United States v. Smalley (8th Cir.2002) 294 F.3d 1030, 1032; United States v. Jones 
(3rd Cir.2003) 332 F.3d 688, 696; United States v. Burge (11th Cir.2005) 407 F.3d 1183, 1190. 
While this issue is apparently an issue of first impression in Idaho, this Court should rule 
that the Nevada conviction is constitutional pursuant to the holdings in Blanton and 
Westmoreland because these cases address the precise issue before the court. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Defendant's prior conviction in Nevada was constitutional and valid 
under Nevada law. Furthermore, Nevada's refusal to provide for a jury trial on misdemeanor 
DUI's has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Federal District Court 
has also upheld the use of those non-jury convictions for enhancement purposes on a felony 
DUI. Nothing in Idaho law provides that the use of such a conviction is not permissible for the 
purpose of enhancing a DUI to a felony. Furthermore, the Nevada statute under which the 
Defendant was convicted is a substantially conforming foreign criminal statute. Therefore, the 
defendant's prior conviction from Nevada is constitutionally and statutorily valid, and can be 
used to enhance his current DUI to a felony. The State's Motion in Limine should be granted. 
DATED this ,,> day of February, 2012. 
/7 f ,~ 
- V· \ r::tJ\t<=::/2 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /Cl'day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
V Telecopy 
egal Secretary 
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Westlaw, 
N.R.S.484.379 
wes~sed Statutes Annotated Currentness 
Title 43. Public Safety; Vehicles; Watercraft 
Chapter 484. Traffic Laws (Refs & Annos) 
Rules of the Road 
Driving Under the Influence ofIntoxicating Liquor or Controlled or Prohibited Substance 
Page 2 of 14 
)CDl 
Page 1 
484.379. Unlawful acts; affirmative defense; additional penalty for violation committed in work zone 
<Text of section expires by limitation on the date of the repeal of the federal law requiring each state to make it unlaw-
ful for a person to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater as a condition 
to receiving federal funding for the construction of highways in this State. See, also, section effective on the date of the 
repeaJ of the federal law requiring each state to make it unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle with a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater as a condition to receiving federal funding for the construction of high-
ways in this State.> 
1. It is unlawful for any person who: 
(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
(b) Has a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath; or 
(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle to have a con-
centration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access. 
2. It is unlawful for any person who: 
(a) Is under the influence of a controlled substance; 
(b) Is under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance; or 
(c) Inhales, ingests, applies or otherwise uses any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound or combination 
of any of these, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of a vehicle, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access. The fact 
that any person charged with a violation of this subsection is or has been entitled to use that drug under the laws of this 
State is not a defense against any charge of violating this subsection. 
3. It is unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to 
which the public has access with an amount of a prohibited substance in his blood or urine that is equal to or greater than: 
Prohibited substance Urine Nanograms per 
milliliter 
Blood Nanograms per 
milliliter 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Go\'. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx.)prfi=HTMLE&pbc=4CCF2658&vr=2.0&d... 8/9/2011 - 9 7 -
Page 3 of 14 
Page 2 
(a) Amphetamine 500 100 
(b) Cocaine 150 50 
(c) Cocaine metabolite 150 50 
(d) Heroin 2,000 50 
(e) Heroin metabolite: 
(1) Morphine 2,000 50 
(2) 6-monoacetyl 10 10 
morphine 
(f) Lysergic acid diethyl- 25 10 
amide 
(g) Marijuana 10 2 
(h) Marijuana metabolite 15 5 
(i) Methamphetamine 500 100 
U) Phencyclidine 25 10 
4. If consumption is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense under paragraph (c) of sub-
section J that the defendant consumed a sufficient quantity of alcohol after driving or being in actual physical control of 
the vehicle, and before his blood or breath was tested, to cause him to have a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in 
his blood or breath. A defendant who intends to offer this defense at a trial or preliminary hearing must, not less than 14 
days before the trial or hearing or at such other time as the court may direct, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a 
written notice of that intent. 
5. A person who violates any provision of this section may be subject to the additional penalty set forth in NRS 484.3667 . 
CREDIT(S) 
Added by Laws 1969, p. 1485. Amended by Laws 1971, p. 2030; Laws 1973, pp. 587, 1277, 1501; Laws 1975, p. 788; 
Laws 1981, p. 1924; Laws 1983, p. 1068; Laws 1993, p. 539; Laws 1999, pp. 2451,3415; Laws 2001, c. 10, § 98, eff. 
April 2, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 421, § 6, efr. Sep. 23, 2003. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 2 
Actual physical control of vehicle 8 
Arguments and conduct of counsel 15 
Arrest, stop or inquiry 9 
Blood tests 11 
Burden of proof 5 
Contributory negligence 16 
Double jeopardy 4 
Due process 3 
Enhancement of offense 17 
Instructions 14 
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1 CASE NO. 07 CR 00294 3G 
:2 2001 JUL ! I f,JI 10: '5 
:' ': '/ :', \\ 
\ .. t", ;"),, ." I 
4 
5 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF DAYTON TOWNSHIP l6~~:~ '~'D,~~:k 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LYON, STATE OF NEVADA 
6 
7 
THE STATE OF NEVADA, 
8 COUNTY OF LYON, 
9 
Plalntiff, 
10 vs. 
II 
12 JUAN LEON JUAREZ, 
Defendant. I 
13 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
AND ORDER OF THE COURT 
14 
The Defendant above-named, having appeared before the Court this July 
15 11, 2007, pursuant to plea negotiations, and having entered a plea of Guilty on 
07/11/2007 to the charge(s) of DUI FIRST OFFENSE NRS 484.3792.1A, a 
16 misdemeanor committed on OS/23/2007 the Defendant was canvassed on plea, 
17 
Represented by KENNETH WARD. The Deputy District Attorney ROBERT BRYANT 
18 was present representing Lyon County. 
19 
Good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's plea be accepted into 
20 the minutes of the court. The defendant is hereby adjudged guilty of: 
21 COUNT I: A violation of NRS 484.3792.1A DU! FIRST OFFENSE, a 
22 misdemeanor. 
23 
24 SENTENCE - COUNT I 
$ 500.00 FINE 
25 $ 115.00 Administrative Assessment 
26 $10.00 Court Facility Fee 
$7.00 Specialty Court Fee 
27 DEFENDANT GIVEN CREDIT FOR $300.00 FOR 4 DAYS TIME SERVED IN JAIL. 
28 
.- ___ .... _, ..,... r... 
~~UJU'-99-
1\ l. 
Defendant ordered to reimburse this court $ 250.00 for the services of the Public 2 Defender. 
3 
4 
Defendant ordered to pay $60.00 Chemical Analysis Test. 
5 
6 Said Fine(s), administrative assessment(s), and additional fees imposed total the sum of 
$ 642.00 AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE is assessed for payment arrangements 
7 making new balance $ 667.00. Payments set at $ 115.00 monthly beginning 
08{11{07. If full payment in the amount of $ 642.00 is received by 07{21{07 
8 the $25.00 fee will be waived. 
9 
Defendant is sentenced to ~ day(s) Lyon County Jail/suspended all but ~ days 
10 for 2 YEARS. 
11 
12 
13 Defendant given credit for time served and does not have to report to jail. 
14 
15 
CONDITION OF SUSPENSION - COUNT I 
16 If defendant fails to comply with any of the below orders the suspended sentenced will 
be imposed. 
17 
18 Defendant ordered to attend and pay for a DUI Workshop and complete by 09/11/07 
19 Defendant ordered to attend and pay for a Victim Impact Panel by 09/11{07. 
20 
No further related problems. 
21 
22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant appear alcohol/drug free to all assigned 
23 programs and county jail. 
24 This order Signed on Wednesday, July 11, 2007 
~25 26 WILLIAM G. ROGERS 
27 Justice of the Peace 
28 / / / 
\'\ J 
I hereby understand the above conditions of my sentence. I understand that if I am 
unable to pay my fines or comply with any other COURT ORDER I must appear in court 
2 
on the last Thursday of the month prior to the due date at 3: 00 pm. to request an 
3 extension. I understand that a $10.00 late charge will be added anytime my payment 
becomes DELINQUENT. Failure to comply with any COURT ORDER will result in the 
4 issuance of a BENCH WARRANT for my immediate arrest. 
5 
6 Defendant's signature 
7 Street Address ~l,0C/)t 19 hw MeJ b G f 23 
8 
City tAhoe.- C; -\-j State -,-C.::::.-f-i4--'>, __ ZiP ~G l?}S 
9 / 
10 Mailing Address 7,0 rx)"'J,- 'D 1b 
II City _______ State _____ Zip __ _ 
12 Phonel2?D) 52, S- 4039 
13 
Payments may be mailed to DAYTON JUSTICE COURT 235 Main Street, Dayton NV 
14 89403, Please make checks payable to DAYTON JUSTICE COURT and indicate the case 
15 number and/or defendants name to ensure proper credit. PAYMENTS MAY BE MADE 
WITHIN MONDAY - FRIDAY BETVVEEN THE HOURS OF 8:00 - 4:30. A drop box is 
16 available for after hour payments. DO NOT PLACE CASH WITHIN THE DROP BOX. 
7 
8 
9 If for any reason you are unable to comply with any of the above orders by the 
required date you must appear IN PERSON prior to the due date to request an 
20 extension from the judge at 3:00 PM on one of the dates below. 
21 
22 1~ ____________ ~ __ ~E=x~te~n~si~on~H~ea=r~inrlgcS~c~h~ed~u~le~2~O~O~7 ____ .-__________ ~ 
JANUARY 25, 2007 FEBRUARY 22, 2007 MARCH 29, 2007 APRIL 26, 2007 
23 Ir--------------T------------~r_------------_r------------_H 
MAY 31, 2007 JUNE 28, 2007 JULY 26, 2007 AUGUST 30, 2007 
24 \ SEPTEMBER 27,2007 OCTOBER 25, 2007 NOVEMBER 29,2007 DECEMBER 27,2007 
25 
26 
27 
28 
CERTIFIED COpy 
The document to which this CE rtlflcate Is 
attached is a full, true and correct opy of the 
original on file and of record in my office. 
DATE: B·s· \ \ 
Justice of the Peace of Dayto~ Township 
JUsticne rt of the, State of Neval1kln and for 
Lyon up :~r, ,..rJ; .--,-"r.11/1(~ n 
BY: G J Vk:x,z,fliifl\," I. JtlA 
CourtCI~k li U ij) U j - 101 
\(t 
\~ PLACER COUl'\"TY SUPERIOR COURT ~.,GN~NT /PLEA/JUDGMENT & SENTENL..t..-/!LJ71 ~.I...-~ Case No':. _ _ ~.L...I<d~..L..::fjb_Z---jV~ __ 
Date:._-!-_.L-.2--=---I-_ Court met at: --{-I ? ~ D:p'.: 14 Judge.: ____ -=B1=AHRKE"""'~~ ______________ _ J'''''~
DAVIES ~orter: I - AN Probation:: ______ ---,';:?--==:::-_____ _ 
PD ~/ p ITZPATB IrK D.D.A::o-. _---'-r.../;Z\"-''ITR:....u:i.i;:Au.:>l\TL----tL-L1U.:...L1I=---::,,-L ___ ~7'r''.-:-. . 1f- .~,/) .~-----h~~~ ~ ~ 
Cierk. 
Defens~ Counsel: 
I.J' J1 ,,~ CuStOOI.' Sturus:-'f::....f-l--l-- lnrerpreter: __ ....L,b-! LlllL/\ jj ;,. ) <<'I 
V" IT n .' certifIed 0 guali5ed Language: -.S=";f.,t.:.==-..!c.....;:::.:..~_+-_ 
NEXT COURT APPEARANCE: 
/D-14 
EJDefendam present Onot present. 
DAtm waived OArm completed OViol ofProb 
. _ -....ApJl.L.- DPllblic Defender 
DConflicrFiIm 
D 
ONor guilty ODt:~ed 
OG~ ~ro Conrendm 
[[Ji:dmittcd DAdvised 
PIX time waived C10 060 DTime not waived 
Trial time waived OlO next date Dgeneral 
~eyaived for i2enc.;f 
l!drJismissed a 
DAmended .' 
#~. /Tahl rights waive. .rai / written 
(lflina1) JulY tnal / Con .. 
.(lflitial) Confrontation & examination. 
( ~(jnitial) Right to remain silent. 
OOrdered booked/released 
OAdvised pymt of booking/ 
incarceration fees 
OAdvised financial resp. 
ORPOwaived 
ORe-test ordered 
OArt-uckle waiver 
OAppeal waiver 
OStipu]ate to ProTem 
ODrop 
OCTETS filed and served 
DArnended CLETS filed and served 
:;::'waf Oshown Onot shown 
Time Estimate 
DProbation summarily revoked 
o Probation reinstated 
OB/W ordered. Bail $. _____ ONCIC 
DArrest warrant ordered . 
DB/W stayed / held 
DB /W recalled set aside 
OBail Forfeited 0 Exonerated 
OO/R revoked 
OReinstated upon payment of reinstatement fet 
DBail apply / balance exonerated 
OForfeiture set aside 
Defendant ordered to report to the: 
OCriminal Division 0 Judicial Assist. 
OPublic Defender 
o Rev e Services 
robarlon Department 
Oforthwith Don_-t-__ -+-LL-1--1--,,-/T_ttend selfhclp meetings per wetk ~lntil ;;.nl!tf nrdC'r of the court 
~------L-.t...#-f-..L....J.f<:.=---­
OPreliminary examination waived, de[enclar:.c held to <inswtr. OC:Cll:1 deemed Complaint to be Information. 
Evaluation: OEC7300EC1017 DFull OCuo>u!tICj'JC Q(;enmJ DpC1368 DpCl026 OPC288.1 0 \'1/13051 
Regues(ec by: OCoun DDA ODefense, ",rith Dr. 
DReguest for nc\ii jiiil'turnirl-date Dgranted Ddenierl. New jail tu,,~ in date _________ Previous jail rum in ciate::--_____ _ 
Transcript request date rep,:>rter_._._. reguested by DCourt DDefense Counsel DDistrict Attorne:: 
Ofier.: __________ _ 
In&:ation' .. ______ _ 
------_._-.. ---,,_ .... -. - ... _ .... -_ .. ---------
-Pie-a' ---(;2=-.-=3::---/ 6-==--z..-(/tJ77 L 
J 
~' 
) J / /, J/"'/) -7 _ 
f-'ople vs. _\.,"".!,--",-f/L£!J;=-.--Lr-,~=--,r.----=-____________ -
IT IS HEREBV t at t e ImpositIOn 0 sentence ORDERED h h' f b e sus pen e an t e 01 owina.lu ament IS Impose . dd dhfl . d d 
CASE NO. CONDITIONAL FORMAL PROBATlON JAIL CREDIT FOR TIME CIS CtC 
SENTENCE PROBATION REINSTATED SENTENCE SERVED 
(number ofvears) ( number of years) 
7d--Lj6zr; 3 Dyes o no f;J CJ +0 ) .,:A. 
Dyes ono ( + ) 
Dyes ono ( + ) 
Dyes o no ( + ) 
, Dyes o no ( + ) 
Defendant must compiete 0 actual days and 0 conduct credits included in custody. DDefendant may apply for alternative sentencing 
on remaining balance from in custody. D Defendant may be released to residential treatment from in custody to complete balance of sentence. 
D Defendant may be released to residential program ifbed is available prio¥to §.entence being satisfied. 
SAID SENTENCE IS TO COMMENCE 0 forthwith ~n / I ?(J~'-:U'/ at 10:00 a.m. when the defendant shall repon 
to the Placer County Jail at 2775 Richardson Drive in Auburn, California. g.see reverse side of this form for additional terms and conditions. 
o Defeudant is not eligible for alternative sentencing 0 No electronic monitoring 0 Other 
o hours community service 0 in lieu offine Offll' ~ne conversion 0 vacated & convened back to fine amount listed below. 
o License is 0 suspended 0 revoked 0 restricted for peri9dOf.,,~:.,;;;':> 0 days 0 months 0 years, 
Restriction includes 0 to/from work 0 during the scope cif:y,Jork 0 to/fr,om program 0 to/from school 0 Other restrictions 
o Interlock Device must be utilized for a period of 1·~~'Years 'on any .Vehicle owned/operated. 0 2 self-helps per week fo-r-6:-m-on-th'-s""'j:-n-H:-e-u -0-[ r-ID-
IJ D~gnated as Habitual Traffic Offender. . ~/., <: ; .. :' "l . . 
lJ..l-Within 21 days enroll into 0 12 hour Alcohol Educ. ff.l 3.m fio~n~tih .... l'.,r-f,o .. : .. ·nder prog" 6 month 1st Offender Prog. 09 mo!)t 1st Offender Program 
o Mandatory Jail Sanction for DTrack 3 OProposH.fori~~6,i 2}; ~.~,:' I UV . - 0 - -- () n o 18 month Alcohol Prog. ··r- ':-':. ;.. . '/r /i/'1 - "7 / () 0 ~ 3l' '1 
o Attend DUr Panel within 60 days 0 Clerk's offj:~.1,s a,uthorizd:l;tofes1rict, C~lifomia Driver's License with proof of insurance nd employ ent/school. 
o Not own or have in possession or control, any deadly w!!apoiiQ; ~reai-ip. '0 ',Register pursuant to 0 Forfeit weapon(s). ____ _ [J Submit person/vehicle/residence to search/seizure at any time without beriefjf.oTwarrant as directed by any Peace Offtc:r. 
o Testing ORe-Test OPC295DNA Samples 0 Reg.ist~r pUrsuant to _____ _ Cd N~tact 0 peaceable contact with . . ., <i; ;,~ . 
If:l1\5stain from use or possession of intoxicants O.i1otfrequeJ1tplaces where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 0 Submit to alcohol testing as directed. 
o Participate in and complete: 0 Batterers 52 weeiC-ptog'[JJt'Y~ek"par~nting program 0 Anger Control 10 Anger Control II 0 Drug Awareness 
o Theft I O. Theft DO HIV Educ. Oq~ic;:es; Ch~lIenge~i.~:Yi??-i!ges.O __ SelfHelp(s)per week for __ wks OUntil Further Order 
~ange reSIdence or leave the State of CahfomJawlthp.!~! pnor approvaL 0 Repon to court as directed. 0 Repon to obahon as ordered. 
~~~r~~~g~Of ~d~ress to ~~.co~~~ __ _ "~-' --:'_~~ ~ Ij. _.. .... -JlI~.- ; ." . ___ L __ _ ... _ 
Probation is 0 modified 0 revoked 0 terminated. 
Probation will terminate upon completion of jail sentence in case number(s) ________________________ _ 
MODIFICATION OF TURN IN DATE 
Original turn in date New tum in date Original sentence 
;&~1tl~£,~;~~~i:~~!~e~FERRAL FOR PAVMENTSSSN ________ f.._L'JJ  CDL 
Pay base fine of $ ~17 ()=.;,;..;;- A ttorn~s $ Restitution to victim $ --0--B-O-Ok-i-ng-fe-eS-S-I-5-0-.00 
DV Fund (PCI203.097(5» $ _______ ~yments granted/modified $ 0 per month commencing ____ _ 
St. Indemnity(PC 1202.4(b)(I» $ _____ _ 
Women's Center $ ------ o Payment or 0 Fine staved until 0 Pay today o Committed in lieu offi~e pursuant to PC2900 .. 5. 0 Consecutive 0 Concurrent 
Total amount due: rFine Calculation Attached $_-----
i:'OU ARE ORDERED to pay booking and incarceration fees subject to a financial evaluation of ability to pay and the right to a hearing on ability to pay. YOll ARE 
FURTHER ORDERED to contact Revenue Services. 11582 B Avenue, DeWItl Center, Auburn, CA within 5 days or within 5 days after you are released from 
custody for a fmancial evaluation and to establish a payment schedule for your fines, attomey fees (if applicable), booking and incarceration fees, presentence report, 
a,..,d any other monetary assessment ordered. If you fail to appear for your fmancial evaluation. Revenue Services will recommend that the Court order you to pay such 
3!r;m:.QiLkip 6! 11 
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THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT 
IS A CORRECT COpy OF THE 
ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THIS 
OFFICE. 
ATTEST: 
Superior Court Clerk. 
~~s::--' 
By . ~~PUty 
I 
COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-0002386 
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 3/9/2012 
Time: 8:58 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Interpreter: Mary Jo Palma 
Counter # 
9.12 Counsel present, def. present with interpreter 
Court introduces the case. 
Interpreter's oath is on file with the Court. 
9.13 State comments that a motion in front of the Court re: a prior conviction might 
dispose of the case if the Court would like to rule on that issue. 
9.14 Mr. Dolan requests to have some brief argument. I 
I 
State is prepared to dismiss count 3. 
Court has the State's brief, and the Defense. 
9.17 Mr. Dolan comments about what the defense is relying on re: substantially 
conforming law, and lack of right to a jury trial on a first offense DUI in Nevada. 
COURT MINUTES 1 
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r 
I Court has counsel argue the Motion in Limine 
I State addresses the Motion in Limine and reviews the brief that was filed. Cites I 
I 
I case law that compares Idaho's statutes to another state re: substantially 
conforming. Cites case law that addresses the lack of right to a jury trial on a 
first offense DUI. 
9.26 Mr. Dolan responds and reviews the defense's brief that was filed. Discusses the 
de waiting period in regards to a rising blood alcohol level, this is the difference 
in statute. Reviews the difference in statute regarding a defendant's right to a 
jury trial for a first offense DUl, cites case law. 
I 
Court inquires if it matters whether the conviction is because of a plea or 
because the case was tried in front of the court. 
Mr. Dolan responds, believe it doesn't matter, continues with argument. 
9.40 State responds, reviews case law comparing Idaho to Montana. 
9.49 Mr. Dolan responds. 
9.54 Court needs a half hour to review cases before ruling. 
State and Mr. Dolan suggest putting on the evidence now to allow the Court time 
to issue a decision. 
Court would rather take the half hour and rule and see where the case is. 
9.55 Recess 
Back on record. 
10.47 Court thanks counsel for waiting for the Court to review case law. As to the 
question of Nevada statute and s conviction on Nevada law substantially 
conforms to Idaho law, has reviewed case law. 
10.59 Mr. Dolan comments about case law, and the difference in law between states re: 
Nevada not being a rebuttable presumption. 
I 
Court responds that the point in the observations is that the court of appeals 
believes there may be some differences, but that doesn't keep it from being 
substantially conforming. Court determines that the statutes are substantially I I 
conforming for purposes of the convictions use for enhancement. Court 
addresses the issue of constitutionality, reviews case law. If a conviction is 
COURT MINUTES 2 
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constitutionally sound, which a conviction without a jury trial is sound. 
This Court finds that the conviction in Nevada meets the constitutional 
standards. Therefore is valid for used in Idaho as an enhancement. 
11.17 I Mr. Dolan is ready for the trial 
Court takes two minute break 
Recess 
11.24 Back on record. 
Counsel agrees that this is the time to commence a court trial. 
Court will take up the court trial on the DUl. 
11.25 State comments that the question now is the identity of the person who has the 
previous convictions and this charge. 
Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. plead to the DUl, it is a question of identity. 
Counsel agrees that in a previous hearing State has admitted Exh. 1 & 2 which 
are certified copies of previous convictions. 
11.27 Court finds Exh's that were admitted on 1/10/12 for a Motion in Limine hearing. 
Mr. Dolan comments. 
Court clarifies that Exh. 1 & 2 are admitted for purposes of this hearing. 
Counsel agree. 
11.28 State calls 1st Wit, Joshua Prichard, sworn under oath and questioned on direct. 
Wit. works for Blaine County Sheriff for the last 3 years, post certified, on June 
18th he was patrolling south of Bellevue on hwy. 75, looking for a specific 
vehicle. There was a complaint of an intoxicated driver. Followed the white 
Chevy Blazer, vehicle failed to maintain the lane. Identifies the driver of the 
vehicle as the Def. seated at counsel table. Def. provided him an international 
driver's license and a passport with a DOB of . Requested that the 
Def. provide a field sobriety test, after asking the Def. if he had consumed 
alcohol. Def. declined to do the field sobriety test. 
I Mr. Dolan objects- ask clarifying question re: miranda rights and questions 
I asked of the Def. Suggests playing the video to save time. 
! 
COURT MINUTES 3 
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1.44 
11.50 
11.54 
11.56 
12.01 
State has no objection. Lays foundation: the stop of the Def. was on 6/18/2011 
and was recorded. 
Court has State mark video as Exh. 1- stipulated- ADMITTED only from the start 
time of 22:06 to the end time of 22:13. 
Counsel publishes Exh. 1 to the Court. 
Mr. Dolan continues questioning in aid of an objection. 
I Object to statement made while under arrest prior to miranda rights being 
given. While in handcuffs Def. said first ttl have a warrant". 
State responds, doesn't know if this is an interrogation 
Court review's case law re: Miranda rights, it appears that the question was 
prompted by the Defs statement about having a warrant. Overrules objection. 
State continues questioning the Wit. Wit. transported the Def. to the hospital for 
a blood draw and then to Blaine Co. Public Safety Facility and participated in the 
pre-booking process, describes forms that are filled out by the arresting officer, 
Def. gave his full name Juan Leon Juarez gave date of birth nonverbally. 
Everything happened in Blaine County. 
Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. on cross, Def. told him that he had been drinking 
Budweiser when he was asked "where have you been drinking". 
State objects- relevance. 
Mr. Dolan responds about the communication problem re: the Defs 
understanding of the officer's questions. 
Wit. assumed the Def. spoke Spanish, did not play the rights in Spanish was not 
able do so at the hospital. Def. did not have a California or Nevada driver's 
license. 
State continues question the Wit. out of all the questions he felt the Def. 
understood. 
Court excuses the Wit. 
I State calls 2nd Wit. Heather Saunders, sworn under oath and question on direct. 
1 C' l/. Works for Blame Count) Shenff and ha", been there for the last 12 12 yrs. her 
position is Assistant Jail Administrator. Describes the booking process, and the 
COURT MINUTES 4 
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comparison of records. Has the jail file on Juan Juarez, which is kept under lock 
and key in the booking room. 
State offers Exh. 2 marked-id- booking sheet 
Court comments about Exh. from previous case re-marks Exh. l-ICOP video to I 
Exh. 6 and marks the booking sheet is Exh. 7. 
Mr. Dolan objects to Exh. 7. 
12.09 Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. to aid in an objection, would know if there were 
mistakes, describes how she uses booking information to be given as statistics. 
Describes what things can be changed and what things cannot be changed. 
Agrees that certain ID numbers the Def. would not know and would not be able 
to provide. 
Mr. Dolan objects to this document being admitted because of the accuracy of 
the information. 
State responds reviews hearsay rule, the booking sheet is not created for 
criminal hearing. State questions the Wit. the purpose of the booking sheet is to 
know who is or has been in the facility and for reporting purposes for State and 
Federal Government. 
12.18 Court takes judicial notice to some degree, reviews the booking sheet. ADMITS 
Exh.7. 
12.22 Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. on cross. Wouldn't know if the booking officer had 
the wrong DOB. There is information in the report that does not come from the 
arrestee. Agrees the report does not have a middle name. 
State has no further questions. 
I 
Court excuses the Wit. 
12.25 State rests. 
Mr. Dolan has no witnesses & rests. 
State gives dosing argument, cites case law, reviews Exh. 1 & 2 convictions from 
Nevada and California and the personal information contained within compared 
to the Idaho booking information. Believes that the State has proven that the 
I Def. is the same person. 
COURT MINUTES 5 
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12.33 Mr. Dolan presents to the Court case law. The case law says that what should be 
used of mug shots, finger prints or identified by court staff that was present at 
the previous convictions. The Defs name is not unique for the area. 
Court will not find that Juan Juarez as a unique name. 
12.38 Mr. Dolan continues, addresses the difference in lack of a middJe name in Blaine 
County, and proceeds reviewing the difference in personal information. 
Reviews case law. 
12.45 State responds. 
Mr. Dolan objects to argument. 
Court allows State to continue. 
State continues. 
12.47 Court comments about Lawyer case law re: Def. did not object to being the same 
person. The point in mention it this Court is not holding the Defs silence against 
him. In looking at the judgments and the differences in personal information 
between them. Finds that the Def. is one in the same and is gUilty to the prior 
convictions. 
12.57 Mr. Dolan argues about there being no evidence as to who filled out the 
information in the judgments. 
State has an issue with Mr. Dolan arguing after a decision has been given. 
Court allows Mr. Dolan to comment. 
Mr. Dolan continues. 
Court responds, it appears that the Def. filled out the information himself. 
Orders a PSI and a Substance Abuse Evaluation. 
12.59 Mr. Dolan comments about services that a Def. can acquire through the state, 
only if the evaluation is through 19-2524. 
Court orders assessment under 19-2524. 
Mr. Dolan gives the Defs contact information: 851 Shanendoa Dr. AptA202 in 
I 
Haileyand phone #: 208-570-3888. 
I i I 
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Court gives questionnaire to the Def. for a PSI. Sets Sentencing for 5/21/2012 at 
10:30a.m. 
1.05 Recess 
COURT MINUTES 7 
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RESET (Clerk, cneck Ii applicable) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Juan L Juarez 
Shenandoah 39 Apt A 202 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Defendant. 
Assigned to: _____________ _ 
Assigned: 
Fifth Judicial District Court. State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
ORDER FOR PRESENTENCE REPORT AND EVALUATIONS 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-2011-0002386 
) CHARGE(s): (see court minutes) \ FILED ~:~.,~~) ) REQUIRED ROA CODES: (Enter the appropriate code) 
MAR - 9 2012 ) ) PSI01- Order for Presentence Investigation Report (only) 
) PSMH1- Order for Presentence Investigation Report and 
JoLynn Drage, CierI< District ~~ental Health Assessment 
L....!::C:£o~uT1:;.,.B2:I~8/n!!!:e~COU~n':J:..:., Ida:::::;.h,;.:;o_ .... ~<>rder for Presentence Investigation Report and 
) Substance Abuse Assessment 
) 
----~~~~~~~~--~--~~~~~) On thisFriday, March 09, 2012, a Pre-sentence Investigation Report was ordered by the Honorable Robert J, Eigee to be completed for 
Court appearance on Monday, May 21, 2012 at: 10:30 AM at the above stated courthouse. 
PLEASE PROVIDE ASSESSMENTS BY THIS DATE: ______________________ _ 
EVALUATIONS TO BE DONE: Copy of each evaluation to be sent to Presentence Investigation Office to be included with PSI 
Under Ie 19-2524 assessment(s) is (are) ordered which shall include a criminogenic risk assessment of the defendant 
pursuant to (IC 19-2524(4)): 
o Mental Health Examination as defined in IC 19-2524(3), including any plan for treatment (PSMH1 ROA code); and/or 
~bstance Abuse Assessment as defined in IC 19-2524(2) including any plan for treatment. (PSSA1 ROA code) 
Other non- §19-2524 evaluations/examinations ordered for use with the PSI: 
o Sex Offender 0 Domestic Violence 0 Other ______ _ Evaluator: ______________ _ 
o No evaluations are ordered. (PSI01 ROA code) 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Daniel M, Dolan 
PROSECUTOR: Jim Thomas 
THE DEFENDANT IS IN CUSTODY: 0 YES ~O If yes where: _______________ _ 
PLEA AGREEMENT: State recommendation 
WHJ/JOC 0 Probation 0 PD Reimb 0 Fine 0 
Date: :1) 9 \2.0\2- ACJ 0 ~stitution ~ _~ o~er: NoNe... Signature: ------~III!II::oIH;..-1!!k:L~~,.......,,--.;::;....--------------
ud , 
EFEN ,ANT'S INFORMA TlON: DO YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER? 0 NO tiyES 
Name: ~ AQ ~ L -=:s\A.D52 Q ?- rilMale 0 Ferr:ale 0 RACE: Caucasian ~Hispanic 0 Other 
Addre
TelePh+ ZQI5 -S7~() Me",ge Phon" - Worl< Phone.· _-____ _ 
Employer- Work Address: ________________ _ 
Date Of~irth: Social Security Number, 
Name & Phone Number of nearest relative: ____________________ --:-___ -:-:>',,-::-__ _ 
Date of Arrest,' _____ lo=-.....J\c..:..\ """~'-\.L2.L.O\~L...:::= ______ Arresting Agency: _..AB~\2t::..:..2.-\-(\.X..-=:::::.--S.;:., c<..~-,---,(""",,' :....=:.....tt..l..-.!. __ 
I Your assigned Pre-sentence Investigator will contact you to schedule an interview using the above information. Please have 
1 your Pre-sentence Investigation Personal History Questionnaire filled out completely for interview. 
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COURT MINUTES 
CR-2011-0002386 
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez 
Hearing type: Sentencing 
Hearing date: 5/21/2012 
Time: 10:54 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA 
Tape Number: DC 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan 
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback 
Counter # 
10.54 Court introduces case, Def. present with counsel, Mr. Dolan, State represented 
by Mr. Fredback 
Court received and reviewed PSI 
Counsel have also reviewed PSI, Mr. Dolan didn't have time to contact the PSI 
investigator after receiving report, appears there are several comments re: lack 
of contact w / previous employers, advises Court that The Roosevelt Tavern 
responded to the PSI investigator via Email 
Court views that as a neutral issue, not the Def.'s fault the employers didn't 
respond to investigator, notes on PSI the Roosevelt did respond 
Counsel only have argument to present, no legal reason why judgment shouldn't 
be entered today 
10.57 State begins argument-this Court heard the court trial in this case, reviews the 
incident, Def. was driving North from Shoshone, dispatch was called re: vehicle 
driving in oncoming traffic's lane, Officer Pritchard followed Def.'s vehicle and 
COURT MINUTES 1 
observed the same kind of driving pattern, Def. stumbled out of his vehicle and 
was too drunk to perform PST's, blood test RAC .238, reviews Defo's criminal 
history, has a warrant from Nevada that is non-extraditable, Def. just made a 
payment on his SCRAM unit, has had SCRAM on since September, State is 
concerned with Defo's high RAC and driving pattern on the highway at 8 p.m. 
when traffic could be heavy, period of jail is necessary, more than the usual 30 
day recommendation, probation acceptable, intensive outpatient treatment, PSI 
recommended traditional rider, State believes CAPP program would be more 
appropriate, $100 restitution for blood test results, $5000/2500 fine, 3 years' 
probation, 3 years prison fixed, 2 years indeterminate, leaves rider program to 
the Court's discretion 
11.04 Mr. Dolan speaks on behalf of Def.-presented letter to Def. from his employer, 
Skipp Merrick, Def. has good job and is a valued employee, surprised with PSI 
investigator's recommendation, reviews Def.'s employment history, Def. 
obtained substance abuse evaluation from the Walker Center and they 
recommend intensive outpatient treatment, eligible for funding through I C 19-
2524, Def. has shown he doesn't need to drink and can remain sober, he is more 
of a social drinker, Mr. Dolan is not sure whatthe criteria for a rider program is 
anymore, doesn't believe a rider is necessary, Def. is good candidate for 
probation, he is entitled to 14 days credit jail previously served, he is prepared 
to go to work release today if ordered, Def. has taken accountability for his 
actions, he was late on SCRAM payment because he was laid off from Roosevelt 
due to slack season, made payment today w / his first paycheck from Merritt, he 
has never disputed being intoxicated, court trial was for legal issues only, Def. 
hasn't had a chance to go back to Nevada to clear the warrant 
Mr. Dolan advises the Court he spoke to Def. previous today about needing an 
interpreter, Def. stated he didn't need an interpreter today, it was more 
confusing for his to follow the interpreter and his attorney at the last hearing 
Court questions Oef., he has understood everything today and doesn't need an 
interpreter 
State makes correction to PSI, the RAC results were .315 
Mr. Dolan agrees the results were in the 3'5, cannot recall the exact number 
Oef. spea}r~ on his own behalf, wants to stay here in the Valley, he had a hard 
time being here at first because he didn't know anyone at first 
Mr. Dolan notes Def.'s brother lives here now and so does his mother 
COURT MINUTES 2 
11.17 Court questions Def. why his name is different on his paycheck 
Def.'s name is Juan Leon Juarez, his employer has his name mixed up on his 
paychecks, he gave his employer his SSN 
Mr. Dolan notes Def. is a U.S. citizen, his father was U.S. citizen when Def. was 
born which makes him a citizen automatically even though Def. was born in 
Mexico 
11.19 Court enters judgment-has considered the 4 goals of sentencing, enters 
restitution order $100, Def. had very high BAC and was very dangerous when 
driving while so intoxicated, reviews Def.'s criminal history, this case warrants 
more jail time than 30 days based upon the high BAC and dangerous driving 
pattern, orders Def. to not drink at all while on probation 
Court imposes judgment, $2500/1500 fine, plus court costs, monthly payments 
$75 start 9-21-12, 60 days jail in Blaine County jail starting today, gives 14 days 
credit for time served, work release authorized. driver's license suspension 
absolute 1 year commencing July 7,2012, interlock required July 8, 2013-May 
21,2015,3 years' probation with standard terms and conditions in Blaine 
County, Def. must meet w / probation officer to review probation terms and sign 
up; 3 years prison fixed, 2 years indeterminate, prison suspended and Def. 
placed on probation, Court advises Def. he has 42 days from the file date stamp 
to appeal decision 
Mr. Dolan advises Court the Def. will beappeaHng trial issues to the Supreme 
Court, questions if Def. can be appointed a State Appellate PD 
Court requires Def. to re-apply for public defender, orders Def. off SCRAM today 
11.30 Recess 
COURT MINUTES 3 
------~-~----
FILED A~. I MAY 2 2 2012 :I 
Jolynn Dmge, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CR-2011-2386 
Juan L. Juarez 
SS#  
D.O.B. , 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
UPON A PLEA OF GUlL TV TO ONE FELONY COUNT, 
SUSPENDING SENTENCE AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION 
I.C.§ 19-2601 (2) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The date of sentencing was May 21,2012 (hereinafter called sentencing date). 
2. The State of Idaho was represented by counsel, Matthew Fredback, of the Blaine County 
Prosecutor's office. 
3. The defendant Juan Juarez, appeared personally. I.e. § 19-2503. 
4. The defendant was represented by counsel, Daniel Dolan. 
5. Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, presiding. 
II. ARRAIGNMENT FOR SENTENCING. I.C. § 19-2510 
1. The defendant Juan Juarez was found guilty, following a court trial, to the charge below: 
Crime of: Driving Under the Influence, a felony 
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Idaho Code: I.C. §§ 18·8004, 18·8005(6),18·8005(10) 
Guilty Verdict - date of: March 9, 2012 
2. The defendant was then asked by the Court whether the defendant had any legal cause to 
show why judgment should not be pronounced against the defendant, to which the 
defendant responded "No." 
IV. SENTENCING DATE PROCEEDINGS 
On May 21,2012, the sentencing date, and after the arraignment for sentencing as set 
forth in section II "Arraignment for Sentencing" above, the Court proceeded as follows: 
1. Determined that more than two (2) days had elapsed from the plea to the date of 
sentencing. I.C. § 19·2501 and I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1). 
2. Discussed the presentence report and relevant matters with the parties pursuant to I. C. § 
20-220 and I.C.R. Rule 32. 
3. Determined victim's rights and restitution issues pursuant to I.C. § 19-5301 and Article 1, § 
22 of the Idaho Constitution. 
4. Offered an aggravation and/or mitigation hearing to both parties, including the right to 
present evidence pursuant to LC.R. 33(a)(1). 
5. Heard comments and sentencing recommendations of both counsel and asked the 
defendant personally if the defendant wished to make a statement and/or to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment. I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1). 
6. The Court made its comments pursuant to I.C. § 19- 2512, and discussed one or more of 
the criteria set forth in l. C. § 19-2521. 
~ THE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows: 
The Defendant is guilty of the Crime of Driving Under the Influence, a felony, and a 
Judgment of Conviction shall enter. 
1. Court costs: The defendant shall pay court costs in the sum of $270.50. 
2. Fine: The defendant is fined the sum of $2,500, with $1,500 suspended, and the 
defendant shall pay all costs, fees and fines ordered by this Court. This judgment that the 
defendant pay a fine and costs shall constitute a lien in like manner as a judgment for 
money in a civil action. I.C. § 19-2518, I.C. § 19-2702. 
3. Penitentiary: The defendant Juan Juarez, shall be committed to the custody of the Idaho 
State Board of Correction, Boise, Idaho for a unified sentence (I.C. § 19-2513) of 5 years; 
which unified sentence is comprised of a minimum (fixed) period of confinement of 3 years, 
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followed by an indeterminate period of custody of 2 years, with the precise time of the 
indeterminate portion to be set by said Board according to law, with the total sentence not 
to exceed 5 years. 
4. Credit for time served: The defendant is given credit for time previously served on this 
crime in the amount of 14 days. I.C, § 18-309. 
The credit for time served is calculated as follows: 
June 18, 2011 - July 1, 2012 = 14 days 
5. Sentence suspended/terms of supervised probation: Provided however, that the 
execution of said prison portion of the sentence is hereby suspended (the costs and fine 
portion is not suspended) and the defendant is placed on supervised probation for a period 
of 3 years beginning on May 21, 2012 to and under the control of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction, (I.C. § 19-2601(5) and I.C. § 20-219), subject to the following terms: 
General Terms and Conditions of Probation: 
a) Supervision Level: The defendant shall successfully complete any specialized 
supervision level deemed appropriate for the Defendant's needs by the Department of 
Probation and Parole. 
b) General Conditions: Abide by the Court Ordered Specific Conditions of Probation 
previously signed and attached hereto as Exhibit 1, which exhibit is by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
c) Specific Conditions: Abide by the Court Ordered Specific Conditions of Probation 
previously signed and attached hereto as Exhibit 2, which exhibit is by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
Special Terms and Conditions of Probation: 
a) Payment of court costs, fines and restitution: The defendant shall begin making 
payments towards the court costs, fines and restitution ordered herein on September 21, 
2012 in the amount of at least $75.00 per month. 
b) County jail time to be presently served: The defendant shall serve 60 day(s) in the county 
jail as a term and condition of probation, which shall commence immediately. The credit for 
time served previously awarded to the defendant, in the amount of 14 days, shall count 
against this jail time. The defendant is granted work release if the defendant otherwise 
qualifies under the Sheriffs classification system. 
c) Driving License Suspension: The defendant's driver's license shall be suspended 
absolutely for a period of one year beginning July 7, 2012. 
d) Interlock Device: Following the period of license suspension, the defendant, while operating a 
motor vehicle, shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock 
device. The defendant must use such an interlock device from July 8, 2013 until May 21, 
2015. 
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VI. ORDER REGARDING RESTITUTION 
1. Restitution to Victim: The Court hereby ORDERS a Judgment of Restitution to be 
entered in this case in the sum of $100.00, (I.C. § 19-5304 (victim». A separate written 
order of restitution shall be entered. I.C. § 19-5304(2). This amount is payable through the 
Clerk of the District Court to be disbursed to the victim(s) in this matter as follows: 
The Right: 
Name: Forensic Services 
Lab No. P2011 0980 
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
$100.00 
VII. RIGHT TO APPEAULEAVE TO APPEAL INFORMA PAUPERIS 
The Court advises the defendant, of the Defendant's right to appeal this judgment within 
forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. Rule 14 (a). 
In fonna Pauperis: 
The Court further advises the defendant of the right of a person who is unable to pay the 
costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning the right as an indigent 
to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and the right to be represented by a court 
appointed attorney at no cost to the defendant. I.C.R. 33(a)(3). I.C. § 19-852(a)(1) and (b)(2). 
VIII. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - RECORD BY CLERK 
The Court orders the Judgment and record be entered upon the minutes and that the 
record be assembled, prepared and filed by the Clerk of the Court in accordance with I.C. § 19-
2519. 
IX. BONDfBAIL 
The conditions of bail given in this case having been satisfied, the bail is ordered 
exonerated. I.C.R. 46(g). 
X. ORDER ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS 
The parties are hereby ordered to return their respective copies of the presentence 
investigative reports to the deputy clerk of the court. Use of said report shall thereafter be governed 
by I.C.R. 32(h)(1),(2), and(3). 
XI. ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO COUNTY SHERIFF 
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It is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the custody of the 
Sheriff of Blaine County, Idaho, for service of the County Jail time ordered herein as a term and 
condition of probation. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: ________ ~~~~-(~/-~~{-L-----
SIGNED: _____ --~-~~:-'I-__::_-:------
Robert J. Elgee, District Judge 
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I.C.R. RULE 49 (b) 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the g-;l.. day of May, 
2012, I have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document: 
Jim Thomas, Esq. 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 756 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Daniel Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Kevin Wayt 
Probation Officer 
dist5@idoc.idaho.gov 
Blaine County Sheriffs Office 
Hailey, Id 83333 
CGD Sentencing Team 
ccdsenten cingd5@idoc.idaho.gov 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~and Delivered 
_ Ovemight Mail 
Fax 
~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Fax 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~and Delivered 
.::-Evernight Mail 
~mail 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~and Delivered 
_ Ovemight Mail 
Fax 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
,#mail 
Deputy Clerk 
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EXHIBIT 1 
COURT ORDERED 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
1. 
IMPOSED AT THE REQUEST OF IDAHO DEPT. OF CORRECTION 
I.e. §§ 20-219,19-2601(5), and I.C.R. 33(d). 
Supervision Level: The defendant's level of super~on, including caseload type and electronic monitoring 
shall be determined by the Idaho Dept of Correction....J ~ 
2. Laws and Conduct: The defendant shall obey all Illunicipal, county, state and federal laws. The defendant 
shall comply with all lawful requests of any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction. The defendant shall be 
completely truthful at all times with any agent or the Idaho Dept of Correction. During any contact with law 
enforcement personnel the defendant shall provide their identity, notify the officer(s) that they are under 
supervision and provide the name of their supervising officer. The defendant shall notify their supervising 
officer of the contact within 24 hours.:S-L 
J. 
4. 
Residence: The defendant shall not change residence without first obtaining permission from an authorized 
agent of the Idaho Dept of CorrectionS L.. 
Reporting: The defendant shall report to his/her supervising officer as directed. The defendant shall provide 
truthful and accurate information or documentation whenever requested by the Idaho Dept of 
Correction.~ 
5. Travel: The defendant shall not leave the State of Idaho or the assigned district without first obtaining 
permission from his/her supervising officer....I'L:. 
6. Extradition: If the defendant does leave the State of Idaho, with or without permission, the defendant does hereby 
waive extradition to the State of Idaho and will not contest any effort to return the defendant to the State of 
Idaho~ 
7. Employment/Alternative Plan: The defendant shall seek and maintain gainful, verifiable, full-time 
employment. The defendant shall not accept, cause to be terminated from, or change employment without first 
obtaining written permission from his/her supervising officer. In lieu of full-time employment, the defendant 
may participate in full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocational program or 
other a,l!tve plan based on the offender's specific situation and as approved by his/her supervising 
officer. 
8. Alcohol: The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages in any form. The defendant 
shall not, for any reason enter any establishment which sells or dispenses alcoholic beverages by the drink. This 
provision is not intended to preclude the defendant from entering restaurants, cafes, or other establishments whose 
primary business is the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. It is intended to preclude the defendant from 
entering bars and taverns. In any event, defendant may not enter such establishments for any purpose other than 
food consur~!on or employment reasons, and must leave as soon as food is consumed or employment shift 
terminates. ~ 
9. Controlled Substances: The defendant shall not use or possess any illegal drug or any substance that simulates 
the effect of an illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of 
ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or possess any controlled substances unless lawfully 
prescribed for him/her by a licensed physician or dentist. The defendant shall use medications only in the 
manner prescribed by their physician or dentist. Y V 
EXHIBIT 1 
RE:VISSD 2/22/10 
-122-
J 0, FirearmslWeapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry, possess or have control of any firearms, chemical 
weapons, electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons, Other dangerous weapons may include, but 
are not limited to: knives with blades over two and one half inches in length, switch-blade knives, brass knuckles, 
swords, throwing stars and other martial arts weapons. The defendant shall not reside in any location that contains 
fireanns or weapon0 L. 
11. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and 
other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling 
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant 
waives his/her Foulih Amendment Rights concerning searches, Furthermore, anyone with whom the defendant 
lives must also execute such a waiver...;s:.L 
12, Cost of Supervision: The defendant shall comply with Idaho Code 20-225, which authorizes the idaho Dept of 
Correction to collect a cost of supervision fee, The defendant shall make payments as prescribed in his/her 
monthly cost of supervision bill.~ 
13, Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by any agent of the Idaho Dept of 
, -\/ Correctlon,~ 
14, Substance Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any test for alcohol or controlled substances as 
requested and directed by any agent of the ldaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant 
may be required to obtain tests at their own expense, If the results of the test jo,dicate an adulterant has been 
used to interfere with the results, that test will be deemed to have been positive.~ 
IS. Evaluation and Program Plan: The defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluation deemed necessary and as 
ordered by the Court or any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction, The defendant shall meaningfully 
participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneficial and as 
directed by the Court or any agent of the Idaho Dept of Co rre2ion , The defendant may be required to attend 
treatment, counseling or other programs at their own expense,~ 
16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home, the defendant shall answer the door for the probation officer. The 
defendant shall allow the probation officer to enter their residence, other real property, place of employment and 
vehicle for the purpose of visitation, inspections and other supervision functions. The defendant shall not 
possess, install or use any monitoring instrument, camera, or other surveillance device to observe or alert them 
to the approach of his/her probation officer. The defendant shall not keep any vicious or dangerolls dog or other 
animal on or in t.(fcperty that the probation officer perceives as an impediment to accessing the defendant 
or their property, 
17, Absconding Supervision: The defendant will not leave the state or the assigned district in an effort to abscond 
or flee supervision, The defendant shall make himself/herself available for supe@pn and program 
palticipation as instructed by the probation officer and will not actively avoid supervision~ 
18. Court Ordered Financial Obligations: The defendant shall pay all costs, fees, fIDes and restitution in the 
amount and manner and to the parties ordered by the Couli. The defendant shall make payments as ordered by 
the Court or as designated in a Payment Agreement and Promissory Note to be completed with an agent of the 
Idaho Dept of Correction<:Y Cr 
19. Confidential Informant: The defendant shall not act as a confidential informant for law enforcement, except 
as allowed in Idaho Dept. of Correction policy and with the written consent of both the Court and the Idaho 
Dept. of Correction J L.-
20, Intrastate/Interstate Violations: If allowed to transfer supervision to another district or state the defendant 
agrees to accept any violation allegation documents purportedly submitted by the agency/officer supervising the 
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defendant in the receiving district or state as admissible i~TIidence as credible and reliable. The defendant 
waives any right to confront the author of such documents. / 
21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the district 
or specific field office that provides his/her supervision. At all times, these additional rules will be imposed 
only after considering the successful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district or 
specific field office. All additional rules will be explained to the defendant and provided to him/her, in writing, 
by an agent of the Idaho Dept ofCorrection.~ 
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EXHIBIT 2 
COURT ORDERED 
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
IMPOSED IN ADDrTION TO THE EXHIBIT I GENERAL CONDITIONS 
I.e. § 20-221 
1. Discretionary county jail time to be served in the future: 
The defendant shall serve not more than 30 days in the 
county jail at the discretion of the defendant's probation 
officer, with the prior approval of the Court. Any time 
spent in j ail pursuant to an Agent I s Warrant and/or for 
absconding supervision does not count against this 
discretionary jail time.~L-
2. Polygraph examinations: The defendant shall submit to 
polygraph examinations at the defendant's own expense when 
requested to do so by the defendant's probation 
officer~0 
3. stipulate to the admission of test results: The defendant 
shall stipulate to the admission of blood, urine, or breath 
test results in the form of a certified affidavit at any 
probation hearing following a judicial determination that 
live testimonial evidence would otherwise be impractical. 
However, the defendant, at the defendant's own expense may 
have the lab analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, or 
breath performed at an in-state approved lab of the 
defendant's choosing upon notifying the official 
administering the test at the time the test is 
requested .;:1 L 
4 . Modification of probation requirements: Probation 
condi tions are set by the court. The court delegates some 
discretion to the agents of the Department of Corrections, 
Probation and Parole to make or enforce probation 
requirements. In the event Probation and Parole sets a 
condition of probation or requires the defendant to comply 
with a condition of probation that is unreasonable or 
impossible to perform, Defendant has the right to motion 
the court to modify or revoke speclIlc probationary 
requi:::-ements. Unless or until any condition is modified by 
the court, Defendants are expected comply to their utmost 
ability with such conditions as may be set. It is very 
unlikely that the standard written conditions of probation 
set by the court will be modified . . :::rlc 
EXHIBIT 2 
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I .:::1cXA.O ~ {0, have read, or have had read to me, the 
above agreement. I understand and accept the conditions of 
supervision under which I have been released. I agree to abide 
by and conform to them and understand that my failure to do so 
maY;::lt~;;;;;i~tion of my prob~e 
trfendant t/ ' Witness 
DJifL~~. 
EXHIBIT 2 
REV:SED ~/4/2011 
2 
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0IDI01f''.I£\1 '1\ \..)1/\1, L FILED P.M 
I MAY 2 2 2012 1 
Jolynn D18ge, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUTNY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2011-2386 
ORDER ON RESTITUTION 
THIS MA TIER came before the Court for sentencing hearing in the above-
captioned action. The Court finds that Idaho State Police Forensic Services is a victim 
under Idaho Code § 19-5304 and has suffered compensable "economic loss" in the 
amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00) as a result of the defendant's criminal 
conduct. 
The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the Defendant pay to the victim the aforesaid 
amount of economic loss as restitution in the above-captioned action to be paid on a 
schedule to be determined by the Defendant's probation officer and to be paid in full at 
least sixty (60) days prior to the Defendant's release from probation. The Defendant 
shall make payments to the Blaine County Clerk of the Court, 201 Second Ave. South, 
Suite 110, Hailey, Idaho 83333. 
The Clerk of the Court shall thereafter remit restitution payments made by the 
Defendant to: 
Forensic Services 
Lab No. P20 110980 
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
ORDER ON RESTITUTION - Page 1 
$100.00 
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It is further ordered that this order shall be a civil judgment against the above-
named defendant and in favor of the aforesaid victim. 
SO ORDERED this ~ day of May, 2012. 
District~ 
ORDER ON RESTITUTION - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~;r day of May, 2012, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jim J. Thomas 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Ave. South, Ste. 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Kevin Wayt 
Blaine County Felony Probation 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Forensic Services 
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125 
Meridian, ID 93642-6202 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 3 Hand Delivered 
__ Telecopy 
--.::L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Telecopy 
---.r U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ Hand Delivered 
__ Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Telecopy 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER ON RESTITUTION - Page 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
Case No. ~ Q..-)-o 11 r? ~ 8'& Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) ADDENDUM TO PROBA nON 
CONDITION RE: IGNITION  l ~~~~----------~ INTERLOCK DEVIC FILED ~,,::zXr:t; 
DOB:  ) 
DL No.  C.A ) MAY 3 0 2012 
______________ ~D=e=re~n=d=an~t~. ________ ) 
.k>£.ym Drage, Clerk District 
Court BlaIne Coon ,ld8ho 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant shall abide by all of 
the special conditions of the Guardian Interlock Responsible Driver Program, as follows: 
1. The Defendant will have in interlock system installed in any vehicle they 
operate by ::S-"-A-\'-1. e , ;-013 and will contact an agent to arrange for 
installation. 
\: 
2. The Defendant will only operate a vehicle with a functioning interlock 
system installed, and will operate no other vehicle during the term of this order unless 
specificallv excused by the court by vvritten order. 
3. The Defendant will not adjust, tamper with, alter, or circumvent the 
interlock system installed or the electrical wiring to the unit, of the unit, or to the ignition 
system, nor remove the unit from the designated vehicle without prior written approval of 
this court. 
4. The Defendant will have monitoring checks performed by the installer 
approximately every sixty (60) days and is subject to random monitor checks. 
5. The Defendant agrees to abide by the policies and procedures of the Idaho 
Ignition Interlock program. 
6. The program shall begin immediately upon installation of the interlock 
device and will terminate ro~ ? ~ f ' AJi5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the cost of this program is to be paid for: 
~ Entirely by the defendant. 
Entirely by the County Fund established for this purpose. The 
county fund is to be reimbursed by the defendant by _______ _ 
ADDENDUM TO PROBATIOJ\ CONDITlOJ\ RE. IGNITIO}"; IKTERLOCK DEVICE - 1 
--- - 13 O· 
Shared equally by the defendant and the county fund. The 
Defendant shall pay his one-half of the service directly to the 
installer on a monthly basis. The county fund is to be reimbursed 
by the defendant by , __ . 
I DO HEREBY ACKNUWLEDGE THAT I RA. VE READ ALL OF THE 
ABOVE TERMS AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THEM. 
(Defendant's Signature) 
IT IS ORDERED thii3 __ day of ~ 
(Judge's 'Signature) 
Robert J. Elgee, District Judge 
R. Ted Israel, Magistrate 
TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT FOR INSTALLATION OF THE 
INTERLOCK DEVICE, PLEASE VISIT THE FOLLOWING WEBSITE FOR A 
LIST OF PROVIDERS: 
http://\\rwvr.itd.idaho.gov/ohs/InstallationSites.htm 
Copies delivered to: 
~ 
c..,....-/' 
C 
~ 
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney 
Prosecutor 
Department of Transportation 
Probation Department 
Dated this 2l\ day of 
Deputy Clerk 
Misdemeanor Felony ~ 
Blaine County misdemeanor probation office: (208) 788-5528 
Felony Probation & Par~ffice: (208) 736-3080 
Probation supervised { unsupervised __ _ 
ADDENDUM TO PROBATION CONDITION RE IGNITIO}': TNTERLOCh DEV1CE -:2 
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.- nlrl 
t\llJi 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Haiiey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fa~ (208)788-5554 
I 1\ I 
\ I 1 \ ! 
\l t"\ L 
Jolynn Drage, C r istrict 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2011-2386 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNT THREE 
Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3504 and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 48(c) for its order dismissing Count Three of the above-captioned 
criminal action. 
The reasons for the dismissal are: (a) pursuant to a plea agreement between the 
parties; and (b) dismissal would serve the ends of justice and the effective 
administration of the Court's business. 
DATED this ). t.\ day of May, 2012, 
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,:36 ~ay of May, 2012, ! caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Dan Dolan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
~ecretary 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE - Page 2 
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i FILED ~.~:~~ 
I MAY 3 0 2012 I 
.... ,... "'- """ £>sfrlcl I 
_.POUrt 8J8Ine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2011-2386 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DISMISS COUNT THREE 
The Court, having considered the motion to dismiss, and good cause appearing 
therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that Count Three of the above-captioned criminal action be 
dismissed. ~ A. 
DATED this oLU day of May, 2012. 
Robert Elf!! 6 * 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE- Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,00 day of May, 2012, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
,Es. 
Law tJw DC)Lf\'N 
33 
_/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
/ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE- Page 2 
-135 
DANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fr LED ~ .. ij .. e:2 11'11 
JUL 02 2012 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun ,Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Juan L. Juarez" 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: The above named Respondent, STATE OF IDAHO 
and their Attorneys, Jim J. Thomas, Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney, 
201 2nd Avenue S. Suite 100 and Lawrence G. Wasden, State ofIdaho 
office of the Attorney General,700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210, P.O. 
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
and the Clerk of the above Entitled Court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant Juan L. Juarez appeals against the above named respondent 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from The Judgement of Conviction entered in the above entitled 
action on May 22, 2012, The Honorable Judge Robert J. Elgee presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 20112386 Page 1 
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.... 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the Judgement of 
Conviction described in paragraph 1. is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule (LA.R). 11 (c.)(1), and (LA.R). 11 (c.)(6). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeaL which the appellant then intends to assert 
in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, is: 
(a) Did the district court err in finding that the Nevada DUI law was a substantially 
conforming criminal violation, as the basis of a prior conviction to enhance the DUJ charge to a 
felony were Nevada is not concerned with the alcohol level at the time of driving, but looks to 
the alcohol level at the time of the test. 
(b) Did the district court err in finding that the Nevada DUI law was a substantially 
conforming criminal violation, as the basis of a prior conviction to enhance the DUI charge to a 
felony were Nevada does not allow for a jury trial for a first offense DUI charge 
(c) Did the district court err in finding that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish 
defendant's identity as the perpetrator who had previously been convicted of a DUI in Nevada 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(d) Did the district court err in finding that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish 
defendant's identity as the perpetrator who had previously been convicted of a DUI in California 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record that is sealed is 
the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386 Page 2 
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5. Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript as defined in LA.R. 25(c). The appellant also requests the preparation of 
the additional portions of the reporter's transcript: 
(a) Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing to the DUI portion of the charge held on December 19, 2011 
(Court Reporter: Susan Israel, estimation of pages listed on the Register of Actions less than 100 
pages); 
(b) States Motion in Limine Hearing held on January 10,2012 (Court Reporter: Susan 
Israel, estimation of pages listed on the Register of Actions less than 100 pages); 
(c) Court Trial held March 9, 2012, (Court Reporter: Susan Israel, estimation of pages listed 
on the Register of Actions one half day of trial more than 100 pages); 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 
28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, in 
addition to those automatically included under LA.R. 28(b)(2): 
(a) Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact statements, addendums 
to the PSI or other items offered at sentencing hearing or the Rule 35 motion hearing. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporter, 
Susan Israel, 201 2nd Avenue S., P.O. Box 1379, Hailey Idaho 83333; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of 
the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, 
LA.R. 24( e»; 
( c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal case (1. C. 
§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 23(a)(8»; 
NOTICE OF i\.PPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386 Page 3 
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.... 
(d) That arrangements have been made with Blaine County who will be responsible 
for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent, Idaho Code §§ 31-
3220, 31-3220A, l.A.R. 24(e); 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
LA.R 20,,,1/ ~ 
DATED THIs4Lday of §,2012 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386 
-----------.~~.~ .... 
Daniel M. Dolan 
Attorney for Appellant. 
Page 4 
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DMTIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
Attorney for Defendant 
FILED ~~:Z"jC 
JUL 02 2012 
JoLYnn Drag C'I Court 81' e, lerk Dls/rict 
lame Coun . Idaho 
(" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Juan L. Juarez, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
Ex Parte Motion To: 
Appoint Counsel on Appeal; 
Waive Fees and Costs of Appeal: 
Prepare the Transcript and Clerk's 
Record at Public Expense 
CO MES NO W Juan L. Juarez, the Appellant herein, by and through his court appointed 
attorney of record, Daniel M. Dolan, and pursuant to Rules 24(e) and 27(e) and 45.1 of the LA.R. 
hereby request that: 
A. This Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-867, for its order appointing the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office to represent the appellant in all further appellate proceedings and allowing 
current counsel for the defendant to withdraw as counsel of record. This motion is brought on the 
grounds and for the reasons that the appellant is currently represented by Blaine County Public 
Defender, Daniel M. Dolan; the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by Idaho Code § 19-
870 to represent the defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; the defendant has been found 
indigent; and it is in the interest of justice for them to do so in this case. 
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for the purposes of the appeal 
only. 
B. The cost to prepare the transcript and clerks record be prepared at public expense. 
C. That any and all fees and cost of this appeal be waived. 
Motion 10 Appoint Counsel Page 1 
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This motion is based upon the following grounds. 
1. The appellant is an indigent person without funds to retain private counsel. 
2. The Appellant was represented by court appointed counsel in the trial court. 
3. The appellant is an indigent person without funds to pay for the costs of the 
preparation of the transcript and clerk's record herein. 
4. The appellant brings this action in good faith 
5. Appellant has attached his affidavit of indigence in support of this motion. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully request this court to appoint at attorney to 
represent him on appeal, and to waive the cost and fees of this appeal and to have the clerks record 
and transcript prepared at public expense, 
DATED THIS 2nd day of Julv, 2012 
Attorney for Appellant. 
Motion to Appoint Counsel Page 2 
-141-
DANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
Attorney for Defendant 
I FILED ~:., !Ql( 
I JUL D 2 2012 
JoLynn Drage, C:Drk District 
Court Blaine ~'\' Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Juan L. Juarez, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
MOTION TO PROCEED 
IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
AND SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant-Appellant, Juan L. Juarez, by and through his attorney 
of record, in the above-entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court for an order of the Court 
to proceed in forma pauperis on the grounds he indigent pursuant to Idaho Code §31-3220A. 
Said Motion is supp0¥d\by the following Affidavit ofInability to Pay Court Fees. 
DATEDthislJdaY~OJb. _ 
Daniel M. Dolan 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
-142' 
AFFIDA VIT OF INABILITY TO PAY 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of Blaine, ) 
Juan L. Juarez, declares under penalty of perjury, that I am the Petitioner in the above 
entitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without being required to prepay 
fees, cost or give security therefor, 1 state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the 
costs of said proceeding or give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief. 
The nature of my action is: an appeal from the Judgement of Conviction. 
In further support of this application, I answer the following questions: 
1. I am presently employed. ~ 0 No a:) 
a. lfthe answer is "Yes" my wages per month are approximately ~ ~"\...... 
(A;X~ 
b. If the answer is "No" list last date of employment and salary: 
$_--
2. I have received money from the following,sources within the last 12 months: 
0 business, profession or other self employment No 
0 rent payments. interest or dividends $ r-'CJ 
0 pensions, annuities or life insurance payments $ /lJd 
0 gifts or inheritances $ tIc) 
0 other sources $ !18 , 
AFFIDA VIT OF INDIGENCE 
L--___________ ~ ____ ~ _____ ~_~ __ -143 
3. The real and personal property I own is: no real property, miscellaneous personal 
property such as clothing , --,-~ ___/-,/J.C-f' /_" _---i-I __ ~ / __ ...;;;::,,-/-,,~_, '_/-,1-/,;'_/ _~_.F_.~ __ --.:;:;..::.._. __ _ 
4. I have a savings account: 
5. I have a checking account: 
0 Yes 
0 Yes 
~ $-
~$ 
---
6. Balance in inmate trust account approximately ~ 
7. Spouse's income $ none 
8. Affiant's dependents: liley-I£ 
9. Affiant's debt!_~6>-' "'-"'". ~_-r::;--"e;,---A_I:f)_'---,--=uL,~_h-=-o-o-,-,J_",-",-d---,i'F--_T6_~_ 
tuJ; &in62SC; LCA::AAT r':::;,/lJr:;~ A¢?"O.& tZoCJ /V) 1 'Iv C~ 
I 72c/:JO LO 
7 
10. Affiant's monthly expenses: rent $480.00, utilities &175.00, 
h9 '7 i 1:0" "" ~cJ 
AFFIDA VII OF n~DIGENCE 
-144 
Further, your Affiant states that I am unable to pay the costs of pursuing this action. I 
verifY that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. 
DATED this Lay of ~ V 
7 
,20IL. 
AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCE 
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D.ANIEL M. DOLAN 
Attorney At Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 757 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-3005 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Idaho State Bar Number 4147 
Attorney for Defendant 
FILED r1aJloI"P.M...i ~ 
[ JUL 1 0 2012 I 
Jolynn Dtage, Cleric District 
Court BllJlne Counly. Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Juan L. Juarez, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2011 2386 
ORDER: 
APPOINTING ATTORNEY; 
W AlVING ALL FEES; 
FOR PREPARATION OFTRANSCRlPT 
AND CLERK'S RECORD 
AT PUBLIC EXPENSE 
THIS MATTER having come before this court upon the motion of the appellant, 
Juan L. Juarez, and being supported by appellant's affidavit; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. For the purpose of this appeal, Juan L. Juarez, Appellant is found to be indigent. 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Daniel M. Dolan, is withdrawn as counsel of 
record for the Defendant and the State Appellate Public Defender is hereby appointed to 
represent the Appellant, Juan L. Juarez, in the above entitled matters for appellate 
purposes. 
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for purposes of the appeal only. 
Order Appointing Attorney Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386 Page 1 
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3. All fees and cost of this appeal shall be waived. 
4. The preparation of the transcript of proceedings and clerk's record is order to be 
prepared at county expense. 
DATED TIllS ~ day Of~' 2012 
ROb:m:e~ 
District Judge 
Order Appointing Attorney Juan 1. Juarez CR 2011 2386 Page 2 
1_ -147' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (() Day of 'JUly , 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method hldicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208 788-5554 
Daniel M. Dolan 
P.O. Box 757 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
208726-1187 
Susan Israel Blaine County Court Reporter 
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
State of Idaho Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720-0010 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 N Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
208-334-2985 
Deputy Clerk 
Order Appointing Attorney Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386 
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Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
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Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
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Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
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Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
Confidential Exhibit: 
Presentence Report dated May 16, 2012. 
Exhibits from Preliminary Hearing held September 14, 2011. 
State's Exh 1. Toxicology Report dated July 20, 2011. 
State's Exh 2. Certified Copies of DUI Conviction from State of Nevada. 
State's Exh 3. Certified Copies of Excessive DUI Conviction from State of 
California. 
Exhibit from Court Trial held January 10, 2012 and March 9, 2012. 
State's Exh 1. Certified Copies of DUI Conviction from State of Nevada. 
State's Exh 2. Certified Copies of Excessive DUI Conviction from State of 
California. 
State's Exh 3. Nevada law. 
State's Exh 4. Nevada law. 
State's Exh 5. California law. 
State's Exh 6. ICOP video of stop. 
State's Exh 7. Blaine County Sheriff's Office Booking Report dated June 19, 
2011. 
Dated this ~ day of September, 2012. 
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk 
Exhibit List - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
Supreme Court No. 40135 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are 
automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those 
requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's 
Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHERE~F, I have h~eunto srt my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this \ day of :::ep)1v1~v ,2012. 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
By ~ 
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plai ntiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JUAN L. JUAREZ, 
Defendant! Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 40135 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
--------------------------) 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and 
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Idaho State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Attorney for Defendant!Appeliant 
Attorney General's Office 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this \ \ day of :i:efleM b<v ,2012. 
JOL YNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
By __ .......... ~"----'--__ _ 
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk 
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